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ABSTRACT 
Why do global governance organizations enter some economic sectors but not 
others? A simple model of material incentives suggests that similar organizations should 
make similar choices. Yet in the empirical realm of jewelry industry governance, similar 
organizations diverge in their response to artisanal and small-scale gold mining: 
certification organizations Fairtrade International and the Alliance for Responsible 
Mining have entered the sector, while the Rainforest Alliance has stayed out. To explain 
this puzzle and its implications for human development, the project proceeds in two 
steps.  
First, it enriches the simple model by taking a discursive institutional approach 
that traces the process by which norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures, and network 
effects shape the sector entry decisions of organizations. Drawing on interview, 
document, and hyperlink data, the project argues that the interaction of norm 
entrepreneurs and organizational culture, more than network effects, explains sector entry 
decisions in the gold governance case. 
  vii 
Second, the project uses the details of the certification standards to conduct a 
decision analysis that estimates their impact on human development. The analysis finds 
that certification organizations are likely to increase a miner’s income by 41%-79% over 
the status quo, which may lift some, though not all, miners out of poverty. It further finds 
that degree of environmental protection as well as which organization is best at providing 
it depends on the gold price and the governance context. At prices below $26,666, the 
Alliance is best and competition creates better or equal outcomes than monopolies. At 
prices above $26,666, however, Fairtrade is best, and competition creates perverse 
incentives for pollution reduction. This surprising finding suggests that in the realm of 
global governance, there can be too much of a good thing.  
 The project argues that governance without governments can foster human 
development, but that better outcomes are possible in the gold mining case. It concludes 
by recommending that certification organizations do three things to maximize their 
positive impacts: 1) prevent de-certification, 2) cooperate rather than compete, and 3) aim 
to be irrelevant, because mining should be a transitory, not permanent, developing 
country livelihood.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 1: Governance Patterns and Human Development 
Within each sector of the global economy, there are rules and organizations working 
transnationally to make production and consumption help rather than harm human 
development. Defined by Sen (1999) as peoples’ growing capacity to live free and 
healthy lives, human development is impacted by global governance patterns because 
their details (e.g. the number, type, and focus of actors and the governance strategies they 
use) shape governance effects (Young 1999, 2010; Carpenter 2014). This project 
explores why global governance patterns have particular characteristics and differ across 
economic sectors in order to learn how to adjust them to maximize human development.  
Over the last two decades, three trends in global governance patterns have 
become clear: 1) an increasing number of actors govern sectors, 2) an increasing 
proportion of these are private or civil society actors, and 3) an increasing proportion of 
private and civil society actors choosing the governance strategy of writing codes of 
conduct for the sectors they aim to change (Young 2002, 2010; Vogel 2006; Avant, 
Finnemore, Sell 2010; Buthe and Mattli 2011; Green 2013; Auld 2014). Analyzing the 
drivers and impacts of these trends is one focus of the global governance literatures on 
institutionalism, transnational advocacy, and private regulation. 
 Institutionalists focusing on the causes and effects of the rising numbers of rules 
governing a sector call this rising institutional “density” (Abbott et al. 2012; Young 2002, 
p.8)) or “complexity” (Alter and Meunier 2009). This is one of several types of 
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“institutional change” that shapes governance patterns (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). A 
portion of advocacy scholars focus on explaining the agendas of these proliferating 
actors, which likewise shape patterns (Price 1998, 2003; Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007, 
2011, 2014; Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998). And a portion of 
private regulatory scholars focus on civil society organizations that govern global value 
chains by creating sets of voluntary rules. These scholars contribute to what is called the 
certification organization literature.  
Voluntary codes of conduct launched by civil society actors may be useful for 
governing sectors experiencing market failures that governments are unable or unwilling 
to fix. Civil society organizations that place labels on products made according to their 
codes of conduct are called “certification organizations.” One motivation behind this 
governance strategy is the need to correct the information asymmetries between 
consumers and producers about the conditions under which the product was made and its 
ramification for human development. A second is to correct the externalities (e.g. 
pollution) that status quo practices in the sector create.1 The certification organization 
literature studies the rise, evolution, and effects of these organizations (Cashore et al. 
2004; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Raynolds et al. 2007; Bacon 2008; Auld 2014). 
 
Section 2: A Gap in the Certification Organization Literature  
My project contributes to the literatures on institutionalism, transnational 
advocacy, and private regulation by filling a gap the certification literature. Auld (2014) 
                                                
1 Other types of organizations are related to the type defined above but different in important ways. One 
type is an organization that has state representatives as its members as opposed to civil society actors, and 
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summarizes how certification organizations have shaped governance patterns for the 
coffee, timber, and fisheries sectors. In particular, he explains why certain internal 
attributes of the first certification organization to enter a sector determines the ultimate 
number of certification organizations that govern that sector. Auld does not, however, 
explain why these organizations entered that particular sector (e.g. coffee) as opposed to 
other sectors (e.g. timber, fish, cocoa, or diamonds). This open question—what factors 
shape certification organizations’ sector entry decisions—is the gap in the certification 
literature that this project helps to fill. Because sector entry is one form of civil society 
agenda setting and contributes new rules to the governance patterns in a sector, filling 
this gap will provide insights for scholars of institutionalism, transnational advocacy, and 
private regulation.  
 
Section 3: The Empirical Puzzle and Research Question 
 
One approach to explaining sector entry decisions might focus on supply and 
demand: if political conditions emerge that increase demand for governance in a sector, 
organizations will decide to enter it until a point of governance saturation. This approach 
has been successfully applied in both the private regulation and transnational advocacy 
literatures (Lecraw 1984; Mattli 1999; Spruyt 2001; Cooley and Ron 2002; Tarrow 2005; 
Buthe 2010; Bloomfield 2014; Carpenter et al. 2014), and in the social movement 
literature, these conditions are called “political opportunity structures” (Tilly 1978; 
Tarrow 2005). If applied to certification organization decisions, it would suggest that if 
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demand for labeled products exists, organizations will enter the sector to supply them 
until a point of overcrowding.  
While this approach may help explain the number of certification organizations in 
a sector, it is silent with regard to explaining their identities and motivations. If anything, 
it might suggest that among organizations with similar missions, the ones that enter are 
those with more resources. However, such conclusions are important and should not be 
left to assumption—they should be empirically explored. Understanding identities and 
motivations  is important because they shape governance patterns and therefore human 
development effects.  
This need for further illumination is demonstrated by the empirical puzzle of 
certification organization response to the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector 
(ASGM). This sector produces up to 30% of the world’s gold supply and is comprised of 
15-30 million people in mostly developing countries who mine with rudimentary 
techniques to earn subsistence livelihoods (Hilson and McQuilken 2014). ASGM has 
been receiving increased international attention over the last decade due to its association 
with economic exploitation, child labor, conflict, and environmental degradation (Sippl 
2015).  In 2013, ASGM was recognized as the leading source of global mercury pollution 
(UNEP 2013), and in 2014, the United Nations launched a multilateral treaty to mitigate 
mercury’s harm (and therefore the sector’s) (UNEP 2014). Given the low governance 
capacity of these mostly developing country parties to this treaty, theses political 
conditions seem like a case of increased demand for ASGM governance by private or 
civil society actors because they could help offset the capacity deficiencies of states.  
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A puzzle emerges through the following circumstance: of the many certification 
organizations well-positioned to supply governance,2 only two have done so, and it is not 
the two that the supply and demand approach might predict. The Alliance for Responsible 
Mining and Fairtrade International entered the sector formally in 2011, but other 
organizations even more well-suited to enter it (i.e. organizations with nearly identical 
missions and much larger budgets) have decided not to do so. One such organization that 
epitomizes this puzzle is the Rainforest Alliance (RA)—there is no obvious reason why 
this organization did not enter the ASGM sector before FLO, nor why it has stayed out 
since.  
Therefore, this project answers the following question: What factors shaped the 
varying sector entry decisions of certification organizations with regard to ASGM, and 
what are the potential impacts of these decisions for human development? 
 
Section 4. Approach to Answering the Research Question 
To answer this question, the project takes one approach for the study of sector entry 
decisions, and a different approach for the study of their effects on human development. 
In order to understand the reasoning behind certification organization sector entry 
decisions, the project needs to explore how organizations encounter and react to new 
ideas. This question has been studied in the transnational advocacy literature on agenda 
setting (Finnemore 1996a; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Carpenter 2014) and the institutional 
literature on the “new institutionalisms” (Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2008, 2010, 
                                                
2 ASGM fairly is similar to the small-scale livelihoods governed by many certification organizations in 
terms of the causes and solutions to the sector’s human development issues.  
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2011; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Both suggest an analytic framework that focuses on 
norm entrepreneurs (Young 1991; Sunstein 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2009); organizational cultures (Schein 2010; Powell and DiMaggio 
2012; Carpenter 2014); and network gatekeeper effects (Bob 2005; Ward et al. 2011; 
Carpenter 2014) might be helpful, since they are the communicative agents and structures 
which shape how new ideas are perceived and valued (Wendt 1992; Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Schmidt 2008, 2010, 2011). Norm entrepreneurs are individuals or organizations 
that advocate for a change to the status quo to become a routine, expected practice. 
Organizational culture is the set of rules, values, and practices that shape an 
organization’s evolution. And a network gatekeeper is the network member considered 
by other network members to be the network’s most respected, and thus powerful, actor. 
Carpenter (2014) argues that network gatekeepers set the advocacy agenda for the entire 
network (i.e. all of its followers).   
 To understand whether and how these three factors shaped certification 
organization sector entry decisions with regard to ASGM, the project selects important 
certification organization cases, collects empirical data from them on the three factors, 
and uses “discursive institutionalism” to analyze the data (Schmidt 2008).  To select 
cases, the project follows the procedures suggested by Mahoney (2004), namely 
identifying “positive” cases in which the outcome of interest (ASGM sector entry) is 
present, and “negative cases” in which the outcome is probable but doesn’t occur. The 
project uses the aforementioned cases of Fairtrade International (FLO) for the positive 
case and the Rainforest Alliance (RA) for the negative one. To collect data on the three 
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framework factors, the project draws on interviews the author conducted with 
organization representatives 2014-2015, analysis of the organizations’ websites, and 
review of organizational documents such as annual reviews, strategy papers, and their 
certification standards. To interpret this data, the project uses the discourse analysis 
techniques suggested by Wodak and Meyer (2015) and the process-tracing methods 
suggested by Bennett and Checkel (2014). Used together, these methods show not only 
whether the framework factors were present in a certain case, but why and how they 
exerted causal influence.  
 To answer the second part of my research question on the human development 
impacts of certification organization decisions, the project adopts a different approach 
that is better suited to the available data. It compares the contents of the two certification 
organization standards for ASGM, i.e. the rules that Fairtrade International and the 
Alliance for Responsible Mining wrote to change production and consumption  behavior 
in the sector. Based on this data, it creates an estimate of likely program uptake patterns 
in the sector, drawing on the literature on competition between civil society governors to 
assess how increasing the dynamics between ARM and FLO may impact governance 
outcomes (Cooley and Ron 2002; Auld 2014; Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013). 
 
Section 5: Preview of the Findings 
The project organizes the analysis around two hypotheses, one for each part of the 
research question:  
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Hypothesis 1: Norm entrepreneurs, organizational culture and network gatekeeper 
effects all played critical roles in shaping sector entry decisions. 
Hypothesis 2: Certification organizations improve human development, and the 
more of them the better.  
 
In summary, the project finds mixed support for the hypotheses. The interaction of norm 
entrepreneurs and organizational cultures are jointly sufficient to explain sector entry 
decisions. The network gatekeeper effect, by contrast, played little to no role in them. 
Further, certification organizations are likely to improve human development: both 
poverty and environment protection are likely to improve at least somewhat with uptake. 
However, the effects of competition are sensitive to the gold price. Specifically, 
competition seems to be better for environmental protection when gold prices are lower, 
and may lead to suboptimal outcomes when gold prices are higher.  
 
Section 6: Preview of Contributions 
These findings make five contributions to research on global governance. A first 
contribution is to institutional theory: only the application of all four “new 
institutionalisms” (rational choice, historical, sociological, and discursive ) provides a full 
explanation of certification organization sector entry decisions in the gold mining case. A 
second contribution to theory is the project’s identification of new norm entrepreneur and 
organizational cultural attributes that shape sector entry decisions. Four aspects of 
organizational culture (growth cycle position, barriers to entry, risk, and existing sector 
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array), organizations’ perceptions of the importance of five sector attributes (a sector’s 
potluck nature, luxury nature, expiration speed, supply chain complexity, and proof of 
concept status) and the norm entrepreneur’s ability to operate as a service provider are 
considerations missing from the advocacy literature, but that this project’s research reveal 
as central to decision-making. A third contribution to theory is placing scope conditions 
on the empirical realms for which network gatekeeping hypotheses apply. A fourth is 
contributing to debates about whether private regulation constitutes meaningful 
governance is just “green-washing,” and whether competition versus collaboration is a 
boon for human development. The project recommends that certification organizations do 
three things to improve governance outcomes: 1) prevent reverse uptake (i.e. de-
certification), 2) cooperate rather than compete, and 3) aim to be irrelevant because 
ASGM should be a transitory, not permanent, livelihood.  
These theoretical contributions are generated via the empirical contribution of two 
sets of detailed case studies in an understudied but important sector for human 
development: ASGM. While the literature on certification is rich, it does not capture 
significant changes in the major organizations during the timeframe 2009-2015, which 
this project captures, and it does not address their engagement in the mineral sector, 
which not only constitutes an analytical puzzle but is an important production-
consumption system its own right. The insights generated from these contributions are of 
interest to scholars as well as human development practitioners, who need efficient and 
effective methods for generating change by freeing the “citizen trapped in the consumer’s 
body” (Auld 2014). 
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Section 7: Overview of the Project 
The justifications for and implications of the research this project offers unfold over the 
course of the next six chapters, summarized below.  
 
Chapter 2: Approaches to Studying Governance Patterns. This chapter reviews the 
institutionalism, transnational advocacy and private regulatory literatures as they relate to 
sector entry decisions and human development. It presents an in-depth explanation of 
why studying norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures, and network gatekeeper 
effects might provide insights into certification organization decisions on ASGM sector 
entry, and presents the two hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 3: Gold Industry Overview. This chapter elucidates the connections between 
gold mining, the jewelry industry, and human development in mining communities. It 
provides an analysis of the value chain for a typical gold wedding ring, noting its 
connection to poverty, pollution, conflict, and other issues.  
 
Chapters 4 and Chapter 5: Why (not) Govern Gold? The Case(s) of Fairtrade 
International and the Rainforest Alliance. These chapters empirically test Hypothesis 
1 by drawing on interview, website and document data to trace the process by which 
norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures and network gatekeeper effects played in 
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shaping sector entry decisions. Chapter 4 presents the case of Fairtrade International and 
Chapter 5 presents the case of the Rainforest Alliance.  
 
Chapter 6: The Potential Human Development Impacts of Certification 
Organization Governance of ASGM. This chapter provides an estimate of the human 
development impacts that might follow from the certification standards launched by 
Fairtrade International and the Alliance for Responsible Mining to govern ASGM. The 
chapter begins with a comparison of the relative stringency of the standards on the issues 
of conflict, labor, environment and development. It then uses decision analysis from the 
perspective of the miner to estimate likely uptake patterns and their associated impacts on 
poverty and pollution specifically.  The chapter concludes with three recommendations 
the analysis suggests might help optimize human development outcomes.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion. The conclusion summarizes the findings and contributions of 
the project, while highlighting promising paths for future research. It concludes with a 
discussion of how the project informs two key global governance debates: what type of 
governance is best, and whether more governance is always better. It suggests that while 
all types of governance have potential and that the best governor is the one with the 
strongest capacity and willingness to cooperate, there can, under certain circumstances, 
be too much of a good thing. These insights on the drivers of governance patterns and 
how to optimize governance effects are useful to human development practitioners, who 
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need efficient and effective methods for advocating change and freeing the “citizen 
trapped in the consumer’s body” (Auld 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1: Sector Entry Decisions of FLO and RA as of February, 2016 
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CHAPTER 2: APPROACHES TO STUDYING GOVERNANCE PATTERNS 
Section 1: Overview 
 As the introductory chapter stated, the units of analysis in this project are 
transnational certification organizations, and the dependent variables are their sector 
entry decisions on artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM), and the potential 
effects of their standards for ASGM on human development. This chapter begins by 
charting the rise of private regulation as a prominent feature of global governance 
patterns with special attention to the role played by certification organizations. It 
continues by exploring the approaches to explaining certification organization sector 
entry decisions suggested by the literatures on institutionalism and transnational 
advocacy. Through this review, the project’s framework factors and hypotheses are 
introduced and justified. The chapter concludes by discussing the stakes of understanding 
sector entry decisions, and how increased knowledge about them can contribute to two 
important global governance debates: : 1) What type of global governor is best for human 
development (Are public or private actors more preferable?), and 2) What number of 
global governors is best for human development (Are more global governors always 
better?).  
Section 2: Rise of Private Authority 
2.1 Governance Patterns and Institutions 
 International relations has historically taken the state as its unit of analysis, but 
over the course of several decades, a steady shift in focus from governments to 
governance has taken place (Rosenau 1995, 1997). Research on “global governance” 
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analyzes “the different policymaking activities that produce coordinated action in the 
absence of world government” (Avant et al 2010). To gain analytical traction on the vast 
terrain of actors and activities the term encompasses, the first move many scholars make 
is to describe global governance in constellational terms. Phrases used in the literature to 
describe the specific mixes of actors, rules, and practices that emerge to address global 
problems that are beyond the power of one state to solve include “governance patterns” 
(Drezner 2009; Auld 2014), “policy mixes” (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998), “activity 
clusters” (Hoffmann 2011), “institutional arrangements” (Young 1991, 2002), 
“institutional architectures” (Biermann et al. 2012) and “regime complexes” (Alter and 
Meunier 2009). I follow Auld in using the term governance patterns  both because my 
project directly builds from his and because it is broad enough to allow study of both 
agents and structures. Again following Auld, and also because nearly every global 
environment, social, and development problem can be traced to production-consumption 
systems (Conca et al 2002; Dauvergne 2008; Donnelly 2013), I conceptualize governance 
patterns in reference to particular economic sectors, defined here loosely and generically 
as collectives of economic activity that transform raw material into finished products. A 
sector can be as narrow as coffee (Auld’s usage) or as wide as agriculture (others’ usage), 
and includes all types of actors in the value chain, from producers to traders to 
manufacturers to retailers. In a refinement of Auld’s (2014) rather narrow and loose 
definition of them as “regulatory mixes,” I further conceptualize governance patterns 
broadly and concretely according to five attributes: 1) the number of governors, 2) the 
mix of authority sources, 3) the methods of governance, 4) the policy scopes and domains 
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(i.e. the targeted issues and actors), and 5) the nature of the relationships between 
governors (i.e. competitive versus  cooperative). In other words, governance patterns 
within a sector are populated by specific sets of actors, rules, and practices, and these sets 
vary across economic sectors according to the empirical values found on these five 
attributes.   
 The concept of governance patterns is similar but different to that of regimes. 
Regimes are the “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area of 
international relations” (Krasner 1983). Regime analysis dominated the IR literature in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Young 1991), and can today be considered a subset of the global 
governance literature that holds the issue area constant and focuses on state-based 
international structures and processes (Haufler 2000, Alter and Meunier 2009). Rosenau’s 
launching of the broader governance approach in the 1990s aimed to balance the 
analytical field by drawing equal attention to agents, and particularly those deriving 
authority from sources other than the state.  
 While the “complex interdependence” scholars of the 1970s (Keohane and Nye 
1977) and the de-regulation, delegation, and business-government relations research of 
the neoliberal 1980s acknowledged the increasing politicization of economic actors due 
to globalization and the perception of government-failures or vulnerabilities (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Wilson 1981, 2003; Verkuil 2007), the shift in the 1990s towards 
“private governance” widened the analytical gaze to include the problem solving 
activities of both business and civil society actors. Wapner (1995), Lipschutz (2003) and 
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Keck and Sikkink (1998) focus on the ability of non-governmental organizations to 
advocate and create change on behalf of powerless populations aggrieved by government 
or business activities. Cutler, Haufler, Porter (1999) review the multiple ways that 
businesses coordinate and evolve their activities with no or only peripheral government 
involvement. Ostrom (1994) focused on how individuals formed cooperatives to 
collectively govern common pool resources. Mathews (1997) went so far as to argue that 
a global “power shift” was occurring, signaling a return to the plurality of actors 
commanding authority that existed prior to rise of the sovereign state system in 1648.  
 The idea of “authority” is understood by Weber (1978) and most recently Green 
(2014) as the normative belief by the target of a governance rule that the rule “ought” to 
be obeyed. In other words, authority is achieved when the consent of those governed is 
granted. This can happen in the case of implicit or explicit coercion by a sovereign state 
(public authority), or it can happen in the case of business or civil society actors who 
elicit deferment by way of their expertise, moral principles, or capacity to achieve results 
(see Hall and Biersteker 2002; and Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010 for typologies of 
authority sources). The number of actors claiming such “private authority” has 
skyrocketed since the 1990s (Avant et al 2010; Hoffmann 2011; Green 2014) and this is 
due primarily, Avant et al (2010) argue, to “globalization, the privatization/deregulation 
revolution, new technologies, and the end of the Cold War.”  
 Globalization is “the shift in the spatial reach of social action and organization 
toward the interregional, intercontinental, or global scale that undermines the 
correspondence between social action and the territory enclosed by state borders” (Held 
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and McGrew 2000, 3).” Not just about the trade in goods, globalization is also about 
trade in ideas. Ideas have been noted as causal factors in a variety of important global 
outcomes, such as the use of human rights as a legitimating reason for sanctions against 
apartheid South Africa (Crawford 2002), the debates between democratic capitalism and 
Soviet statism as drivers of the break-up of the Soviet Union (rather than measures of 
military might) (Wendt 1992, Bennett 1999, Tannenwald 2005), and the non-use of 
nuclear weapons due to the nuclear ‘taboo’ (Price et al 1996). Accordingly, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that derive power from their ability to spread ideas 
(as opposed to their ability at generating material profit) have proliferated. Likewise, the 
near simultaneous privatization movement of Thatcher and Reagan eras encouraged both 
NGOs and firms to emerge or evolve to provide many of the social services (e.g. 
education, health care, security) that were formally provided by the state. In addition to 
raising sheer numbers of firms and NGOs by creating a market for public services, it also 
supported the rise of self-regulation by firms, known as the “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) movement (Vogel 2006), and the rise of advocacy and regulatory 
activities by NGOs to either push firms to tighten their self-regulation or offer alternative 
sets of regulations themselves (Mathews 1997). With the end of the Cold War and the 
rise of advanced communication and transportation technologies, more geographical 
spheres of influence became available to both businesses and NGOs (Avant et al 2010). 
When these organizations offer their regulatory, advocacy, and capacity building abilities 
to the global community, they can be considered “global governors.”  
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 In the last decade, these private global governors are increasingly emerging or 
evolving to employ the regulatory approach to governance, and this project follows other 
scholars in calling the codes of conduct written by firms or NGOs “private regulation” 
(Vogel 2008; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Auld 2014). Because these codes of conduct are 
“rules” aiming to “organize and control economic, political and social activities” (Mattli 
and Wood 2009), their emergence, evolution, and effects can be usefully expressed in the 
language of institutions. Synthesizing a long-established research tradition (Hall and 
Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1983; North 1990), Steinberg (2015) offers the most 
accessible definition of institutions, calling them the social rules that make coordinated 
human activity possible (p.7). These social rules can be either formal as in the case of 
written constitutions and policy documents (conception preferred by North 1990, Streeck 
and Thelen 2005), or they can be informal as in the case of unwritten but practiced norms 
and values (Ostrom 1900; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Schmidt 2008; Scott 2008). In 
both cases, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) note that institutions are “distributional 
instruments laden with power implications” (p.8) since they establish who can participate 
in governance, assign roles to governance participants, privilege some agendas over 
others, and direct  the distribution of resources (Young 2002; Steinmo 2014). In other 
words, they shape the strategic behavior of actors. This project follows Young (2002) in 
taking care to not conflate institutions (rules) with organizations (actors). Organizations, 
Young (2002) writes, are the “material entities with employees, budgets, equipment, and 
(often) legal personalities” that are guided by the rules of the governance ‘games’ in 
which they participate. Private global regulatory organizations, then, are bundles of 
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formal and informal institutions that guide its employees in authoring global regulatory 
institutions to govern various economic sectors.  
 In declaring institutions the “levers that will ultimately decide whether humans 
can reconcile the pursuit of prosperity with thoughtful environmental stewardship” (p.8), 
Steinberg (2015) echoes the sentiments of several Nobel prize winning institutionalists. 
Coase and North won for their work on the former by explaining how institutions 
lowered transactions costs (Coase 1960) and structured societal incentives such that 
capitalism spread throughout the world (North 1990). Ostrom won for her work on the 
latter which showed how the “tragedy” of common pool resource depletion (Hardin 
1968) could be avoided at the local level in the absence of either state or market 
authorities if the right social rules were in place (Ostrom 1990). These two lines of 
research catalyzed the global governance literature on institutions that explains 1) the role 
of institutions in driving current levels of global inequality and environmental 
degradation (Bates 2014; Mahoney 2010b; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) and 2) the 
emergence, evolution, and effects of global governance institutions created to remedy 
these legacies  (Haas et al. 1993; Young 1991, 1999, 2002, 2010; Spruyt 2001; Haufler 
2009, 2010; Krasner 2004; Mattli and Woods 2009; Selin 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 
2012; Auld 2014; Steinberg 2015). This project contributes to both of these strands.    
2.3 The Stakes: Why Study Governance Patterns 
 Answering the research question is important because it determines global 
governance patterns in sector causing an array of harm to human development.  Because 
of these human development implications, researchers are working to understand the 
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implications of two key changes in governance patterns: increasing privatization of 
governance and increasing institutional density.  
2.4: Debate—Is  More Always Better? 
 While Conca and Dabelko (2002) occupies a clear “more is better” stance” by 
arguing that the costs of global conflicts rise by the number of institutions they disrupt, 
most scholars fall on more moderate ends of the spectrum. On the pessimistic side, 
Young (2002) urges caution in assuming that more governance is always better. Writing 
with regard to rising “institutional density,” defined as more institutions operating at the 
same time in the same “space” (e.g. local, regional, global), he notes that institutions 
“should not be expected to perform equally well in all settings for all problems” and that 
“what works well for one may be a dismal failure for another” (P. 20). In other words, the 
institution may not “fit” well with the problem, and the more institutions the emerge to 
solve it, the more “interplay” between them exists. Interplay can hamper coordination, 
notes Young, and can also be bad, Alter and Meunier (2009) write, because it “reduces 
the clarity of legal obligation by introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and 
jurisdictions governing an issue.” Selin (2012) likewise notes density’s ability to hamper 
implementation, and explores the role of “regional centers” in building the capacity of 
actors to manage  increasing institutional overlap and demands.    
 Writing specifically about the rising numbers of private governance organizations 
and institutions, Cooley and Ron (2002) continue this density pessimism, while 
Hoffmann (2011), Hafner-Burton (2008), Humphreys (2006), and Cashore et al. (2004) 
create room for optimism. Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that increasing numbers of 
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NGOS vying for a limited supply of donor contracts creates a “scramble” in which NGOs 
try to cut costs and speed results to the detriment of the achievement of their goals. 
Hafner-Burton (2008) understands the cause for pessimism, but notes that in the case of 
using trade conditionality to enforce human rights, that “regime complexity can make 
enforcement of rules that are impossible to implement in one area possible to implement 
in another.” Hoffmann (2011) likewise falls on the more optimistic end of the spectrum, 
seeing the proliferation of private institutional “experiments” for governing climate 
change as a needed balance to the missing or private-governance-dependent multilateral 
treaties in the issue area. Cashore et al. (2004) and Humphreys (2006) echo Hoffmann’s 
sentiment in their studies of the forestry sector.  
 Grounding the debate in the realm of certification organizations, Auld (2014b) 
contributes by noting the “specialization-comprehensiveness tradeoff” that these 
governors face, which have clear implications for institutional density. If each 
organization specialized in governing one economic sector, institutional density would be 
lower than if every organization became comprehensive, expanding to govern a wide 
array of sectors and issues. An organization’s choice to specialize or be comprehensive is 
associated with two effects:  1) interactive effects (e.g to effectively govern forests you 
must effectively govern agriculture), and 2) spillover effects (e.g. tightening governance 
to prevent terrorism may hurt immigration, and tightening child labor laws may hurt 
poverty reduction in the short term). Interactive effects suggest that more governance 
might be better (or at least an improvement on missing governance as in the cases of 
forests and climate change), and spillover effects suggest that more may be worse 
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(although their are positive spillovers too via avenues like learning and awaremess 
raising). Despite being taking a “something’s better than nothing” stance in the forestry 
sector, Cashore (2008) argues that the massive proliferation of certification organizations 
in recent years is not a good thing, arguing that human development would be better 
served if all certification organizations merged under one “Better World” label. But if 
such a magic governance wand could be waved, would a private “Better World” 
regulation be preferable to a public one? 
2.5: Debate—Which authority source is better? 
 Mattli and Woods (2009) devote an entire volume to assessing the “normative 
desirability” of public versus private regulations, noting that each can fall prey to capture 
by special interests and also make positive contributions to the governance of certain 
economic sectors and issues. In general, global governors sourcing their authority from 
the public realm (e.g. states and the IGOs states inhabit) have the advantageous option of 
creating legally-binding rules backed by the threat of punishment that apply to a large 
number of actors.i While there are some clear victories of this public multilateral 
approach to global governance (e.g. ozone layer protection via the Montreal Protocol, 
various EU cases) (Selin and VanDeveer 2015), such global public policies tend to 
struggle with effectiveness. Sometimes this is due to weak or vague treaty language, 
which is often required to gain consensus among states with varying interests (Selin 
2010). Other times it is due to the ‘‘implementation gap,’’ a phenomenon in which parties 
to the treaty lack either the will or capacity to comply with its stipulations (Selin 2012; 
Templeton and Kohler 2014). At still other times, when states do ratify treaties and 
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incorporate stipulations into law, the well-known problem of “government failure” 
occurs, either by way of principal-agent issues or other general pathologies of 
bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004). 
Partly in response to these shortcomings and for reasons discussed previously, 
private actors have arisen in great numbers as global governors. Scholars who view this 
trend optimistically, such as those in the “corporate social responsibility” or “corporate 
shared value” movement argue that firms know best how to alter their behavior most 
efficiently and creatively, and will become more benevolent if the right market pressures 
are applied by politically mobilized consumers (Porter and Kramer 2011). NGOs are 
highly capable of mobilizing these consumers, pressuring both governments and firms to 
create more effective governance instruments, facilitating the implementation of these 
instruments, or creating alternative instruments themselves (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
Micheletti 2003). This (re)rise of private governance by firms and NGOs constitutes a 
benevolent “power shift” in global governance that enhances democracy by devolving 
power to the people (Mathews 1997).  
While the rise in private governance quantity is clear, its contribution to 
governance quality is not. Vogel (2006) argues that the ‘market for virtue’ is small and 
meaningful change is expensive. Since actors tend to put their need for organizational 
survival first which typically means prioritizing financial considerations (Cooley and Ron 
2002), participation in voluntary schemes often only attracts actors who are either rich or 
already performing well. This means that civil society regulations such as those in the 
‘fair trade’ movement often fail to reform the worst offenders and assist those most in 
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need (Jaffe 2007, Borck and Coglianese 2009). It further means that businesses are likely 
to only make the minimal numbers of changes needed to be accepted into “green clubs" 
(Prakash and Potoski 2006). Dauvergne (2008) further points out that the social or 
environmental gains achieved in one sector or dimension are often offset by losses in 
others. And Cadman (2011) complains in his study of public-private partnerships that 
programs that bypass or minimize public actors often lack accountability, leading to 
democratic deficits and challenges regarding legitimacy. Lipschutz (2003) sums up these 
critiques by arguing that the market is an ineffective tool for solving the problems it 
helped to create.  
This debate, however, has a tendency to forgo examination of the ability of 
governors to learn from this feedback and evolve. This question puts the focus back on 
the inner workings of private governance organizations, and particularly the inner 
workings of NGOs, which likely would not enter a sector or regulate an issue if they 
believed themselves to be ineffective. Understanding why NGOs decide to enter a sector, 
how they decide to improve it, and what this looks like and implies in the case of small-
scale mining’s impact on human development will contribute to these debates. The 
analytical approach taken to answering this question is presented in the next section of 
this chapter. After applying the framework to certification organization decisions on 
mineral sector entry (Chapters 4) and mineral issue prioritization in regulations (Chapter 
5), the project contributes to each of the debates reviewed by assessing how the two 
certification organizations governing small-scale mining interact with each other and with 
other governance organizations to foster human development improvements. While it is 
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too early since their launch as governors to analyze the effects of their institutional 
contributions empirically, Chapter 6 will discuss the theoretical implications of existing 
rules and thereby lay the groundwork for future empirical research.  
The next section of this chapter will switch focus from reviewing the importance 
of governance patterns to reviewing explanatory theories of their emergence and 
evolution. It according switches focus from analyzing institutions as outcomes (with 
associated implications) to institutions as explanatory factors.  
 
Section 3: Approaches to Explaining Governance Patterns 
How should international relations build and justify its theories? Are the ‘inter-paradigm’ 
debates between the various ‘isms’— be they realism, liberalism, constructivism or a 
particular strand of the ‘new institutionalisms’—as relevant today as they were in the 
1990s? This project follows Bennett (2013), Schmidt (2010) and other prominent 
scholars in arguing that there are limits to the utility of making debates between ‘isms’ 
the focus of modern research. Bennett (2013) wisely argues that “no single grand theory 
can capture the complexities of political life” and that the real explanatory weight in 
‘paradigmatic’ studies based on ‘isms’ is carried by the more “fine-grained” theories 
about causal mechanisms housed within them. Clarifying that “theories exist in our 
heads” while “causal mechanisms exist in the world,” George and Bennett 2005 offer a 
thorough definition of causal mechanisms as the “ultimately unobservable physical, 
social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in 
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specific contexts to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities in ways that 
change these entities’ characteristics, capacities, or propensities.” 
According to Bennett, for a theory about a mechanism to be strong, researchers 
must actually observe the hypothesized process linking a specific cause to a specific 
outcome in empirical cases. “Theories about mechanisms are suspect if it can be shown 
that individual actors did not make the calculations, evince the preferences, respond to 
the stimuli, or engage in the behaviors posited by structural theories.” Therefore, the 
objective of my project is to test the strength of theories about the mechanisms of  
institutional change. More specifically, I test mechanisms theorized to cause changes in 
organizational form (namely sector entry and issue governance) which manifest as 
institutional change in governance patterns.  
But which sets of causal mechanisms to focus on? Steinberg and VanDeveer  
(2012) identify three common approaches to explaining global governance phenomena: 
those focused on interests, institutions, and ideas. In order to explain my first dependent 
variable (sector entry) from which my second dependent variable (governance impacts) is 
derived, I apply each approach in turn to arrive at the most suitable analytical framework. 
After this exercise in causal model enrichment is finished, I review the literature of each 
of my causal factors (Section 4 of this chapter).  
3.1 Interests as Explanatory Factors 
As VanDeveer and Steinberg (2012) write, “interest-based explanations emphasize 
political actors’ pursuit of rational goals, often construed as material self-interest 
calculated through cost-benefit analysis and typically modeled with the use of game 
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theory”. Based in the analysis of boundedly rational decision makers and the logic of 
utility maximization, interests-based research prizes “parsimonious and generalizable” 
explanations, even at the cost of mismatch with specific empirical cases. In the realm of 
international relations, this approach is typical of the realist and liberal paradigms, which 
tend to focus on states or IGOs as the units of analysis and the key drivers of decisions. In 
the case of certification organization decisions on sector entry, state centric causal 
mechanisms (i.e. measures of military or economic power and interests) are of little use, 
since the goal is to understand the decisions of NGOs that span national boundaries and 
often eschew government funding (i.e. NGOs’ behavior is not at the bequest of the state). 
Of course, degrees of state capacity, state affiliation with certain economic sectors, and 
contracts for state-backed funding opportunities may factor into NGO decisions on sector 
entry, but such causal mechanisms leave the internal decision-making process of the 
organization opaque, and given that certification organizations operate in such an array of 
high and low capacity and industrial-capture settings, this approach does not bear much 
fruit for this particular project. Avant et al (2010) agree that state-based theories do not 
always provide the richest explanations: “International relations theories that focus only 
on states are poorly equipped to understand this kaleidoscope of activity by such a wide 
range of agents. Functionalist theories of global governance pick up more activity but 
downplay the contentious politics of global governance. Neither type of theory provides 
much guidance about dynamics and change. Without theories about these diverse actors 
and dynamic processes, we do not have conceptual equipment with which to understand 
significant aspects of global politics.” 
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3.2 Institutions as Explanatory Factors 
Both realism and liberalism, and the rational choice perspectives that underly them, do 
consider the importance of an actor’s institutional setting in structuring their material 
interests and thus decisions. This is where the second of the three approaches to 
explaining global governance— institutionalism— intersects with interest-based 
approaches via the rational choice strand of the “new institutionalisms” (North 1990; 
Dewan and Shepsle 2008). While the concept of “institutions” was introduced in Section 
2, the focus then was on institutions as outcomes, or dependent variables. 
“Institutionalism,” by contrast, is an approach to social science that treats institutions as 
causal forces, or independent variables. In his overview of the history of institutionalism, 
Steinmo (2008) explains that “institutionalism” is “as old as the study of politics,” 
recognized by Plato, Aristotle, Locke, and Hobbes as a useful approach to understanding 
empirical phenomena since they shape political behavior and normative values. While the 
‘old institutionalism’ was more concerned about the rules of the state (e.g. constitutions) 
and “rules on paper,” the new institutionalism focuses on “rules in use” (Young 2002) 
and the “micro-motives” at work in producing actual outcomes (Schelling 1978). The 
failures of the Weimar republic, colonial structures, and the rise of autocracies and chaos 
in developing world pushed old institutionalism out of fashion and paved the way for the 
grand theories international politics, e.g. Marxism, modernization theory, and the 
aforementioned rational choice theory, and smaller but still general theories of human 
behavior (Przeworski and Teune 1970) that dominated the behavioralist revolution post 
World War II (Steinmo 2008). This trend changed when Skocpol (1979) brought 
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institutions “back in” in her famous and empirically grounded study that cited institutions 
as the causes of revolutions. As Steinmo explains, institutionalists like Skocpol are 
typically motivated by “the desire to answer real-world empirical questions” as opposed 
to “the desire to press an argument or push a methodology.” They seek to understand 
“through empirical investigation” whether formal or informal institutional structures 
shaped ideologies, preferences, and behavior in specific empirical cases.  
Adopting this empirically based approach and returning to the project’s focus on 
sector entry decisions, the rational-choice (RI) strand of the new institutionalisms is 
essentially the interests-based approach plus the study of rules. Applied to the empirical 
case of certification organization sector entry decisions and in an environment in which 
all certification organizations can be expected to evolve,ii a simple model of supply and 
demand would predict that, ceteris paribus, existing multi-sector certification 
organizations should respond in the same way to the institutional incentives provided by 
a candidate sector. If demand for sector transformation is sufficient and certification 
organizations have the material capacity to supply it, all of them should enter the sector 
until a point of saturation (as they have for coffee, bananas, cocoa, and cotton). Cooley 
and Ron (2002) support this view, arguing that “the incentives and constraints produced 
by the transnational sector’s institutional environment” determine the entry decisions of 
all private organizations, businesses and NGOs alike. Carpenter et al. (2014) also support 
this view, noting that demand for sector entry may spike due to “trigger events such as 
natural disasters, genocides, or industrial accidents,” and that after such events, sector 
entry should diffuse across all organizations until the point in which the marginal return 
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to an additional organization’s sector investment is negative. In summary, if incentives 
are the same, then the decision should be the same, unless one organization has more 
financial capacity than another, in which case the richer organization should enter the 
sector first. Yet this simple model of supply and demand does not adequately explain 
empirical realities in the small-scale mining case: several multi-sector certification 
organizations have existed in the same “institutional environment,” but only one has 
expanded to enter the sector, while all the others have stayed out. This situation is 
particularly puzzling given the identity of the cases in these groups: while both share 
similar missions and past entry decisions, the Rainforest Alliance (RA) has greater 
financial capacity to expand than Fairtrade International (FLO), yet it is FLO that has 
entered the small-scale mining sector, not RA.iii 
 This situation inspires the application of additional institutional lenses to enrich 
the RI model so that it explains certification organization decisions in small-scale mining 
case. Historical institutionalism (HI) has been a useful framework for studying these 
kinds of situations in which organizations have departed on different evolutionary paths 
(Auld 2014). HI shares with RI the view that people are rational utility maximizers, but 
gets very specific in its empirical grounding, asking why decisions were made in a 
particular case at a particular time. HI argues that decisions made at a given point time 
are shaped by the rules of that time, which, in turn, are shaped by the rules that came 
before them. This means that the full spectrum of theoretical choices is likely not 
available to the decision maker due to the distributional power of institutions. Put another 
way, HI argues that early decisions on rules privilege the interests some actors over 
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others, such that when the opportunity emerges to change the rules, the already-privileged 
are able to design the rules to maintain or enhance their power, thus “locking in” their 
interests and setting actors (be they organizations or populations) on predictable 
evolutionary “paths” (Pierson 1994). In addition to Pierson’s processes of “feedback” 
loops and subsequent “path dependence,” Steinmo argues that institutions cause stability 
because people prefer the familiar and habitual. Further, when institutions are nested and 
overlapping, changing one (and thus changing evolutionary paths) becomes cumbersome 
since changing one often requires changing them all. Therefore HI models are very good 
at explaining cases of stability, but they have less success in explaining cases of change.  
 For example, HI does an excellent job of explaining the evolutionary path (i.e. 
changes in organizational form) taken by the Rainforest Alliance (RA). RA’s early choice 
to enter the agricultural sector institutionalized agricultural interests in its governance 
structures such that subsequent sector entry decisions should enhance rather than detract 
from them. The addition of HI to the simple model therefore explains RA’s entry into the 
tourism and cattle sectors, as these sectors create positive synergy with their existing 
sector array (tourists like to visit farms and farms often raise cattle alongside crops). It 
also explains their lack of entry into the minerals sector (miners and farmers tend to view 
each other in zero-sum terms such that a gain for one is a loss for the other). Turning to 
the case of Fairtrade International (FLO), HI is similarly helpful in explaining FLO’s 
sector entry decisions up until the point in time when FLO encountered the idea of 
certifying minerals. With regard to mineral sector entry, HI predicts that FLO would 
follow RA: FLO similarly has agricultural interests institutionalized in the organization, 
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so expansion into mining should not happen. My empirical research (2014) confirms that 
the Latin American and Caribbean producers association within FLO was strongly 
opposed to mineral sector entry because they identify as representing agricultural (before 
Latin American) interests, and FLO’s governance structures at the time gave them 
sufficient power to create a check on other factions with opposing interests. And yet HI’s 
prediction does not hold: FLO entered the small-scale mining sector, despite the internal 
institutional incentives pushing against it.iv 
 HI does have revisions that are better at explaining change, but only one comes 
close to being helpful in this empirical case. Prior to the mid-2000s, institutional change 
was thought to come either from “exogenous shocks” that created “punctuated equilibria” 
(i.e. institutions changed radically by jumping from one form to another) (Krasner 1983) 
or from relatively infrequent “critical junctures” which likewise created radical change 
(Collier and Collier 2002). Preliminary research suggests that neither of these causal 
mechanisms (nor the radical changes they are associated with) were present in the cases 
of RA or FLO, and they similarly leave other scholars unsatisfied as they do not examine 
cases of incremental change nor leave room for the power of human agency. Thelen and 
Mahoney (2009, p.15, p. 22), try to fill these gaps by offering a model of institutional 
change based on four causal mechanisms and their corresponding agents who leverage 
institutional ambiguities to launch them: 1) institutional displacement via 
insurrectionaries, 2) institutional drift via symbionts, i.e. ‘parasitic’ agents subtly 
undermining or co-opting institutions, 3) institutional conversion via opportunists, and 4) 
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institutional layering via subversives, who play by the rules of the game yet disrupt the 
status quo by adding new institutions on top of old ones.   
3.3 Ideas as Explanatory Factors 
 Mahoney and Thelen’s concept of “layering” is similar to how certification 
organizations change their form via sector entryv, and the associated ‘subversive’ agents 
share much in common with the norm entrepreneurs that play a central role in the third 
traditional approach to explaining global governance, the study of “ideas” (Steinberg and 
VanDeveer 2008). The ideational approach to global governance is called 
“constructivism” in international relations (Wendt 1992; Finnemore 1996, 2014; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998). As Steinberg and VanDeveer (2008) explain, by 
“emphasizing the conceptual dimensions of political life, this tradition explores the 
values, concepts, identities, symbols, and interpretive frameworks that shape 
understandings about what is important, what is and is not a political problem, who 
should participate in politics, and by what means” (p. 33). As with the institutional 
approach, the ideational approach is highly empirical, focused on explaining how actors 
see themselves and their strategic environments through qualitative methods based in 
thick description and interpretation (Geertz 1994; Bob 2005; Carpenter 2014) or 
quantitative methods utilizing public opinion surveys (Lupu and Stokes 2010).  
 The ideational approach gains much analytical traction when used in combination 
with the institutional approach. Indeed, much like the “interests” approach usefully 
overlaps with the “institutional” approach via rational choice institutionalism, the 
“ideational” approach overlaps with the “institutional” approach via the sociological and 
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discursive institutional strands of the new institutionalisms. Sociological institutionalism 
was the first iteration of overlap, arguing that the logic of social appropriateness drove 
human behavior to an equal or greater degree than the logic of material calculation and 
maximization (Powell and DiMaggio 2012). It focused on the role of cultural norms in 
creating statics like the “non-use” of nuclear weapons, but shares with HI its difficulty in 
explaining change, as it views cultural values as fixed (Schmidt 2008). The second 
iteration of overlap between ideas and institutions fixes this problem. Discursive 
institutionalism is an analytic orientation offered by Schmidt as an alternative to debates 
between the various other ‘isms’ in IR (2008, 2010). This fourth ‘new institutionalism’ 
differentiates itself by subsuming the best that the older three institutionalisms have to 
offer and focusing on mechanisms of change. Schmidt defines discursive institutionalism 
(DI) as an umbrella concept for a range of analytic approaches that focus on “the 
substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed 
and exchanged” (Schmidt 2010). “Discourse,” she explains, “is not just ideas or “text” 
(what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said)…The term refers 
not only to structure but also to agency” (Schmidt 2008). 
 Discursive institutionalists, for example, might applaud Hacker and Pierson’s 
(2011) study of how rational businesses pursuing their economically defined interests 
explains the rise of inequality in the US since 1980, but would urge them to push further 
to analyze the roots of “business’s ideas about what is in its interests and how to attain 
them” (Schmidt 2011). Likewise, Schmidt sees Mahoney and Thelen’s (2009) analysis as 
going “a long way toward embedding agency in institutionalism and thereby 
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endogenizing change,” but argues that it still does not explain “the dynamics of change,” 
i.e. why change agents were successful in their endeavors, and is therefore somewhat 
mechanistic as it lacks consideration of agents as thinking, reflective, decision-makers. 
Schmidt argues that the discursive institutional approach can answer these remaining 
questions of how agents select, deploy, and respond to ideas in ways the result in 
institutional change.    
 Since my project specifically asks about the change and continuity in two 
certification organization cases that neither RI nor HI sufficiently explain, applying a DI 
framework that places agents in their communicative contexts to trace the causal flow of 
ideas appears to be a promising way of enriching the model. An analysis that places text 
in context may very well explain “how and when ideas in discursive interactions enable 
actors to overcome constraints” (Schmidt 2010) and thereby create a rich and fulfilling 
explanation of certification organization decisions on sector entry and issue governance. 
 
Section 4: Analytical Framework 
 To populate my analytical framework based in discursive institutionalism (DI), I 
draw from the advocacy literature on global governor agenda setting and NGO behavior. 
In the last ten years, several of these scholars have implicitly deployed DI to explore this 
project’s larger question of why some ideas (rather than others) gain traction within 
global governance organizations to manifest as central features of governance patterns 
(see Carpenter 2014 for review). It is clear from this literature and from the DI 
perspective more generally that attributes of the norm entrepreneurs who define and 
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advocate issue adoption play a central role in agenda-setting decisions. And the 
communicative contexts in which ideas are presented also seem to matter. For this 
reason, this project studied the literatures on organizational culture and network effects as 
well. Below is a review of each of these literatures which shows why certain factors were 
chosen to populate the framework and motivate the hypotheses. A key contribution of 
this dissertation is carrying findings on these advocacy-based hypotheses to the private 
regulatory literature on certification organizations, as these findings will help  the 
certification literature understand sector entry decisions and will help the advocacy 
literature understand the extent to which agenda setting in certification organizations 
operates similarly or differently to processes in other global governors. 
Factor 1: Norm entrepreneurs  
One strand of research in the transnational agenda setting literature argues that norm 
entrepreneurs play central roles in getting ideas adopted by global governance 
organizations. The concept of a “norm entrepreneur” comes from Sunstein (1996) and 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and is related to earlier research on political leadership 
and regime formation (Young 1991). Broadly defined, norm entrepreneurs are agents 
with strong ideas about what constitutes desirable behavior who seek or create a venue 
from which to advocate for their preferred behavioral change in a target community.   
The role of individuals and leadership has long been a subject of controversy in political 
science because it is often difficult to distinguish between the causal force of a person 
(e.g. Jack, Jill, Napoleon) and the causal force of their office or functional role (e.g. the 
President, soldier, researcher) (Machievelli and Wootton 1995; Mahoney and Thelen 
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2009; Alquhist and Levi 2011). In the international relations literature, Waltz (1959) 
sparked debate via his “three image” analysis of the causes of war, which explored the 
roles played by individuals (first image), states (second image), and the distribution of 
material power in the anarchic international system (third image). Waltz argues that all 
three hold analytical potential, but that the third carries by far the most explanatory 
weight (this book brought “structural realism” into fashion in international relations). 
Wendt (1992) and other constructivists pushed back against this power politics and 
“structure” not “agency” turn, suggesting that all structures were ‘socially constructed,’ 
“anarchy is what states make of it,” and thus first image analyses of the ideas held in 
individuals’ heads are crucial. Young (1991) agrees, arguing that “leadership is a critical 
determinant of success or failure in the processes of institutional bargaining that dominate 
efforts to form international regimes, or, more generally, “institutional arrangements” in 
international society.” Young applauds attempts to “bring the individual back in” without 
“diminishing the role of collective entities such as states IGOs, NGOs, multinational 
corporations (MNCs).” Young identifies three types of leaders who may (or may not) be 
representatives of organizations: 1) structural leaders, who bring leverage to the 
bargaining table; 2) entrepreneurial leaders, who translate negotiation material into 
understandable and mutually beneficial terms (e.g. Mustafa Tolba during the science-
heavy ozone treaty negotiations); 3) intellectual leaders, who rely on the “power of ideas” 
to “shape the way individuals understand issues and the options available to deal with 
them” (e.g. Henry Dunant’s role in the International Red Cross’s creation, Jean Monnet’s 
role in creating the common heritage laws of the sea, Raphael Lemkin’s role in creating 
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the genocide convention (Power 2013)). This third type of leader is closest to the concept 
of a norm entrepreneur, and most appropriate for studies of change as it opens analysis to 
questions of the attributes possessed by the entrepreneur that enable them (and not 
someone else in the same position) to powerfully persuade decision makers.  
Today’s empirical literature on the role of entrepreneurs in global governance 
agenda setting tends to focus on cases of successful advocacy (i.e. when the entrepreneur 
persuades a global governance organization to adopt the entrepreneur’s issue). While 
both cases of successful and non-successful advocacy must be studied to understand the 
true power of causal mechanisms (Mahoney and Goertz 2004), a fruitful framework can 
nonetheless be fashioned based on what has worked in successful cases.vi Busby (2010) 
calls the influence of an entrepreneur’s attributes “messenger effects,”vii arguing that an 
entrepreneur’s credentials (e.g. educational and employment experiences), levels of 
celebrity, or similarity to the adopting individual or organization (on factors like 
credentials, personality traits, or religious background) “can be as important—if not more 
so—than the content of the message itself.”viii Another key attribute appears to be the 
entrepreneur’s professional affiliation relative to the adopting organization. Oestreich 
(2007) studies successful entrepreneurs that have come from within organizations, but the 
majority of successful entrepreneurs come from outside of them.ix Bob (2005) points to 
the entrepreneur’s marketing “savvy” as a determinant of success, arguing that 
entrepreneurs differ in their ability to “calibrate” their “asks” such that they “match” the 
adopting actor’s values and capacity.x In the same vein, Joachim (2007) argues that an 
entrepreneur’s plea must balance emotional “testimonial information” with detached 
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“scientific knowledge” since, as Carpenter et al. (2014) notes, decision-makers in 
adopting organizations often “pride themselves on their objective technical expertise.” 
Carpenter et al. (2014) further found that decision-makers in adopting organizations 
thought that the stronger an entrepreneur’s “personal charisma, credentials, personal 
network, social media skills, advocacy skills, and mastery of the English language,” and 
the more the entrepreneur represented an “unlikely leader,” the more successful the 
entrepreneur would be.xi Busby (2010) corroborates the potential advantage of an 
“unlikely leader” persona through the case of Senator Jesse Helms’ advocacy for the 
Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign (Helms was formerly a vocal foreign aid skeptic). Still 
others focus on the degree to which the entrepreneur can act as a service provider 
(interview with Graeme Auld in May 2015). This line of research connects analysis of 
entrepreneurs to more economic theoretical perspectives. By providing research reports 
or industrial expertise, for example, an entrepreneur lowers the start-up costs associated 
with adopting a new issue, thereby lowering the sector’s “barriers to entry” and making 
adoption more likely.xii For simplicity, I have grouped these entrepreneurial attributes 
into three categories: Personal Background, Communication Strategy, and Service 
Provision.  
Norm Entrepreneur Attributes: 
Personal Background Communication Strategies Service Provision 
¨ Credentials ¨ Charisma ¨ Celebrity & Network 
¨ Media skills ¨ Calibrated askxiii ¨ Industry expertise 
¨ Outsider/Insider Status ¨ English ¨ Research report 
¨ Similarity ¨ Setting ¨ Funding 
¨ Unlikely leader  ¨ Proof of concept 
   Table 2.1: Norm Entrepreneur Attributes 
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All of this research on norm entrepreneur attributes connects to Schmidt’s 
(forthcoming) discursive institutional work on how the power of persuasion impacts 
policy decisions and thus governance patterns. While individuals may possess certain 
inherent traits that make them “fit” well with an individual or organization “on paper,” it 
is the way these traits are mobilized during discursive interactions that determine their 
true power. This is how her DI approach adds to HI approaches; it explains why fit is 
important, and the micro-mechanisms through which it works.  
My project extends this research on norm entrepreneurs by conducting empirical 
research on their role in certification organization decisions on sector entry. Recall that a 
key premise of my project is that the “issue adoption decisions” that are the outcome of 
interest in the transnational advocacy literature on agenda setting are akin to the “sector 
entry” and “issue governance” decisions that are missing from the certification 
organization literature (Chapter 1 and Section 2 of this chapter). While the roots of the 
roles of norm entrepreneurs in sector entry can be detected in some certification 
organization studies (Auld 2014, for example, notes the influence of a famous bagpiper in 
convincing the FSC to certify certain species of wood and the Aquaculture Stewardship 
Council’s role in convincing IFOAM to enter the aquaculture sector) it is to date 
underdeveloped and under-theorized, constituting a gap in the certification literature that 
this project fills.xiv   
Factor 2: Organizational Culture  
 The norm entrepreneur literature recognizes the importance of attributes of the 
adopter organization and of the issue itself in explaining an organization’s “issue 
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adoption decisions.”xv While Carpenter 2014 keeps these two factors separate, I subsume 
them in the concept of “organizational culture,” defined by sociologist Edgar Schein as 
the set of rules, processes, and values learned and practiced by an organization as it 
adapts to changing internal and external conditions. Schein identifies three components of 
organizational culture: artifacts (observable rules and processes), values (goals, strategies, 
justifications), and assumptions (traits and biases held by employees and their groups 
coming from their educational, professional and personal backgrounds). Taken together, 
organizational culture constitutes the communicative and ideational context in which 
decisions on organizational evolution are made. It determines the organization’s 
interpretation of and reaction to candidate issue attributes as well as events in the broader 
“institutional environment.” Because of this, organizational culture can send an 
organization down a predetermined evolutionary path (i.e. the cultural rules and issues it 
naturally comes into contact with make the perceived best response to situations clear), 
and it can also make an organization more or less susceptible to influence from network 
effects or norm entrepreneurs advocating for change (via aspects of its governance 
structures or ideational affinities, e.g. reverence for “unlikely leaders”). Knowing that 
organizational culture filters perceptions of issues, entrepreneurs, and institutional 
contexts is an important first step for understanding decision-making, and the second step 
is to get very specific about which attributes matter most.  
Regarding issue attributes, the advocacy literature suggests that organizations care 
most about the following six: the nature of the victims (e.g. easy to perceive as 
vulnerable/innocent)) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Carpenter 2007); the nature of the harm 
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caused (e.g. bodily versus psychological) (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998); the nature of 
the perpetrators (e.g. already viewed as public enemies) (Carpenter 2007); the nature of 
the causal chain of harm (e.g. caused by human choice or result of natural disaster or 
systemic issues) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Carpenter et al. 2014 found that respondents 
cared very much about an issue’s fit with the adopting organization’s mission. This fit is 
what Bob 2005 refers to as “substantive matching.” They also cared about an issue’s fit 
with the existing array of issues it dealt with. Organizations view issues as either 
complementary or competing with existing ones, indicating that issue “linkability” is 
important (Carpenter et al. 2014).xvi  
This discussion of mission fit and linkages turns the focus back to adopter 
organization attributes, which are also central explanatory factors in the advocacy 
literature. According to the “survival of the fittest” and “population ecology” perspectives 
that connect the global advocacy research to the domestic interest groups literature 
(Bloodgood 2011; Abbot et al. 2012) and to the more material analyses of decision-
making (Cooley and Ron 2002), organizations adopt new issues to help them survive and 
thrive (Prakash and Potoski 2006; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). But from a discursive 
institutional viewpoint, conceptions of what is needed and worth investing in to survive, 
i.e. how many resources a given challenge merits, is a socially constructed product of 
organizational culture. Unlike a firm that must raise financial profits for its stakeholders, 
a non-profit like a certification organization or more typical advocacy organization must 
deliver substantive gains towards achieving its mission. Thus a DI perspective throws 
light on an organization’s conception of its mission and “appropriate” strategies of 
  
43 
achieving and funding it. The donor calculus highlighted by Cooley and Ron is useful 
when an organization is primarily dependent on traditional types external short-term 
contracts, but their analyses says nothing about why organizations chose and remain 
dependent on those funding structures, why they might change them, and whether 
organizations who have made different choices are able to minimize the deleterious 
effects of the “scramble” for money described by Cooley and Ron. Therefore, an 
organization’s strategy for obtaining financial sustenance is both a product and facet of 
their culture, and should be studied as such alongside other adopter organization 
attributes, such as whom they trust for information and ideas, how they conceive of their 
mission, what issues they’ve engaged to date (for linkage concerns), and the structures 
they use to govern themselves as they evolve via expanding or deepening their work.  
My project extends this research on organizational culture by conducting 
empirical research on its causal role in decisions made by certification organizations, 
which are similar to the typical advocacy organizations that Cooley and Ron study yet 
also different in meaningful ways (i.e. funding structures). This extends the work of 
Cooley and Ron by applying their analysis in a different but related empirical realm in 
the same ways that it extends the work of Auld and Carpenter. 
As with the role of norm entrepreneurs, the roots for determining organizational 
culture’s role in shaping governance patterns can be found in Auld (2014). For his third 
question on governance patterns, his unit of analysis is the economic sector, and given the 
organizational form of the first-mover certification organization in a sector,xvii Auld can 
predict whether an additional certification organization will enter the sector and whether 
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it will be competitive with or complementary to the first-mover. Auld states clearly on p. 
6, however, that his analysis is “conditional on programs having emerged in a given 
sector.” Therefore, he leaves open the prior questions of 1) why the first-mover entered 
one specific sector (for example, coffee) as opposed to another (for example, cotton), and 
2) why the second-mover joined the first-mover in one specific sector (in this example, 
coffee) as opposed to another sector in which the first-mover was active (in this example, 
cocoa). Auld agrees that explaining this prior decision on sector entry is a gap in the 
governance pattern literature that my project can fill.  
As for Carpenter’s work, I extend her (and others’) research on issue attributes by 
adding a group of sector attributes to the framework (as is appropriate since I carried her 
framework from the empirical realm of human security to the empirical realm of 
economic sectors). My empirical research found that five product attributes influenced 
adopter organization decisions: sector entry is more likely if (1) the product has 
production levels that are of a predictable (rather than “Potluck”) nature, (2) has a simple 
(rather than complex) supply chain, (3) is a “Fast-Moving” (rather than Slow Moving) 
consumer good, (4) is a basic necessity (rather than luxury) good, and (5) if proof of 
concept (i.e. a functioning ethical supply chain) exists in reality (rather than in theory). 
This idea of “sector attributes” is brand new to the certification and advocacy agenda 
literatures, making them helpful contributions of use to future scholars researching the 
extent to which certification is likely to spread across economic sectors as a global 
governance tool. xviii 
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In a similar way, my empirical research brought to light additional attributes of 
organizational culture that influence issue adoption when the concept of an “issue” 
includes economic sectors. In addition to confirming the role of mission fit, linkages to 
existing issues, funding structures, and voting structures, my empirical research pointed 
to the influence of three new organizational attributes that matter. Sector entry is more 
likely if (1) the organization is in a broadening (rather than deepening) point in its 
Growth Cycle, (2) the financial and intellectual barriers to entry (i.e. start-up costs) are 
low (rather than high),xix and (3) entry presents low (rather than high) levels of Risk. As 
with the five sector attributes mentioned in the previous paragraph, these three 
organizational attributes (as applied) are new to the certification and advocacy 
literatures.xx Together, the existing literature and my original research show that 
organizational culture matters because it filters the way attributes of issues, sectors, 
entrepreneurs, and other internal and external factors are perceived. I group attributes of 
organizational culture into three categories for simplicity: Structures, Resources (i.e. 
Start-up costs), and Perceptions. 
Organizational Cultural Attributes 
Structures Resources 
(Start-up Costs) 
Perceptions 
¨ Voting rules ¨ Funding ¨ Mission 
¨ Staff Configuration ¨ Expertise ¨ Strategy 
¨ Form ¨ Reputation ¨ Growth Cycle 
 ¨ Network ¨ Values (e.g. change, risk, learning ) 
  ¨ Issue Attributes (victims, perpetrators, 
complexity, harm, linkages) 
  ¨ Sector attributes (potluck, complexity,xxi 
FMCG, luxury, proof of concept) 
   Table 2.2 Organizational Cultural Attributes 
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Factor 3: Network Effects  
 In addition to suggesting that ideas for institutional change are brought to 
organizations by norm entrepreneurs, the transnational advocacy literature also suggests 
that ideas for change can come to the organization from its broader social and 
communicative context, i.e. its networks. While the study of networks has a long tradition 
in political science (reviewed in Tarrow 2005; Hafner-Burton 2009; Ward et al. 2011), 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) were among the first to analyze them at the transnational level. 
They defined transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as ‘‘groups of actors working 
internationally on an issue who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”  
 As Ward et al. explain in their (2011) review, TAN research often begins by 
studying the ‘‘links between nodes,’’ where ‘‘nodes’’ are actors such as individuals, 
states, or organizations, and ‘‘links’’ are the forms of connection between them, such as 
friendships, citations, or trade agreements. Links act as channels through which material 
and non-material resources such as money or norms flow, and therefore constitute 
meaningful structures that define, enable, and constrain node behavior (Hafner-Burton et 
al 2009; Ward et al 2011; Carpenter 2014). The direction and reciprocity of links can 
reveal meaningful patterns that yield important insights about network composition (Auld 
2015), network power dynamics (Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007, 2011, 2014; Wong 2008), 
and ideational cleavages within networks (Bob, 2005, 2009).  
 The power dynamics strand of the literature suggests that the nodes that receive 
the most links are the most respected, and thus powerful, actors in the network (Ward et 
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al 2011; Box-Steffensmeier et al 2013). These most “central” network actors are called 
gatekeepers by Bob (2005) and Carpenter (2014) because they let some issues into the 
network while keeping other issues out. Carpenter (2014) argues that “network centrality 
confers important agenda-setting influence on specific organizations” and that 
“organizations judge candidate issues not just on their merit but on how the issues 
connect to specific organizations.”xxii Further, she argues that an issue diffuses rapidly 
among network members once the “gatekeeper” organizationxxiii adopts it via a “ripple 
effect” until a “tipping point” is perceived at which time organizations are dissuaded 
from issue adoption due to over-crowding. This phenomenon of an organization’s social 
and communicative context influencing their decision making is exactly the type of 
phenomenon DI predicts should happen.  
 Carpenter (2014) studies this phenomenon in the human security network, and 
this project tests the scope of her findings by examining whether the same thing also 
happens in the ethical trade network. Human security is a paradigm for understanding 
human vulnerabilities that makes the individual (rather than the state) the unit needing 
“freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” (UNDP 1994). Whereas Carpenter’s ‘big 
picture’ outcome of interest is human security, the focus of this project is ethical trade, 
which it defines as trade that fosters economic growth in ways that protect the 
environment, foster social equality, and alleviate poverty. A member of the ethical trade 
network, then, is any actor that works to transform global supply chains in ways that 
promote these goals.xxiv Both ethical trade and human security are precursors for human 
development, therefore it makes sense to follow Carpenter in analyzing each of them 
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separately, rather than a human development network, which would be a bit too broad to 
be useful.    
 In addition to the contribution of testing gatekeeper theory in a new empirical 
realm, I further test it in a type of network not studied by Carpenter, the ego-network. An 
ego-network is akin to an individual’s social network, and in the case of certification 
organizations, will be comprised of a variety of actors working on trade and non-trade 
issues. By Carpenter’s and DI’s logic, it should likewise display gatekeeper effects, i.e. 
certification organization decisions should be effected by the preferences of gatekeepers 
in both the ethical trade network and their ego network.  
Network Attributes 
Ethical Trade Gatekeeper Preferences Ego-Network Gatekeeper Preferences 
  Table 2.3 Network Attributes 
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
 The global governance literature suggests that this discursive institutional (DI) 
framework that explores the role of norm entrepreneurs, organizational culture, and 
network effects in shaping certification organization sector entry decisions should bear 
analytical fruit. I therefore explore the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Norm entrepreneurs, organizational culture and network gatekeeper 
effects all played critical roles in shaping sector entry decisions. 
 
The theoretical literature is clear that both institutions and ideas are important causal 
forces. Organizations likely have unwritten rules about which types of people and sorts of 
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communication they trust, and what sectors and issues they ‘ought’ to pursue. The 
theoretical literature is also clear that institutions are important outcomes.  
When a certification organization decides to govern a new sector, it creates rules 
to address certain issues, and these rules  interact with the rules from other governors to 
create a complex set of institutions that both creates incentives for positive behavioral 
change and opportunities for regulatory dysfunction. To understand the potential effects 
of having two, as opposed to one, civil society-backed certification organizations 
governing ASGM, the project assesses a second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Certification organizations improve human development, and the 
more of them the better.  
 
 Before testing these hypotheses through the case studies presented in Chapters 4 
and 5, Chapter 3 will provide an empirical foundation for understanding the dynamics of 
the ASGM sector and its connections to human development problems.  
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CHAPTER 3: GOLD INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
The previous two chapters argued that learning about certification organization sector 
entry decisions enhances academic understanding of institutions and their impacts on 
human development. They further argued that an analytic framework assessing the roles 
played by norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures, and advocacy networks could help 
illuminate the drivers of these important decisions. This chapter argues that this 
framework is best deployed in the empirical world by studying certification organization 
decisions on entering the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector (ASGM).  
Many economic sectors in the global economy present both challenges and 
opportunities for human development. The forestry sector, for example, has been the 
focus of international attention since the 1990s (Cashore et al 2004; Humphreys 2006; 
Auld 2014). Keeping the world’s forests in tact slows climate change because trees act as 
carbon sinks, and protects biodiversity because forest ecosystems are some of the most 
dense and diverse habitats on the planet. At the same time, the global demand for timber 
means that cutting down trees provides income for individuals and countries struggling 
with poverty. In a similar way, the problems and opportunities presented by the world’s 
fisheries have long drawn international attention (Ostrom 1990; Desombre and Barkin 
2011; Auld 2014). Overfishing and bycatch are straining aquatic populations to the point 
of collapse which in turn effects the entire ocean ecosystems. Fishing by whatever means 
available, however, is again one of few sources of income for communities who claim the 
right to prosper from the resources found within their territorial boundaries.  
  
51 
This project focuses on the ASGM sector primarily because it presents the 
analytical puzzle discussed in Ch.1 (i.e. some unlikely certification organizations have 
entered the sector while more likely ones have stayed out). However, the project also 
focuses on ASGM in order to offset imbalances of attention in the academic literature, 
and because the sector poses important challenges and opportunities for human 
development in its own right. While precious minerals are central to many cultural rituals 
and can be a boon for human development, their production can also wreak havoc on 
social, economic and environmental systems (Ali 2009; Bloomfield 2014; Hilson and 
McQuilken 2014). Both the potential and perils of diamond mining are well covered in 
the academic literature (Ross 1999; Le Billon 2008; Smillie 2010), and the international 
community launched the Kimberley Process in the early 2000s in an attempt to transform 
the sector (Haufler 2009). Less attention has been paid to the gold mining industry, 
despite its many corollaries to the diamond industry in terms of its potential to help or 
hurt human development. One important corollary is that the challenges and opportunities 
posed by mining are usefully disaggregated by scale. In other words, the challenges and 
opportunities associated with large-scale mining are very different than those associated 
with small-scale mining. Again academic attention has tended to skew in favor of 
attention to large-scale operations involving multinational firms, while the artisanal and 
small-scale sector involving subsistence miners often working informally or illegally 
remains understudied (see for example Bloomfield 2014 and Ali 2009, which focus on 
large scale mining with only passing reference to ASGM; for a good overview of the 
work on ASGM, see Hilson and McQuilken 2014). The following sections provide an 
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overview of the gold industry and ASGM’s links to human development challenges and 
opportunities. It is based on analysis of the original, primary data I collected through 
interviews with industry representatives, as well as on reviews of secondary data 
published by industry and governance organizations.  
 
Section 1: Gold Industry and Human Development 
As Ali’s (2009), Bernstein’s (2012) and Kwarteng’s (2014) histories of gold explain, 
humans have been extracting gold from the earth for at least 5,000 years. The tombs of 
Egyptian kings demonstrate the human propensity to turn the metal into ceremonial items 
of beauty, but gold was also turned into coins for use in trade around 500 BC. As a 
medium of exchange, it was preferable to other commodities like animals or spices 
because of its durability (never decays), transportability (lucrative in small amounts) and 
universal value. Even today gold is the investment of choice in times of economic strife 
or upheaval (Economist 2011). It can be exchanged quickly for cash, and in countries 
where banking systems are weak, the jewelry and dowry systems becomes means of 
storing and transferring wealth (Larmer 2009). It’s general rise in price over the last 40 
years can be seen in Table 3.1. 
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           Figure 3.1 Gold Prices 
 
Part of gold’s value comes from its scarcity relative to other metals. In all these 
5000 years, only 157,000 metric tonnes have been mined, which is enough to fill three 
Olympic-sized swimming pools (Forbes 2010). In contrast, 1.2 million tonnes of silver 
have been mined in the same period (approximately 10 times more), and copper is in a 
completely different league, with an average of 15 million tonnes per year being mined 
over the last decade (USGS 2015). The World Gold Council claims that gold is far more 
rare than diamonds, and that the latters high price is chiefly due to artificial as opposed to 
natural supply restrictions. They believe the world’s gold supply will peak in 2015, after 
which annual production levels will continuously decline as the price may continually 
climb.   
While the overall quantity of gold present in the earth is small, its distribution 
across the planet is wide. Gold is found on every continent, and there are of 15,000 
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tonnes of gold expected to be embedded in the ocean floor (World Gold Council 2015). 
On land, gold deposits are of 2 types: primary lode deposits which are the “veins” found 
in “hardrock,” and secondary placer deposits, which are comprised of gold dust, flakes 
and nuggets that have eroded from primary deposits to settle into riverbeds (Kirkemo et 
al 1997). Lode deposits are formed through a complex process that involves magma 
interacting with underground water to release or transform minerals and shove them 
upwards towards the Earth’s crust. The water cools as it rises, leaving behind veins of 
gold in a variety of rock types. Often the process of mountain creation facilitates this 
process, so lode deposits are particularly frequent in such terrains. Placer deposits are 
frequent downstream of these terrains. Impure gold has a density of 16 to 18, whereas the 
waste rock (gangue) in which it’s embedded has a density of about 2.5. This difference 
and natural causes of agitation facilitates the separation of gold from gangue, while 
gravity ensures the released gold dust and particles find their way downstream to settle on 
or near bedrock (underneath riverbed soil) in places of slower river currents, where other 
debris like coarse sands and gravel have settled. There are five types of placer deposits, 
ranging from alluvials, which are closer to the surface to paleo-placers, which are buried 
deep within rocks.  
In the 19th century, mining of both primary and placer deposits tended to be 
geographically concentrated in the major gold rush countries of Australia, New Zealand, 
Brazil, Canada, the United States and South Africa. By 1970, South Africa alone was 
producing two thirds of all the mined gold in the world (WGC 2015). Since then, 
production has diversified geographically. Table 3.1 shows the top twenty gold producers 
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in the world in 2014. Unfortunately, this spread of production has not corresponded with 
a spread in human development. Table 3.1 also shows the inequality-adjusted human 
development ranking categories for each of the major gold producing countries (the UN’s 
rather charitable categories are Low, Medium, High, and Very High) (UNDP 2013). 
While three of the top 20 gold producing countries earn “Very High” human 
development scores (the United States, Canada, and Australia), half of the top 20 
countries earn only “Medium” or “Low” human development scores. This proportion of 
lower human development scores gets worse when production is separated by scale. Of 
all the gold extracted from the earth, it is estimated that 70% is extracted by large scale 
operations and 30% is extracted by artisanal and small-scale operations (Telmer 2011; 
World Gold Council 2015). Table 3.2 shows that in the group of 26 top ASGM countries 
(out of the 70 or so countries known to have ASGM sectors) there are no countries with 
“Very High” levels of human development and 85% of countries receive “Medium” or 
“Low” or scores (compared to 50% of the top 20 when large-scale mining is included).  
Research on the political economies of mining communities indicates that ASGM 
is both a cause and a consequence of these low levels of income, education, and life 
expectancy. The following subsections will elucidate these connections via the case of 
ASGM supply chains serving the jewelry industry. The jewelry industry is the final 
destination for 48-58% of the world’s mined gold (World Gold Council 2015; Gold 
Fields Metal Survey 2015). Given that ASGM is estimated to account for 12-30% of the 
global mined supply, this means that when a customer walks into a jewelry store, it is 
possible that up to 20% of what they see is the result of ASGM. It is important that 
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citizen-consumers know the human development ramifications that this 20% is associated 
with, so that they can decide whether the current governance patterns shaping the jewelry 
and ASGM sectors (Table 3.3) are sufficient or need to be changed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both LSM and ASM Gold Production, 2014, 
Source: GFMS 2015, HDR 2014 
Country Tonnes iHDI 
   
China 462 Medium 
Australia 273 Very High 
Russia 262 High 
United States 205 Very High 
Peru 173 High 
South Africa 164 Medium 
Canada 154 Very High 
Mexico 118 High 
Indonesia 116 Medium 
Ghana 108 Low 
Brazil 81 High 
Uzbekistan 80 Medium 
Argentina 60 High 
PNG 58 Low 
Kazakhstan 49 High 
Mali 47 Low 
Tanzania 46 Low 
Chile 44 High 
Colombia 43 Medium 
Philippines 42.6 Medium 
Table 3.1 Gold Production, All Scales 
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ASGM Production Levels, Source: World Gold 
Council for AGA (2011), HDR 2014 
  
20-50 tonnes/yr 
Brazil High 
Peru High 
Colombia Medium 
Cameroun Low 
China Medium 
Indonesia Medium 
Phillipines Medium 
6-10 tonnes  
India Low 
Tanzania Low 
Venezuela High 
Guyana Medium 
French Guinana Low 
Tanzania Low 
Zimbabwe Low 
Mali Low 
Ghana Low 
Ecuador Medium 
0-6 tonnes  
Russia High 
Mongolia Medium 
Kenya Low 
Ethiopia  Low 
Somalia Low 
Myanmar Low 
Kyrgystan Medium 
Table 3.2 ASGM Countries and Human Development 
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Global Regulatory 
Organization 
Authority 
Source 
Regulation 
Type 
Regulation 
Focus 
Regulates 
ASGM? 
Regulates  
Mercury? 
Extractive 
Industries 
Transparency 
Initiative 
Civil 
Society 
Reporting Development NO NO 
Responsible 
Jewelry Council 
Private Certification Environment, 
Social 
NO NO 
Cyanide Code Civil 
Society 
Code of 
Conduct 
Environment NO NO 
Voluntary 
Principles 
Both Code of 
Conduct 
Social, 
Conflict 
NO NO 
Global Reporting 
Initiative 
Civil 
Society 
Reporting Any CAN CAN 
No Dirty Gold Civil 
Society 
Code of 
Conduct 
Environment, 
Social 
CAN CAN 
World Gold 
Council 
Private Certification Conflict CAN NO 
Conflict Free 
Smelter 
Civil 
Society 
Certification Conflict YES NO 
Fairtrade 
International 
Civil 
Society 
Certification Environment, 
Social, 
Development 
YES YES 
Alliance for 
Responsible 
Mining 
Civil 
Society 
Certification Environment, 
Social, 
Development 
YES YES 
OECD Due 
Diligence Guide 
Public Code of 
Conduct 
Conflict YES NO 
UN Minamata 
Convention 
Public International 
Law 
Environment YES YES 
Table 3.3 Governance Patterns for Gold 
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Section 2: ASGM and First Dimension of Human Development:  
Income, Education and Health 
2.1. Income 
 
The income portion of the HDI reflects that in most communities, individuals need to 
earn a cash income in order to provide themselves and their families with basic needs 
(e.g. food, water, shelter). In countries where ASGM is an option, people generally have 
few other options and may have been trained as a miner throughout their childhood, 
making it a convenient livelihood to choose (Hilson and McQuilken 2014). 
Unfortunately, as it is currently practiced, ASGM is not a livelihood that earns people 
enough money develop beyond a subsistence existence.xxv ASGM is estimated to 
comprise 12%-30% of global gold production, which, based on 2014 production 
estimates (GFMS 2015, USGS 2015) is equivalent to 376-940 tonnes.xxvi At an average 
international price of $1,100 per troy ounce,xxvii the dollar value of the gold produced by 
the ASGM sector in 2014 was between $13.3 and $33.2 billion. But because of the nature 
of the gold supply chain (which will be discussed in detail in the next section) the 15-30 
million miners who worked to produce this gold receive a maximum of 70% of its 
international price (Fairtrade Gold website 2015). These numbers have the following 
implications for the standard of living of these men, women, and children.  
If the lower estimate that 12% of the world’s gold supply comes from ASGM is 
correct, then an average income for an artisanal miner might range from $0.85 to $1.70 a 
day (depending on the population size). According to the World Bank’s definitions, these 
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amounts mean that the average artisanal miner is living in either extreme poverty (less 
than $1.25 a day) or moderate poverty (between $1.25 and $2.50 a day) (World Bank 
2014). The survival of a person in extreme poverty is uncertain from year to year. While 
$1.25 a day may buy the basic necessities of life, any shock to the daily routine, such as 
an illness, drought, or job loss, puts the person’s life in danger. A person living in 
moderate poverty is able to meet their basic needs and survive these shocks, but no more. 
There is not enough income to make investments in education, infrastructure, and 
savings, and therefore not enough to make choices that help them progress towards their 
goals, which is a problem from a human development perspective.  
If the higher estimate that 30% of the world’s gold supply comes from ASGM is 
correct, then an average income for a miner might range from $2.12 to $4.24 dollars per 
day (depending on the population size). According to the World Banks definitions, this 
means that some miners are living in moderate poverty, while others are out of poverty 
but earning very low incomes ($4.25 per day is equal to an income of $1,500 per year).  
This problem of low levels of income among miners, however, is not the result of low 
levels of money flowing within the mine-to-market value chain: the world consumes 
approximately 2,500 tonnes of gold jewelry each year, which is $88.4 billion at the 
international price of gold, but, as will be explained below, the industry usually sells gold 
jewelry for minimally twice what it’s worth. This dichotomy between the high levels of 
money in the system and the low levels of money that stay with the miner raises 
important questions about the ethical functionality of the sector.  
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Drawing on data from my interviews with industry representatives, my pricing 
research, and supplementary secondary sources, the following paragraphs explain why 
and how this dichotomy emerges by detailing the flow of money in a typical ASGM 
value chain. This exercise uses the example of a typical gold wedding ring of the type 
purchased by 80%-100% of people in most countries in the world, and corrects the 
information asymmetry that currently exists between retailers and consumers regarding 
how much of the final price of a ring each actor in the value chain receives. Table 3.5 
follows this supply chain analysis and summarizes the findings. Some of the terms and 
derivations of numbers are listed in the Appendix, and spreadsheets are readily available 
from the author upon request. 
Wedding Ring Value Chain3 
 
Because gold is so malleable, it is always alloyed with other more durable metals such as 
silver and copper so that gold jewelry never consists of 100% pure gold (which would be 
24 carats, i.e. 24k). After reviewing a range of jewelry company’s offerings, this project 
found that a typical wedding ring is made in either 14k gold (58% pure gold) or 18k gold 
(75% pure gold), and weighs approximately 4 grams for a ring of an average size six (6). 
In this example, I use the 18k gold case and an average gold price of $1,100 per troy 
ounce. Using these numbers, a 4 gram ring made of 18k gold contains 3 grams of pure 
gold, which is worth $106.11. But, as mentioned previously in the case of the miner, no 
value chain actor receives exactly 100% of the value of the gold for their services. 
                                                
3  Again, the data used in these calculations are from my interviews with industry representatives 
(Respondents 4, 15, 16) and my pricing research and supplementary secondary sources. 
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Instead, a percent of the value of gold is added or subtracted to this base value of the 
gold. This is colloquially known as an actor’s “value-added” and can also be thought of 
as their service fee. Of note is that this fee is a payment, not a profit. Each actor has 
separate costs of production (e.g. rent, equipment) that is unrelated to the value they 
believe they add to the semi-finished or finished product they buy from the supply chain 
actor upstream of them (i.e. closer to the first point of production). The price they paid 
for this upstream material plus the value they add to it is called their “cost of goods,” 
which is equivalent to the selling price of the materials to the next downstream actor in 
the value chain. These calculations result in a final ring price (in this example, $445). 
From the discussion above which is elaborated upon below, it is clear that this final value 
of the ring is not evenly dispersed between supply chain actors, and it is currently 
dispersed in a way that leaves the miners in poverty. The following sections reveal why 
some actors are getting more than others by tracing the flow of money from the ASGM 
miner to a small to medium sized independent jeweler.xxviii The results of this exercise are 
noted in the below discussion of each actor’s contribution and summarized in the section 
that follows these. The exercise is important as it enables reflection upon whether and 
how the system should be changed by global governors.   
 
Actor 1: Miner 
 Fairtrade International and the Artisanal Gold Council estimate that an average 
miner receives up to 70% of the international price of gold for their product.xxix  In the 
wedding ring example, that comes to $74 (equivalent to 17% of the final $445 selling 
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price of the ring), which is supposed to cover the capital and labor investments miners 
make to produce the gold as well as the value of the 3 grams of pure gold in the ring. 
Capital and labor costs will vary depending on the miner’s geological, political, 
technological and business contexts. The first expense of a miner should be acquiring a 
mining permit from the government, but several factors coalesce to make mining without 
a permit (i.e. “informally” or “illegally”) quite common. One factor is that acquiring a 
permit is cumbersome, involving excessive travel and paperwork. Another reason is that 
permits for ASGM may be in limited supply or not worth the effort of acquiring because 
the best mining sites are often reserved by governments for large-scale operations who 
are likely to extract larger volumes of gold, and therefore pay more to the government in 
taxes and royalties. The need to pay taxes is another factor leading to high rates of 
informal mining, as many miners feel they do not benefit from government services and 
therefore do not want to pay for them. This relates to another factor driving informality, 
which is the difficulty of projecting governance across vast terrains when budgets are 
tight and institutions are weak. A final factor is that ASGM is outlawed in several 
countries (e.g. China) due to social and environmental problems associated with it and 
the aforementioned preference of catering to large scale firms (UNEP 2013; Hilson and 
McQuilken 2014). These factors create conditions in which miners who do not want to 
mine legally can nevertheless make it their livelihood and sell gold into the global supply 
chain. This lawlessness also makes miners easy targets for exploitation and downright 
theft. Many work environments resemble forced-labor or indentured servitude operations 
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(Human Rights Watch 2013, 2015), which means they get far less than the 70% of the 
LBMA price that those operating in more legal and safe environments might get. 
Once a permit is acquired (or the decision to forgo a permit is made), ASGM has 
other costs associated with each of the four steps of production. Step one is removing the 
gold laden rock (the orexxx) from the ground. The geological context will determine the 
type of equipment that is needed. If the mining site is a placer deposit (i.e. in a riverbed), 
panning, diving, or dredging equipment is required. If the mining site contains a primary 
lode deposit (i.e. hardrock) actual holes or mineshafts need to be dug into the ground and 
mountainsides with whatever digging equipment can be afforded (from mere shovels to 
dynamite to more mechanized machines). Once the ore is removed from the ground, step 
two is combining it with water and grinding and crushing it into a slurry to increase the 
material’s surface area. Some rocks are harder than others, and the tools for crushing 
them range in complication from basic hammers and mortars and pestles to mechanized 
mills requiring electricity, which range in price from $1000 to $6000. At this point, 
experts recommend that miners use equipment (e.g. shaker tables and sluices) to 
concentrate ore, which enables to them to use fewer chemicals and is therefore better for 
human and environmental health, but miners sometimes skip this step to save costs. 
Step three involves the process of applying chemicals to the crushed (and perhaps 
concentrated) ore to release the gold from the surrounding rock. If miners have more 
money to invest in production, they usually use the process of cyanide leaching, which is 
soaking slurry in cyanide ponds until the gold is released from the ore. More frequently, 
miners use a process called mercury amalgamation, which is commonly perceived as the  
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    Figure 3.2 Prices of Gold and Mercury 
fastest, easiest, and cheapest way to remove gold from ore. In this process, mercury is 
mixed into the slurry and attaches to exposed gold particles. These attachments create 
balls of “amalgam” that are composites of mercury, gold and a bit of waste rock. The 
mercury is usually bought from a local dealer (for approximately $1.50 per ounce) and is 
often but not always illegal for use in mining.  
 After the mercury-gold amalgam ball is created, step four in the process is heating 
the amalgam with a blow torch or other device such that the mercury vaporizes out of the 
amalgam and into the atmosphere, leaving only the gold and traces of waste rock behind. 
Miners have the option of heating the amalgam inside a piece of equipment called a 
retort, which protects the miner and the environment from much of the mercury fumes 
that are emitted during the process, but not all miners are aware of their benefits or have 
access to them, so in practice they are seldom built or purchased. If demand and access is 
secured, basic homemade retorts cost $5-$50 and more complicated commercial retorts 
cost $200-$500 (Sippl and Selin 2012). With or without a retort, the result of burning 
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amalgam is a saleable product called gold “doré,” which is a spongy material with a high 
percentage of pure gold and low percentage of waste rock. What didn’t make it into the 
amalgam ball and thus doré (i.e. the excess water, rock, and mercury which is collectively 
called tailings) is either dumped into nearby waterways or poured into a “tailing pond,” a 
protected pool which protects the environment but adds to production costs.  
The actual costs to an individual miner of going through the above four step 
process will depend on their business context— i.e. whether they are working as an 
independent family unit or whether they are part of a small to medium enterprise or 
cooperative. As Kevin Telmer of the Artisanal Gold Council explained to the author in a 
2012 informal interview, in an average size artisanal gold mining group, there will be 10 
miners overseen by a site boss who gets the permit (if one is sought), purchases the 
equipment and mercury, and sells the final product (the doré) to the first buyer of the 
gold, who is typically a local trader who visits the mine on a regular basis and transports 
the doré to town for sale on down the supply chain to the consumer (“downstream”). 
Telmer explained that the costs are born differently depending on whether the miner’s 
business unit is sharing the costs of production, whether bartering for things like housing 
and healthcare are part of their business arrangement, and on the level of the cut taken by 
the site boss. 
With these factors in mind, it is easy to see why ASGM is associated with low 
levels of income and therefore human development. At average ASGM levels of gold 
extraction, it will take a typical miner 43 to 100 days to produce the 3 grams of gold in a 
4 gram 18k ring. This results in an average daily income of $1-$2 per day (or $2-$4 for 
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higher ASGM production estimates)xxxi minus all of the aforementioned. This analysis 
shows clearly that ASGM is not a lucrative livelihood. Miners typically turn to ASGM as 
a survival strategy or as an additional livelihood in an attempt to rise above the poverty 
line, but the above discussion shows why the status quo functionality of the supply chain 
leaves them with too little money to be able to make the investments needed to do this. 
The next sections explain where the rest of the $445 that the consumer is willing to pay 
for the ring goes and the justifications each actor gives for the value-added fees they take.   
 
Actors 2-3: Traders 
After the miner, the second and third links in the ASGM value chain are traders. 
Because mining often takes place in remote rural areas, the first type of trader, an ‘onsite 
buyer,’ provides service to the miners by traveling to and from the mining site and town, 
and by finding an amenable buyer in town to sell to. Usually this in-town buyer is a gold 
shop, that will refine the doré one more time, perhaps combine it with other amounts of 
gold (from both legal and illegal sources rendering them untraceable), and sell the 
resulting product to the second type of trader, the “regional buyer.” This regional trader 
might sell the gold to their country’s central bank, to an international trader within the 
country who holds an exporting license, or they may hold the exporting license 
themselves, and sell it to an importer abroad. Most traders run a “high-volume, low-
margin” business. This means that they charge low value-added percentages on a large 
number of transactions. Another reason their service fee percentages are low is because 
they have very little overhead (i.e. no staff, equipment, or office rent to pay) unlike the 
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two “bookends” of the supply chain. While the exact percentages that traders take vary 
(on factors like their volume models, the price of gold, and the services they provide), the 
average fee they charge for their services works out to be around 2% of the value of the 
gold they trade.  
 
Actor 4: Assay Office 
In addition to transporting the gold and connecting sellers and buyers, a final 
service of the trader is getting the doré to the assay office prior to delivery to a refinery. 
An assay office is a public organization (or private organization operating under a 
government contract) that performs a purity test on the doré to officially determine the 
amount of pure gold within it. An assay office is supposed to act as a neutral third party 
to the trader and refiner— prices are set for refining the gold before it is refined—and 
they also protect the consumer by certifying the purity of gold flowing through the 
international system, often through the use of ‘hallmarks’ or national stamps. There are 
only a small number of assay offices in each country, for example 4 in the UK, 6 in the 
US, and 10 in Switzerland. A typical rate for assaying the gold in a ring is between .5% 
and 1% the value of the gold within it. 
 
Actor 5: Refinery 
Like assay offices and traders, refineries run a high volume, low margin business 
and have less overheard expenses than the miners, manufacturers and retailers at the 
bookends of the supply chain. The term and actor “refinery” often comprises two 
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activities: refining and fabricating. Refining is melting all of the gold received in a giant 
pot, and fabricating is pouring that melted gold into finished products (e.g. bullion bars) 
or semi-finished products (e.g. coins, medals, or jewelry inputs like wire or sheets).  
The majority (about 2/3 or 70%) of the world’s mined gold flows to refineries 
located in Switzerland. In addition to this high level of geographic concentration, the 
refining industry is also highly horizontally integrated. Six companies refine 90% of the 
gold mined each year, so it is very likely that the artisanally mined gold in the example 
ring was refined by one of the four leading refineries in Switzerland: Valcambi, Pamp, 
Argor-Heraeus, or Metalor . Once the gold is sold to a refinery, refined and fabricated, 
traders have the option of buying the gold back or the refinery can keep the gold and sell 
it downstream themselves. Refiners almost universally charge 1-2% of the value of gold 
for their services, and if they are also fabricators, it is estimated that they may add an 
additional 3%. If the traceability of the gold was not lost when an onsite buyer (Actor 2) 
sold it to a gold shop, or when a regional buyer (Actor 3) combined it with other local 
sources, then it is surely lost at the refinery. If a trader wanted to keep the gold from a 
given piece of doré separate throughout the refining process, they might get charged a 
rate at the higher end of the spectrum since the refiner either loses time or needs to buy 
extra equipment. This is why securing traceable gold is more expensive and almost never 
available.xxxii  
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Actor 6: Manufacturers or “Casting Houses”: 
Manufacturers or casting houses buy the pure gold products from the refineries 
and “alloy” them into semi-finished products of different caratages and uses. At this point 
in the value chain, the business begins to switch from one of high volumes and low 
margins to one of lower volumes and higher margins because the range of products being 
sold diversifies and the perceived value the manufacturer adds to each is increased. The 
manufacturer is the actor that would furnish the semi-finished gold it purchased from the 
refiner into either wire or some other type of jewelry input, or into a nearly-finished piece 
like 18k size 6 wedding band in the example (but without any polishes or engravings). 
The products the manufacturer offers depends on the skills and thus needs of the other 
actors downstream in the value chain (the wholesalers and retailers). The manufacturer 
might make a gold ring with a space for the attachment of a gemstone which would be 
added by a designer or wholesaler (Actor 7). Or they might simply provide Actor 7 with 
14k or 18k wires which Actor 7 then uses in a variety of ways to create finished products 
themselves. Therefore, the fee the manufacturer charges depends on the type and volume 
of goods sold. Interview data indicates that the charge is somewhere in the 25%-29% 
range (with the lower charges for larger volume actors and the higher charges for small 
volume actors).  
 
Actor 7: Wholesale Designer, “Jeweler,” or “Goldsmith” 
The actor who buys nearly finished pieces of jewelry or basic jewelry inputs from 
a manufacturer usually performs the actions that transform the material into the final 
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product (although occasionally Actors 7 and 8 are merged into one, such that the retailer 
both finishes the product and sells it to the public).  This actor is the wholesaler, who is 
often referred to as a “goldsmith” or “jeweler,” and they finish the product by polishing, 
sanding, adding gemstones to or engraving a finished ring. They can also buy a basic 
finished piece of jewelry, melt it, and transform it into a different piece of jewelry. Once 
these services are provided, the actor either sells their newly finished piece of jewelry 
directly to the public if they have a showroom or website and funds for marketing, or 
they sell it to a retailer who’s invested in building and connecting to a customer base in 
these ways. This actor who finishes the product in these ways must make investments in 
training (e.g. design school or gemological association degrees), equipment (e.g. casting 
forms, engraving and polishing tools), the physical space to work and stock finished 
items (which requires paying rent), and business relationships with the manufacturers or 
traders who supply them materials. For all of these services, the standard charge across 
the industry is a “turn-key,” which is industry jargon for twice the “cost of goods.” In the 
basic ring example, this is equivalent to a value-added of 105% of the value of gold in the 
ring, or 25% of its final selling price. Wholesalers justify this high fee by arguing that 
they have turned a commodity into a specialized product that consumers only buy once or 
twice a year at most (or, theoretically, once in a lifetime in the case of wedding jewelry). 
This means that their business is both low volume and slow moving (i.e. has a slow 
“turnover”), and yet their overhead is as high as it might be for the manufacturer, who’s 
more able to sell in bulk. Therefore, they argue, they must charge a high value-added 
percent to make their business viable. In response to questions about why they charge 
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exactly double their cost, few answers are given beyond “that’s how it’s always been 
done” and “that’s what the retailer is willing to pay.” 
 
Actor 8: Retailer 
The retailer similarly runs a low-volume, slow turnover business and has even 
greater overhead charges than wholesalers and manufacturers. While they typically buy 
finished products and do not transform the jewelry, they do transform the public into 
paying customers. This means that their service charge of minimally “two turnkeys,” or 
twice their cost of goods, is supposed to cover their market research into customer and 
supplier characteristics, their advertising efforts, and the costs associated with their 
selling space (e.g. rent, salaries, and design, whether for a ‘brick and mortar’ store with 
sales staff or an online store with a website and technicians). In the ring example, twice 
the retailer’s cost of goods is equivalent to a value-added of 210% of the value of gold in 
a ring. This brings the final price of the ring to $445, which is in line with estimates 
gathered from an array of retailers (Table 3.4).  
 
18k size 6 ring prices from a range of retailers 
Zales (~) $250 
Amazon: $300 
Tamara $440 
Rebekkah (~) $636 
Cartier $880 
Table 3.4 Typical Ring Prices 
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Summary: 
This value chain analysis shows that when a customer buys the example ring from 
a store, the money they paid for the ring is distributed to the value chain actors in the 
proportions in Table 3.5.  
There are, of course, variations on this supply chain model. Tiffany and Co., for 
example, have a high level of vertical integration in their supply chains. In 2014, 22% of 
their gold was sourced from the Rio Tinto-owned Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation’s 
Bingham Canyon mine in Utah in the USA while the rest was “procured from recycled 
sources.” This Rio Tinto operation integrates the first five actors in the supply chain, from 
mining to refining. Tiffany buys bullion bars directly from this operation, then ships them 
either to the manufacturing facilities which they own, or to facilities that they trust (and 
audit regularly against their internal code of practice). If the manufacturing processes at 
these facilities (e.g. alloying metals into different caratages and casting them into 
different products) keep the gold from the Kennecott mine separate from the rest of the 
gold in the facility, and Tiffany gets this exact gold back rather than an identical product 
of equal value, then Tiffany can claim that all of the gold on their jewelry store shelves is 
fully traceable to the US and not affiliated with ASGM. However, if any mixing or 
substitution happens at the manufacturing plant, these claims on traceability are lost. For 
example, Cartier works to support artisanal mining in Honduras by buying 100% of the 
output of a single ASGM operation. However, this output is refined in a refinery in Italy, 
which refines sources from all over the world. Therefore Cartier cannot be sure what 
percentage of their actual jewelry on their shelves contains artisanally mined gold. In 
other words, they can make claims about their sourcing, but not about their products.  
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Another supply chain variation is practiced by a small jewelry store in Toronto 
which is both a wholesaler and a retailer (Respondent 16) . The owner admits she has no 
idea where the gold that ends up in her products comes from since she buys it straight 
from a manufacturer. And in yet another variation, Patrick Schein is both a trader and a 
refiner who sources artisanal gold from mines that adhere to his personal ethical 
standards, and he offers the option of traceable or untraceable gold (untraceable is 
cheaper— the buyer knows it is ASGM, but not where it is from or the exact production 
practices of the mine). In a final and most involved variation similar to Tiffany but 
committed to providing an option of ASGM sources, CRED’s owner runs a fully 
traceable artisanal gold supply chain. He is not only the business owner, but also the 
trader, buying directly from artisanal mines, exporting the material, refining it at a small 
non-Swiss refinery that is willing to keep his purchases separate from the other materials, 
and manufacturing it via artisans near his UK store who commit to keeping his materials 
separate from all others.  
So while there are infinite variations, the example walked through in this project’s 
value chain analysis is quite typical and provides consumers and all stakeholders with the 
information they need to decide whether the ethics in the system are functional. The math 
shows that the current system leaves the miner in poverty, which drags down human 
development in both local and global communities due to poverty’s externalities. These 
externalities include low levels of education, health, and environmental protection, as 
well as political disenfranchisement and frequent co-occurrence with violent conflicts. 
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These externalities either directly or indirectly thwart human development, and their 
relationship to ASGM is discussed in the next section.   
 
2.2 Education and Health 
In addition to income, the other two components of the HDI calculation are 
literacy rates and life expectancy, which the UN uses as proxies for measures of 
education and health. Many people living and working in ASGM communities suffer low 
levels of education. One reason for this is the aforementioned poverty levels. While 
tuition for schools in low-income countries is usually free, governments typically require 
families to pay for school related expenses, such as uniforms, books, and writing 
Typical Supply Chain for ASGM and a Small-Medium Jeweler for 4 gram, 18k Gold 
Ring priced at $445 
  Value-Added Cost of Goods 
Share of Gross 
Proceeds 
  
% of ring's gold 
value gained 
from sale 
$ gained 
from sale 
 ie selling price 
to next buyer 
% of final ring 
price 
1 Miner 70% $74 $74 17% 
2 Local, on-site buyer 2% $2 $76 0.5% 
3 Buyer/Exporter 2% $2 $78 1% 
4 Assay 1% $1 $79 0.2% 
5 
Refiner and 
Fabricator 5% $5 $85 1% 
6 Manufacturer 25% $27 $111 6% 
7 Wholesale Jeweler 105% $111 $222 25% 
8 Retailer 210% $222 $445 50% 
Table 3.5 Ring Price Proportions by Value Chain Actors 
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equipment. Therefore miners who are using the majority of their income for food and 
housing may not have the extras required to send themselves or family members to 
school. Long travel distances from mining sites to schools and poor health also contribute 
low levels of school attendance, as does the general norm of allowing children to work on 
mining sites to help their families earn extra money. In socioeconomic environments 
where it is difficult to see the payoff of education anyway (e.g. there are few jobs 
available for graduates), the problem of low levels of education is further exacerbated.  
Low levels of school attendance and low levels of health work together to form a 
vicious circle, particularly in the case of the health threats found in mining communities. 
Some threats do not require much education to detect. Digging deep holes and hauling 
rock are hard on the body, especially when done under tropical heat. Diving into rivers 
and lakes to obtain placer deposits and descending mine shafts and using dynamite are 
similarly obvious dangers. But the health threats from the mercury that most miners rely 
upon are less easy to detect, and the majority of miners are unaware of mercury’s harm or 
have misconceptions about its risks. In communities all over the world, miners have been 
using mercury amalgamation for generations, reinforcing the perception of its usefulness 
and safety. A further problem is that mercury fumes are invisible and odorless, while 
many miners believe that only visible or strong smelling substances are dangerous. It can 
also be very difficult to attribute health problems to mercury exposure in environments in 
which malaria, sexually transmitted diseases, contaminated drinking water and 
malnutrition are all frequent and can cause symptoms similar to mercury exposure. 
Mining communities are unfortunately such environments, as ASGM creates pools of 
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water which attract mosquitoes, impermanent settlements of migrants create conditions in 
which sex work is a common and sanitation systems are not advanced enough to protect 
water supplies, and scarce food sources encourage consumption of ‘bushmeat’ which can 
harbor an array of diseases. Still other miners are aware of mercury’s dangers but are 
unaware of or lack access to ways to mitigate them. As discussed previously, a retort is a 
piece of equipment miners can use to protect themselves (and the environment and 
therefore global populations) from mercury vapors during the amalgam burning stage. 
Building or buying a retort, however, can be expensive, and using it improperly is easy 
without training and results in little to no environmental protection and lower levels of 
gold recovery (see Sippl and Selin 2012 for detailed discussion of these issues).  
Low levels of awareness and abilities to change behaviors surrounding mercury 
are a huge problem for both local and global human health because the heavy metal is a 
hazardous neurotoxin that takes more than 2,000 years to return to sediments (N. Selin 
2009). When miners burn amalgams without proper equipment (or with incorrectly used 
equipment), elemental mercury is vaporized into the atmosphere and is inhaled by people 
in the vicinity of the burning. Elemental mercury vapor causes an array of negative health 
effects such as tremors; emotional changes; insomnia; muscular weakness; headaches; 
nerve malfunction and cognitive impair. At the highest levels of exposure, the kidneys 
become damaged and respiratory failure can cause death.  It is this elemental mercury 
that enters the atmosphere through amalgam burning that makes ASGM the leading cause 
of global mercury pollution in the world. However, inhaled mercury vapor is primarily 
inhaled by local mining rather than global populations. Fetuses and young children are 
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particularly at risk, as concentration levels rise quickly in smaller bodies and their 
nervous systems are still developing and thus even more effected than adults.’ 
Unfortunately, as noted above, the prevalence of children and pregnant women in mining 
communities is high. Children often skip school to help their families mine, and women 
are mines just as often as men. Because child care and time off are luxuries few in these 
communities afford, they often do not take breaks from mining when they’re pregnant 
and bring young children with them to the mining sites to look after them.  
The vaporized mercury that is not inhaled by the miners and their communities 
travels through the atmosphere to redeposit on the land and in waterways globally. The 
mercury that settles in waterways joins the mercury that has likewise settled there via the 
aforementioned dumping of mining tailings from ASGM. This mercury is consumed by 
micro-organisms and in this way transforms into methylmercury. Fish and other sea 
creatures ingest these micro-organisms, and the methlymercury accordingly 
bioaccumulates up the food chain. Large, carnivorous fish like tuna and swordfish, as 
well as large fatty mammals like whales, have the highest levels of mercury 
contamination. Rice is also now recognized as a food with problematically high levels of 
mercury contamination (Raloff 2010). When organic mercury deposits on land, it is 
absorbed into underground aquifers, and that water is absorbed by the edible portion of 
rice. When humans eat these foods, adult nervous systems are harmed at high levels of 
exposure, but children and fetuses are harmed at very low levels of exposure. In these 
populations, low levels of exposure to methylmercury impact cognition, memory, 
attention, language, fine motor and visual spatial skills. Methylmercury poisoning from 
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seafood and rice is threat to all populations globally, but especially to those in developing 
countries in which both fish and rice are staple foods and few alternative options are 
available.  
Cyanide leaching also presents threats to human health. Cyanide is toxic to 
humans and can be absorbed by inhalation, digestion and through the eyes and skin. 
When cyanide enters the bloodstream, it causes a variety of blood problems, including 
the inability of cells to absorb oxygen. This depresses the central nervous system, which 
can cause respiratory failure and death. At higher levels of concentration, cyanide also 
damages the heart. While a safer process than mercury amalgamation and used by the 
majority of large scale gold companies, cyanide leaching and tailings pools often break 
(even in advanced large scale mining operations in industrialized countries) exposing 
miners and the animals and plants they eat to poisoning. Further, many miners combine 
mercury amalgamation with cyanide leaching. When combined in waterways (as happens 
in the dumping of tailings) cyanide accelerates the transformation of mercury into 
methylmercury.  
 
Section 3: ASGM and Second Dimension of Human Development:  
Environment, Conflict, Political Contexts 
 
While the income, education and health components of the HDI are recognized as 
necessary conditions for human development, they are not sufficient conditions. High 
levels of these components must be present within a context that supports their 
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expression for human development to flourish. This is why the UN’s most recent 
conceptions of human development also have a second dimension which declares the 
need for healthy ecosystems, peace, and political equality and freedom. Under status quo 
governance conditions, ASGM communities rarely exist in such supportive contexts. 
While ASGM’s harm to human health was discussed above, it is important to note 
that it harms the health of the environment as well. To begin mining a site, the space must 
be reached by a group of miners (which can mean the creation of roads through 
previously intact forests) and in the case of land sites must cleared by cutting down the 
trees and removing surrounding foliage. This process and that of digging unsettles the 
earth, creating increased waterway sedimentation which changes the chemical and 
therefore biological context of waterways in detrimental ways. Water is already a scarce 
resource in many mining communities, and ASGM not only pollutes it but uses an 
immense amount of it during the gold extraction process. There is also, of course, the 
problem of chemical pollution. Chemical pollution harms plant and animal health in 
similar ways how it harms humans, with mercury causing reproductive problems and 
cyanide attributed to mass die offs of fish, birds and mammals.  Finally, ASGM often 
occurs in protected areas in which governments are trying to protect endangered species 
and precious habitats. Occasionally miners who have ancestral origins in such areas can 
obtain permits to mine there, but frequently permits are forgone, and the laws meant to 
protect these areas are violated.  
As mentioned before, ASGM occurs in remote regions in developing countries 
who struggle to find the will and ability to project governance across their political 
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domains. Such situations frequently co-occur with informal governance by illegitimate 
non-state actors and violent conflict. Internal and transnational conflicts need financing 
for arms and recruits, and their leaders frequently turn to the minerals sector where high-
value lootable resources can be traded in black market conditions (Ross 1999; Smillie 
2010). Just as was the case with diamonds in Sierra Leone’s civil wars, ASGM has been 
used to financially support conflicts in both Colombia and the DRC (Bargent and Norby 
2015; SEC 2013). This political and economic context also frequently disenfranchises 
miners from the political processes of their countries. As a low income group, politicians 
rarely cater to these constituencies anyway. They also feel disconnected from the political 
process and its proceeds (e.g. protection from crime and provision of basic services), and 
thus often wish to continue to operate outside of it if their short-term outcomes seem 
better. This situation constitutes yet another vicious cycle, as participation in government 
is a key way of improving one’s circumstances and exercising choice and voice.  
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
This chapter has provided empirical evidence of the human development opportunities 
and challenges posed by ASGM. Governance patterns in this sector are therefore 
important to study in their own right as well as because they present the empirical puzzle 
discussed in Chapter 1. The next two chapters deploy the analytical framework in the 
cases of Fairtrade International’s and the Rainforest Alliance’s divergent decisions with 
regard to entering the ASGM sector.  The justification for the selection of these 
certification organization cases is explained in each chapter’s introduction.    
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CHAPTER 4: WHY GOVERN GOLD—FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL CASE 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation argued that learning why and how global 
governance organizations decide to target certain economic sectors enhances academic 
understanding of institutions and their impacts on human development. They further 
argued that an analytic framework assessing the roles played by norm entrepreneurs, 
organizational cultures, and advocacy networks could help illuminate the drivers of these 
important decisions. Chapter 3 justified the use of this framework to study sector entry 
decisions on the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector. And now Chapters 4 and 5 
of the dissertation deploy this framework in the empirical world. Taken together, 
Chapters 4 and 5 ask: Why do some certification organizations enter the ASGM sector, 
but others do not?  
To answer this question, the project takes a few methodological steps to select 
appropriate cases and to organize the data. The first step is identifying the population of 
cases, i.e. delineating the realm of actors or phenomena from which units of analysis will 
be selected and to which the project’s findings will apply (George and Bennett 2005; 
Collier et al 2008; Mahoney 2010a). A population is delineated using scope conditions, 
defined as the minimum criteria that join units of analysis together as a “set,” or group of 
a certain type. For this chapter, I focus on the population of certification organizations 
(COs) that certify small-scale producers in more than one low human development 
country4 and sold to consumers globally (as opposed to nationally) between the years 
                                                
4 As defined by the World Bank and identified in Chapter 3 
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2000 and 2010 (the period during which idea to certify ASGM was first pitched and 
gained traction in a CO).  
I focus on COs governing small-scale producers rather than those certifying large-
scale firms for four reasons: 1) the regulatory contexts for each group are likely to be 
different (Raynolds et al. 2007), 2) when analyzing causal mechanisms, it is best to keep 
as many variables the same as possible; 3) the analytical puzzle of interest is found in the 
small-scale as opposed to the large-scale mining sector; and 4) as explained in Chapter 3, 
small-scale producers face larger human development challenges than those employed by 
large-scale firms and deserve more analytic attention. I focus on COs working to 
transform supply chains with production points in low human development countries for 
two reasons: 1) these populations that are most likely to turn to ASGM as a livelihood; 
and 2) they stand to benefit the most from ethically transformed global supply chains. I 
further insist on the scope condition that COs operate in more than one country to control 
for geographic specialization or preference explanations of sector entry and to classify the 
COs as global as opposed to regional, national, or local governors (i.e. to avoid 
justifications like “We only work in Brazil,” “The French love wine,” or the “our national 
government is threatening to regulate the sector”). The final scope condition is that the 
cases don’t explicitly exclude ASGM as an entry option, i.e. their mission is broad 
enough to make certifying ASGM a reasonable prospect. The Aquaculture Stewardship 
Council, for example, is not in the scoped population because they explicitly focus on 
aquaculture instead of governing an array of economic sectors.  
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With the population of cases defined, the second step required to answer the 
question is selecting a sample of cases from the population. Gerring and Seawright 
(2008) provide a “menu” of seven sampling strategies for researchers. The best strategy 
for my particular question is constructing a ‘most similar’ case study design comprised of 
cases that are similar in nearly all respects except for the outcome of interest (here, 
ASGM sector entry). This is most appropriate because my dissertation aims to explore 
whether the theorized relationship between independent and dependent variables actually 
exists in the empirical world (Gerring and Seawright 2008). 
The logic underlying ‘most similar’ designs is akin to that of experiments, in 
which the treatment and control groups are assumed to be similar enough that any 
resulting difference between them can be attributed to the treatment. In small-n case 
studies like mine, the treatment is akin to the causal mechanisms associated with the 
framework factors, such that norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures, and network 
gatekeeper effects can be considered as separate or interacting ‘treatments.’  
Unlike experiments, however, cases in a small-n most similar design are not selected 
randomly. Quite the opposite, they are selected purposively. Random sampling in such a 
small-n population might lead to selection of cases that are unrepresentative or that lack 
sufficient leverage for causal inference (Gerring and Seawright 2008). In such research 
designs, it is imperative to “select on the dependent variable,” but as many subsequent 
scholars have pointed out, this advice mostly applies to large-scale statistical studies 
(Mahoney 2010a).  
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To select my ‘most similar’ cases, I followed the strategy proposed by Mahoney 
(2004). The first step in their protocol is to select a “positive” case, defined as a case in 
which the outcome of interest is present. The second step is to select a “negative” case, 
defined as a case that lacks the outcome of interest, but is similar to the positive case in 
other theoretically meaningful ways. Chapter 4 traces the process by which the 
framework factors shaped outcomes in the positive case (Fairtrade International), 
whereas Chapter 5 does the same in the negative case (Rainforest Alliance). The data 
used to construct these case studies is from three main sources: 1) interviews conducted 
with respondents from each of the case organizations, 2)  documents and website text 
written by the case organizations and other organizations when applicable, and 3) the 
hyperlinks found on the case organizations’ websites. The interview and document data 
was reviewed and interpreted by the author, without the assistance of content-analysis 
software. The hyperlink data, by contrast, was collected and analyzed using the same 
procedures as Carpenter (2014), which includes use of the software program 
IssueCrawler. After justifying my selection of Fairtrade International as my positive case 
in the following paragraphs, the chapter continues by using the framework factors to 
create a narrative of the Fairtrade International’s sector entry decision on gold (one 
framework factor for each section).  
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        Figure 4.1 from Gerring and Seawright (2008) 
 
 In the empirical realm of my dissertation, a positive case is defined as a CO that 
has entered the ASGM sector. The number of positive cases in the previously described 
population happens to be extremely small: there are currently only two, Fairtrade 
International (FLO) and the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM). FLO is an 
excellent case to select because it fits all of the scope conditions for the entire period of 
the study (2000-2010). Fairtrade International was established in 1997 in Germany to 
unite the smaller, nationally focused alternative trade organizations that had emerged 
across Europe and North America since 1988 (FLO website 2015).  Since its initial focus 
on agricultural foods on supermarket shelves, it has expanded to include both cotton (for 
clothing) and gold (for jewelry) in its array of certified goods. It enjoys about 80% brand 
recognition in Europe and 57% recognition across the 24 countries (FLO Annual Report 
2011). FLO governs by creating a standard that regulates the social, economic and 
environmental practices of supply chain actors that source from small-scale producers in 
low-income countries.  
As written in its founding and current documents, FLO’s mission—“enabling the 
sustainable development and empowerment of disadvantaged producers and workers in 
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developing countries”—is broad enough to justify the governance of a wide array of 
economic sectors (FLO website 2015). It was neither a foregone conclusion nor an 
impossibility that FLO would enter the ASGM sector, therefore understanding why it did 
so is an interesting question and helpful academic contribution. ARM, on the other hand, 
is an inferior case to select because it was established for the sole purpose of governing 
small-scale mining, and from its inception in 2005 until 2013 it planned to always be in 
partnership with well-established organizations that would handle the marketing aspects 
of CO operations (Respondents 4, 8; Valerio 2013) . In other words, ARM’s entry into 
the ASGM sector was a foregone conclusion, and they did not fit the population criteria 
of being an independent global certifier until 2013. Further, the reasons for their entry 
into ASGM as an independent certifier in 2013 (and therefore their eligibility to be a 
member of the study’s population) are fairly straightforward— FLO and ARM disagreed 
on their vision of an ethically transformed ASGM sector as well as the wisest strategy for 
achieving that vision, so they mutually agreed to end their partnership (Respondents 3, 4, 
8). Rather than choosing to dissolve, however, ARM decided to reinvent itself as a direct 
competitor to FLO.  
To summarize, while ARM is an interesting and important case, it is not the best 
candidate for the positive case in this most-similar design because its experience and 
decision-making context is rather unique and not very comparable nor generalizable to 
other certification organizations in the population. The case of FLO, on the other hand, is 
highly generalizable and comparable to several negative cases in the population, so FLO 
is selected as the “positive” case in this chapter. Luckily, as the following sections reveal, 
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the story of ARM is central to the story of FLO’s gold sector entry decision, so its history 
is far from lost— it is usefully embedded in  FLO’s.  
 
Section 1: Norm Entrepreneur Attributes 
 
 How did FLO encounter the idea of certifying gold, and why did this idea gain 
traction in their organization? My data strongly suggests that theories of transnational 
advocacy and discursive institutionalism were correct in predicting that individuals can 
have unique persuasive power distinct from the power of their role (Carpenter 2014; 
Schmidt 2008, 2011). In other words, not just anyone could have successfully pitched the 
idea to certify gold to FLO— it had to be someone with personal characteristics that 
mattered to the target and who could communicate their idea and associated services in a 
way that was persuasive to their target. In the case of FLO, norm entrepreneur Greg 
Valerio had the right mix of traits to persuade his target, Harriet Lamb (then Director of 
Fairtrade Foundation, Fairtrade International’s United Kingdom branch) (Respondent 3). 
The following sub-sections trace the process by which FLO encountered the idea to 
certify gold, and provide evidence in support of the argument that Valerio’s discursive 
interactions with Lamb were necessary conditions for FLO’s decision to govern the 
sector. Had Valerio been absent from the FLO narrative or had he done things differently, 
FLO’s organizational cultural factors pushing against gold (discussed in the next section) 
would have kept the organization from entering the sector.    
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1.1: Personal Background 
 As he reports in his 2011 autobiography (and as gleaned from interviews with him 
in 2014), Greg Valerio was born in England in the 1960s. After a childhood in which he 
experienced ethical injustices via interaction with official government institutions such as 
schools and foster care systems, he was expelled from high school and a grew an 
immense internal dislike for status quo governance systems. With little education or 
money, but plenty of talent and emotions to work through, Valerio found artistic success 
as an actor. But financial success alluded him, and after a spell of homelessness, he found 
solace in Christianity and asked for help from the local church in Chichester. The church 
noted Valerio’s talents as a dramatic communicator and his aversion to economic 
injustice, and gave him job as a teacher in their community outreach program, called 
Christian Relief and Education for Development (CRED). His task was to learn about the 
causes and solutions to poverty in the developing world, and then to share this knowledge 
by presenting at educational events for the congregation and local schools. At the end of 
each educational event, donations for the church’s programs in Africa would be collected. 
Soon the church sent Valerio to Tanzania to bring back first-hand stories of church’s 
benefits in the region. Greg encountered many producers of handicrafts on this trip (e.g. 
bags, figurines, batik fabrics), which sparked his idea to transform the church’s very 
traditional charity model (cash donations were used to provide Tanzanians with food and 
medical care) into a model that paid Tanzanians cash for their goods by selling them in 
England at the educational events. These “global bazaars” were very successful, and soon 
Valerio was making regular sourcing trips to Tanzania on behalf of the church.   
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 On one such trip, Valerio encountered some Tanzanians selling finished pieces of 
jewelry. He wanted to buy some for the church’s bazaar, but wanted to meet the actual 
producers (as he did for the other products he sold, since personal stories were good for 
sales). He was taken to where the jewelry was manufactured, and refused to buy the 
product due to the terrible conditions he observed (e.g. metallic dust was poisoning the 
workers, many of whom were children). Valerio further inquired about where the actual 
metal came from, and learned of about the complicated and problematic gold supply 
chain. He was eventually taken to a nearby mine in which the status quo conditions of 
ASGM were present, and again he was shocked and refused to buy any of the jewelry 
until the supply chain could be made both traceable and ethical. But rather than these 
experiences repelling him from involvement with jewelry, Valerio felt inspired to devote 
his life to transforming the sector. Upon returning home, he partnered with his church to 
create CRED Jewelry, a for-profit social enterprise founded and run by Valerio that 
channeled a portion of the profits back to the church. He began learning as much as he 
could about the jewelry industry, sourcing from the most ethical gold, diamond, and 
gemstone supply chains he could find, and advocating for jewelry sector reform. His 
transformation into a norm entrepreneur determined to bring the world’s first traceable, 
ethically sourced jewelry to market was complete.  
1.2: Resource Strategies 
Despite CRED Jewelry being up and running in 1996, Valerio was unsatisfied with the 
ethical implications of the materials he was able to source for years (Valerio 2013). 
Finally, circa 2002, a friend introduced him to Columbian development scholar and 
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activist Catalina Cock. Cock insisted that Valerio accompany her on a trip to Colombia 
where she was working with a group of miners in the Choco Rainforest who were 
producing completely ethical gold. In partnership with several local NGOs, Cock had 
helped the miners to form a cooperative called Oro Verde, acquire permits to pan alluvial 
deposits without chemicals, protect the water from siltation, restore the land after 
extraction, and sign a contract with a refinery in nearby Medellin that was willing to 
refine their gold separately from other sources so that it could remain traceable. Valerio 
travelled to Colombia in 2004 and found in Oro Verde exactly what he’d been looking 
for. He bought a small amount of gold from these miners and flew back to the UK. After 
passing the gold along to his manufacturers and designers, he put the world’s first fully 
traceable, ethically produced gold wedding rings on his store shelves. Although he 
originally wanted to source ethical diamonds and gemstones as well, none of the “ethical” 
operations he’d visit met his standards, and he decided that focusing on one precious 
mineral might be the best strategy anyway. Once the market for ethical gold was secure, 
he could use the new proceeds to invest in developing these other sectors, using the 
power of example to motivate both consumers and producers.  
With proof of the ethical gold concept in his hands, Valerio’s new goal became 
scaling and spreading the Oro Verde model to other mining communities and consumer 
markets. To do this, he partnered with Cock and the Columbian NGOs in 2004 to form an 
umbrella NGO called the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM). While ARM’s 
members possessed the knowledge and experience necessary to spread the Oro Verde 
model to other mining communities, only Valerio had knowledge of the jewelry industry. 
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Valerio believed, however, that his knowledge and industry power were insufficient to 
truly transform ASGM, and that consumers would want an external guarantee on the 
ethical claims retailers would be making, such as the Kimberley Process gave diamond 
consumers.  
Therefore, Valerio proposed that partnering with an existing, well-established 
third-party certification organization was their best way of moving forward, and he also 
believed that marketing efforts should focus on the UK first (Valerio 2013; Respondent 
4). UK markets (as opposed to other European, American or Asian markets) were his 
target because 1) he knew them from his jewelry industry work, and 2) he saw them as a 
good incubator for launching new ideas and ethical movements given their small size, 
large financial power, and relative homogeneity. Valerio proposed that FLO, rather than 
another certification organization, should be their target because it was (at the time) the 
most recognized ethical brand in UK markets, and given the newness of the idea of 
certified gold, he wanted something already engrained in the UK consumer culture shift 
in consumptive practices was as easy as possible.  
 In planning their pitch to Fairtrade Foundation (FLO’s UK branch), ARM decided 
to offer FLO more than a good story— they wanted to present Fairtrade with services that 
lowered the costs of entering the new sector as close to zero as possible. The first sector 
entry step in most governance organizations is usually commissioning a research report 
(Respondents 3, 4, 6, 7). This costs money and time, and ARM hoped to remove this 
expense for FLO by both providing them with a report on ASGM that they had 
commissioned from the World Resources Institute (Valerio’s idea based on tip from a 
  
93 
mentor) and by virtue of the industry experience housed in ARM’s staff— Valerio knew 
the jewelry business, and the Columbian NGOs new how to reform mining (Valerio 
2013). ARM further sought to reduce entry costs by presenting FLO with a pre-written 
certification standard. ARM downloaded the basic standard FLO used for its other 
products and rewrote it to be applicable to small-scale gold mining, saving FLO’s staff 
this investment of time and energy (Valerio 2013). Finally, ARM had a ready-to-sell 
product that could (retrospectively) be considered to have been made according to this 
standard. In other words, on top of the research and pre-written standard, ARM offered 
FLO ‘proof of concept;’ evidence that the idea of certifying ethical gold could actually 
work in practice. 
1.3: Communication Strategies 
 With this bundle of services in hand, ARM planned its pitch to FLO. The task of 
asking for partnership was given to Valerio, likely because he possessed many of the 
traits that theory says are important for delivering a good pitch. Recall from Chapter 2 
that the transnational advocacy literature suggests that aspects of the messenger are at 
least as important in persuasion as the message itself. And a target’s perception of and 
experience with a messenger are largely the product of discursive exchange. The target 
has internal rules and preferences for receiving messages that follow the basics of “if, 
then” thinking—for example, “If we have friends in common, then I can trust him,” or “If 
he talks about profit, then he doesn’t understand our organization,” or “If there are no 
numbers in a pitch, then it is not to be taken seriously.” The job of a norm entrepreneur is 
to make discursive choices that motivate the target to behave in the desired way. Of 
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course material conditions might not be malleable (e.g. entrepreneurs may enter a pitch 
with funding, the right social connections, or neither), but the framing of material reality 
is always the choice of the entrepreneur, and can tip the scales in their favor.  
 Before frames are even deployed, theory says that English language skills and 
personal charisma are factors encouraging success, and Valerio had plenty of both 
(Respondent 3, 4; Lamb 2008). He was a native speaker like his target, and is described 
by respondents as a charismatic story teller (he describes himself as being “very 
convincing,” noting that his theatre background has been helpful) (Respondents 3, 4). 
Valerio secured the opportunity to exercise his skills via his relationship with Katharine 
Hamnett, a well-known British designer of high-end political tee shirts (Valerio 2013, 
Respondent 4). In the 2000s, Hamnett was focusing her advocacy on the harm to human 
development caused by the fashion industry, and particularly the plight of cotton farmers. 
In 2003, FLO was in the early stages of entering the cotton sector, and Hamnett contacted 
Fairtrade Foundation requesting some pamphlets to hand out during her London Fashion 
Week show. Harriet Lamb (then Director of Fairtrade Foundation) was thrilled to be in 
touch with Hamnett and keen on getting her to commit to a line of tee shirts made 
exclusively of Fairtrade cotton. The two agreed to discuss the future of their partnership 
over dinner at Hamnett’s house, and Hamnett decided to invite Valerio to this dinner too. 
Valerio had studied Hamnett’s success and become her mentee and friend. She knew he 
was seeking partners for his ethical jewelry campaign, and saw this as the perfect 
opportunity for him to make his pitch.   
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 When Lamb first encountered “Katherine’s friend, Greg Valerio,” he was 
“lounging in a sofa, trendy shirt unbuttoned revealing his large chunk-chain necklace” 
(Lamb 2008). By all respondents’ accounts, Valerio and Lamb, both the epitome of 
“charismatic leaders,” “hit it off” immediately (Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4). In Hamnett’s 
kitchen over glasses of champagne, Valerio explained to Lamb the plight of small-scale 
miners, noting its similarity to that of the small-scale agricultural producers FLO was 
already working with. He noted the technical findings from his commissioned World 
Resources Institute report, and spoke of his personal travels to Tanzania. “Truth and 
light” were the values by which he lived his life, he explained, and now that he knew the 
truth about gold mining, he had a “moral obligation” to ethically transform his own 
jewelry business and shed light on the problems of the industry as a whole (Valerio 2013, 
Respondent 4).  
 Valerio explained to Lamb that he would begin this process in a few months (in 
February 2004) by visiting the Oro Verde miners in Colombia and bringing the world’s 
first ethical wedding rings to market. He argued that the demand for ethical jewelry 
existed in the public, although it was largely latent at that moment. Once the public knew, 
he argued, the demand would follow, just as it had for fair trade agriculture. Through 
these conversations in this communicative context, Valerio persuaded Lamb that 
certifying gold was an idea worthy of pursuit by FLO. Lamb gave Valerio her number, 
and asked him to arrange a formal meeting with her after his trip to Oro Verde (Valerio 
2013, Respondent 4).  
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 This exchange represents a major success for Valerio, who at the time (2003) had 
nothing more to offer FLO than his stories about what he had seen and why FLO should 
do something about it. Between this dinner party in 2003 and their formal meeting in 
2006, Valerio and his partners prepared for the pitch in the previously described ways 
(e.g. formalizing ARM as an organization, buying gold from Oro Verde, downloading 
and adapting FLO’s standard, and deciding on persuasive frames for arguments). Finally, 
over a glass of wine, Valerio pitched to Lamb the bundle of services ARM could offer 
FLO, arguing that FLO  was “uniquely suited” to help the miners out of “poverty” 
because of FLO’s years experience with small-scale producers and high levels of 
consumer recognition (Respondent 4). If FLO didn’t help the miners, Valerio argued, no 
one would. And now that FLO knew, and had a pre-written standard and product ready to 
sell, they had a “moral obligation” to act (Respondent 4). Valerio recalls that persuading 
Lamb was “not difficult,” and she agreed to champion the idea of gold certification 
within Fairtrade Foundation (Respondent 4).  
1.4: Summary of Norm Entrepreneur Attributes 
 Recall from Chapter 2 that theories of advocacy suggest that a norm 
entrepreneur’s personal background, communication strategies, and the services they 
provide shape their degree of success. The empirical evidence gathered for this case 
suggests that these theories are strong: many of the factors predicted to be positively 
associated with successful advocacy were present in the case of FLO and Greg Valerio. 
Process-tracing of the interview evidence suggests Valerio’s background and 
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communication strategies shaped Lamb’s perception of the value of gold entry to her 
organization and the value of the services ARM could provide. 
 Assessing the role of personal background is difficult because the author was not 
able to conduct an interview with Harriet Lamb. However, Lamb did write about her first 
meeting with Valerio in her 2008 autobiography, and the author did interview Valerio 
and others familiar with their relationship, and it seems that his outsider status, similarity 
to his target, and status as an unlikely leader helped his advocacy succeed, as did his 
“credentials” in terms of being a jewelry store owner as well as a colleague of someone 
FLO trusted and wanted to work with (i.e. Hamnett) (Valerio 2013, Respondent 1, 2, 3, 
4). Theory defines credentials in terms of academic degrees and sees them as helpful, but 
in this case, Valerio’s lack of formal education and status as a ‘rebel’ member of the 
industry targeted for reform (as opposed to a member of an NGO targeting that industry) 
made him an “unlikely leader,” which is also helpful to advocacy. Valerio started with 
nothing and built his own capacity as a poverty and industry expert. In many ways, this 
mirrors the path of personal development FLO hopes to encourage in the producers it 
works with. FLO and its affiliates likely, then, respect this path, and therefore respect 
Valerio. “Similarity to the target” also played a role. Despite the difference in academic 
credentials (Lamb has a master’s degree), Lamb and Valerio are roughly the same age 
and had both spent extensive time in developing countries working with producers 
effected by chemical pollution (Lamb befriended banana producers who suffered from 
DBCP, Valerio befriended miners suffering from mercury) (Lamb 2008, Valerio 2013). 
Beyond this, respondents report that they share many personality traits (e.g. lack of 
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snobbishness, “big idea” orientation, “charismatic” personalities) that made them fast 
friends (Respondent 3). Lamb was excited by the prospect of working with someone with 
whom she got along so well, and felt that they shared the same vision of FLO’s mission. 
This is in part, of course, because of the communicative tactics Valerio deployed. 
 Valerio used his command of English and drama to convey an argument for sector 
entry calibrated to resonate with Lamb. Rather than emphasizing mining’s impact on 
deforestation or the financial success it would have as a certified product, Valerio used 
moral argumentation and focused on the issues of poverty, child labor, and chemical 
pollution. He did not solely use moral argumentation, however—he tempered this with 
technical facts on the scale of the ASGM problem from his previously commissioned 
research report and, in his formal meeting, the practical fact that a gold standard and 
compliant product were ready to hit markets. While he did not offer any funding or 
celebrity connections to get the project started, his expertise in jewelry and ARM’s 
expertise in mining would offset any capacity deficits FLO might be worried about. 
Finally, Valerio’s first pitch was delivered in Lamb’s preferred setting for forming new 
partnerships, someone’s house as opposed to their office (recall that Lamb had tried to 
recruit Hamnett for partnership by attending a dinner at Hamnett’s house).  
 
Clearly lowering the financial and transaction costs of sector entry makes it more likely, 
but theories of norm entrepreneurship would emphasize that the way such services are 
conveyed shapes their perceived value (Carpenter 2014; Schmidt 2011). When asked 
about the practical, rational, and financial reasons why FLO entered gold, a key 
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respondent said she really couldn’t find any. In her words, “I’m trying to think of a 
rational-material reason why we went into gold as opposed to something else, and there 
and there just isn’t one— it was totally emotional and all about Greg and Harriet” 
(Respondent 3). Valerio was also described as “the perfect person for Harriet” 
(Respondent 3), but it is important to note that this perception of a perfect match is the 
result of specific communicative choices, not luck. While some facts like his education 
and upbringing were out of Valerio’s control, the majority of facts that shaped Lamb’s 
perception of the wisdom of the idea of gold sector entry were open to Valerio’s 
manipulation. Had another person occupied his role as norm entrepreneur, they likely 
would have made different choices, and the results would likely be different as well.  
 While the evidence suggests that a specific expression of norm entrepreneurship 
was essential to FLO’s decision to enter gold, and therefore a necessary condition, it also 
suggests that it wasn’t a sufficient one. Convincing Lamb was the key to getting the idea 
to certify gold inside the organization, but what caused it to gain traction and successfully 
manifest as a regulation? Since Lamb was not an all-powerful dictator, but rather the 
director of an organization with specific rules, processes, and values, studying FLO’s 
organizational culture is essential to understanding the full story of gold sector entry. The 
interaction of FLO’s gold entrepreneur and organizational culture, this project argues, are 
jointly sufficient for explaining FLO’s sector entry decision.   
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Section 2: Organizational Culture 
2.1: Introduction  
 As explained in Chapter 2, organizational culture is another important factor to 
consider when explaining aspects of organizational agenda setting, such as sector entry. 
An organization’s culture is typically defined in the business and sociology literatures as 
the “set of shared meanings that make it possible for members of a group to interpret and 
act upon their environment” (Schein 2010). An organization’s rules, values, and 
processes as understood and practiced by its members shape its evolution in two ways. 
First, these cultural attributes move the organization down a particular evolutionary path 
through the practice of business as usual, i.e. making the “best” response to new 
situations given the incentives of the status quo. Second, if the organization encounters a 
new stimuli (e.g. a norm entrepreneur’s advocacy), culture can help explain the 
organization’s response to it.   
 Whereas the focus in the last section was on the norm entrepreneur as the agent, 
this section focuses on the organization as the agent (or, more specifically, the agency of 
ideas within the organization). It picks up the story where the last section left off—in 
2006 at the formal meeting between norm entrepreneur Greg Valerio and Fairtrade 
Foundation director Harriet Lamb. Shifting the perspective to the organization at this 
point reveals why the idea to certify gold survived in the organization, despite 
considerable organizational pushback. The analysis shows that certifying gold was not 
the natural outcome of path dependence, although certain aspects of FLO’s culture did 
encourage that outcome. On balance, it appears that gold sector entry would not have 
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happened by way of organizational culture alone. It was the interaction between norm 
entrepreneurs and the organization’s culture during the 2006-2009 period that enabled 
sector entry to happen.  
 The following sections use organizational cultural attributes to finish telling the 
story of why FLO entered the gold sector. After describing FLO’s typical process for 
sector entry, the sections highlight the organizational cultural attributes that worked in 
favor of FLO’s governing gold, followed by the attributes that worked against it. The 
conclusion explains how Valerio and Lamb interacted with these factors to tip the 
balance of power in gold’s favor.  
2.2: Typical Process for Sector Entry 
 As explained previously, FLO as an organization was formed in 1997 as an 
umbrella structure to coordinate and steer the work of the 19 national marketing 
initiatives (FLO 2015). Each of these individual initiatives had their own fair trade 
visions, strategies, product arrays, standards and labels, and FLO emerged to unify them 
into one transnational organization with all of these facets in common. FLO operates 
according to the following basic structures and processes (FLO 2015; FLO Annual 
Reports 2000-2015). First, it divides its affiliates into five groups: 1) producers, who are 
organized into regional networks comprised of representatives from cooperatives in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; 2) national marketing initiatives, who 
lobby retailers to buy products bearing the Fairtrade label; 3) traders, who buy from the 
producer cooperatives and sell to the retailers; 4) a general management staff, who work 
at Fairtrade’s international headquarters in Germany to implement the organization’s 
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strategy by writing product standards, organizing producer capacity building programs, 
managing finances, etc.; and 5) a Board of Directors that defines the organization’s 
mission and sets its strategy by voting on new initiatives and allocating resources to 
them.  
 In terms of processes, FLO brings the producers and national labeling initiatives 
together every May in a General Assembly to discuss issues, elect the Board of Directors, 
and approve the Board’s decisions. Producers and national marketing initiatives have had 
different voting rights over the last 15 years, and therefore have wielded different levels 
of power at different times. Bennett (2015) charts three distinct periods in which changes 
in voting power occurred, reflecting what interview respondents say was a general 
attempt to progressively devolve more power to representatives from “the South” 
(Respondents 1, 2, 3). During the period 1997-2005, producer networks were not invited 
to General Assembly meetings and had no representation on FLO’s Board. During the 
period 2005-2011, producers gained voice but not equality. The 3 producer networks 
were invited to join the 20 national initiatives in the General Assembly, but each of these 
networks had 1 vote, resulting in 3 votes from producers and 20 from national initiatives. 
Similarly, the producer networks were given membership on FLO’s Board, but they held 
only 4 of the Board’s 13 positions (Boards were comprised of 4 producer representatives, 
5 national initiative representatives, 2 trader representatives, and 2 members from outside 
of the organization). Finally, during the period 2011-2015, producers gained true 
equality: 3 producer networks now share 50% of the General Assembly votes, and they 
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have 4 out of 11 Board seats (national marketing initiatives also have 4, traders have 2, 
and independents have 2).  
 The voting power of producers is an important aspect of culture and is critical to 
explaining FLO’s sector entry decisions because ideas for new sectors typically come 
from producers already in the system who have engrained interests and preferences 
(Respondents 1, 3, 6). New products are usually proposed by producers who would like 
to extend the percent of their business that can be Fairtrade certified (Respondents 1, 2, 
3). For example, if a farmer sells both coffee and nuts but only coffee is governed by 
FLO, they’ll propose that FLO enter the nut sector. Alternatively, ideas will come from 
the national marketing initiatives, and very often from Fairtrade Foundation, which has 
served informally as the lead for new product research for the past 15 years (Respondents 
1, 2, 3). In either case, ideas for new sectors are usually first presented to FLO as a 
collective in the General Assembly meetings, and it is also in these meetings that the 
Board’s decisions on them are finalized.  
 The typical sector entry path is a four-step process (Respondents 1, 2). The first 
step is conducting preliminary research. If a member of the FLO system is serious about 
getting a standard created for a product, they must start by conducting a feasibility report 
which minimally argues that 1) the sector is trapping producers in poverty and certifying 
the product is possible and would improve their situation (referred to as by respondents as 
“the development case”), and 2) a sufficient market for the certified product either 
currently exists or could be built (referred to as “the business case”) (Respondent 1). The 
second step is creating a standard for the sector, which requires an investment of time and 
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energy by FLO’s staff. If the Board decides, based on the feasibility report, internal 
opinions, and FLO’s strategy for the coming years, that sector entry is a good idea, they 
will turn the project over to the Standards Committee (a department housed in FLO’s 
headquarters in Germany) who is charged with working out the details. It is fairly normal 
for a product team to be created as well, composed of members of the various segments 
of the organization (e.g. people from the standards, marketing and producer relations 
areas) who become experts on the product and oversee its launch. When the standards are 
nearly complete, the third step is presenting the case for sector entry to the Board, who 
votes yes or no (majority rule) on devoting the requested resources to bring it to market 
(e.g. money for advertising, specialty staff, producer capacity building, etc.). Finally, the 
board’s decision is brought in front of the General Assembly, which votes yes or no on 
the Board’s budget which includes allocation to the new sector.   
2.3: Attributes Favoring Gold Sector Entry  
 There are four aspects of FLO’s organizational culture 2006-2009 that helped 
gold survive this sector entry process to become a newly certified product. First is the 
strategy FLO chose to achieve its stated mission of “enabling the sustainable 
development and empowerment of disadvantaged producers and workers in developing 
countries.” FLO’s “Strategic Plan” for the period 2003-2008 covered the critical year 
2007— the ten year anniversary of FLO as an organization. In the years leading up to this 
milestone, there was a belief held among FLO’s leadership that FLO had proved its basic 
model in the last decade and needed to reflect on the question “What’s next?” There was 
a lot of talk about how to “stay fresh” and “relevant” (Respondent 3). The answer to these 
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questions in the Strategic Plan was to achieve 3 goals by 2008: doubling the number of 
certified cooperatives, increasing sales of existing product categories, and, critically, 
extending the FLO’s work to new non-food product sectors (FLO’s Strategic Plan 2003). 
This was not that reason that Valerio chose FLO to pitch instead of another organization, 
but it is likely a reason why Lamb (as a leader of FLO) was particularly excited about the 
idea to certify gold in their formal meeting in 2006.  
 To select a new product from the many possible candidates, FLO’s Strategic Plan 
also stated that it would listen to “indications” from its national initiatives. Therefore the 
second aspect of FLO’s culture that fostered gold sector entry was Lamb’s position 
within the organization: she held the highest post in Fairtrade Foundation (FF), the UK’s 
national initiative which did the majority of research for FLO on new products 
(respondents described it as an “incubator” for new ideas (Respondent 3)).  Lamb was 
thoroughly convinced by Valerio that gold was a perfect match for FLO’s mission and 
that, indeed, FLO had a “moral obligation” to help the miners. In her organizational 
position at FF, she had the power to take action on these personal beliefs by assigning her 
New Products Team the task of applying for a grant to do a feasibility study on gold. The 
team won a grant from CAFOD and used part of the funds to send a team to meet the 
miners ARM was working with in South America in January 2007 (Valerio 2013; 
Respondent 3). After being shown that an ethical supply chain existed in Oro Verde in 
Columbia and could be replicated in some mining cooperatives in Peru, the FF team 
agreed to begin the work of convincing FLO to govern the sector. In the Spring of 2007, 
FF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ARM which kicked off the 
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formal negotiating process with FLO (Valerio 2013). Between 2007 and 2009, multiple 
meetings between ARM, FF, and FLO were held, during which representatives from FF 
and ARM tried to convince FLO’s producer networks, national initiatives and other key 
members of FLO (namely Board members) that certifying gold was a wise move. 
 A key point that FF and ARM emphasized in these meetings was how similar the 
issues effecting and emanating from the gold mining sector were to those effecting and 
emanating from sectors FLO already governed (Respondent 2, 3, 4; Lamb 2008; Valerio 
2013). FLO’s familiarity with and preference for these issue traits is the third 
organizational factor supporting gold sector entry. The project’s research corroborates 
Carpenter’s (2014) findings that governance organizations care a great deal about 
whether the issues involved in a new campaign are: 1) linkable to issues they are already 
governing, and 2) whether they have certain attributes known to be associated with 
successful campaigns. Many of ASGM’s issues are linkable to issues FLO was already 
working with and have three of five attributes the advocacy literature suggests are helpful 
to campaign success (see Chapter 2 for a review).  
 The first of these is the fact that the majority of mining’s harm is physical as 
opposed to mental or political, and this attribute tends to be associated with campaign 
success and therefore made gold sector entry more attractive. Second, when the victims 
of such physical harm are a systematically discriminated against or a relatively vulnerable 
group, attractiveness increases. This helped gold since the miners of Oro Verde (which 
Valerio focused on in his pitch) were Afro-Colombian (descendants of African slaves and 
a marginalized population) and mercury poisoning is most dangerous to pregnant women 
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and children (relatively vulnerable groups). Third, these ASGM issues are very similar to 
issues present in other sectors governed by FLO. For example, child labor is a problem 
on cocoa farms, and chemical pollution via pesticides is a problem in nearly all 
agricultural sectors. This similarity would enable FLO to make linkages between its 
existing sectors and gold, which is important for marketing and building on existing 
organizational knowledge and skill capacities. In a sense, linkages are an important way 
of lowering the start-up costs for sector entry and keeping momentum growing on issues. 
However, not all of the attributes of issues associated with gold encouraged sector entry. 
Working against gold is the structural nature of poverty (which drives the livelihood) and 
the lack of already-in trouble perpetrators. But FLO was founded to combat poverty, and 
they were not afraid to confront any type perpetrator. So on balance, the attributes of 
issues associated with ASGM encouraged gold sector entry, and ASGM had more of 
these positive issue attributes than other sectors FLO was considering at the time, such as 
timber.   
 Finally, the fourth organizational cultural factor that encouraged gold sector entry 
was FLO’s voting structure at the time the idea to certify gold was made. As explained in 
the previous sub-section, decisions on sector entry are made by the Board and approved 
by the General Assembly. Therefore the distribution of voting power among proponents 
and opponents of gold at the time of the vote was critical to gold’s success. The strongest 
opponents to gold within the organization were the producer networks, and the network 
for Latin and Caribbean producers (known as the CLAC) was the biggest opponent of 
them all (Respondent 2, 3, 4). The CLAC’s beliefs about themselves and FLO’s mission 
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differed from what was written in FLO’s official documents and articulated by its other 
members. Rather than being a network of “small-producers,” as they are described, they 
identify as “farmers,” and as such they do not feel a sense of solidarity with other small 
producers such as fisherman, timber workers, or miners  (Respondent 2, 4). Further, they 
actually felt great animosity toward gold miners, describing them as “criminals” who 
encroach on their land and pollute their waters (Respondent 3). The CLAC believed the 
miners’ interests were directly opposed to theirs, and were highly against any channeling 
of FLO’s resources to support them (Respondent 2). The CLAC believed that any 
additional resources should go toward furthering the work started in agriculture— if more 
products and producers were to be brought into the Fairtrade system to “keep it fresh” 
and meet the mission, they argued that these expansions should be within the context of 
agriculture (Respondent 2).  
 Had the official sector entry vote occurred just a few years later (in 2011 or later), 
the producer networks would have had more equal voting power on both the Board and 
the General Assembly, making gold sector entry much less likely. However, the official 
sector entry vote that formalized the partnership between ARM and FLO happened in 
November 2009. At this time, producer networks had gained positions on the Board, but 
they did not have enough votes to outnumber the other members (the five national 
initiatives, the two traders, and the two independents). Harriet Lamb, members of FF’s 
“Gold Team,” Greg Valerio and the members of ARM worked hard to convince these 
other Board members that gold sector entry was a wise choice worthy of their vote 
(Valerio 2013). While the votes of specific Board members are confidential, a majority of 
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the Board eventually voted in gold’s favor and the General Assembly approved the 
decision, despite what respondents say was significant pushback from not only the 
producer networks, but also several marketing initiatives and the members of FLO’s 
general management team (Respondent 2).  
2.4: Attributes Working Against Gold Sector Entry  
 In addition to the producer networks who saw their relationship to gold miners in 
zero-sum terms, gold was a difficult sell to these other factions within FLO because of 
their cultural beliefs on what makes a sector favorable (i.e. likely to be a successful 
certification initiative) (Respondents 3, 6).  
My empirical research found that sectors are viewed more favorably by FLO if 
the product : 1) has production levels that are of a predictable (rather than “potluck”) 
nature (Respondents 2, 3); 2) is a basic necessity (rather than luxury) good (Respondent 
3); 3) is a “fast-moving consumer good (FMCG)” (rather than a slower moving good that 
stays on store shelves longer) (Respondent 3); 4) has a simple (rather than complex) 
supply chain (Respondent 6); 5) is one that FLO is familiar with (as opposed to one that 
will require research and hiring of new staff) (Respondent 3); 6) is linkable to existing 
products such that existing producers, retailers, and advertisers will benefit (Respondent 
3), and 7) has proof of concept, i.e. a functioning ethical supply chain that exists in reality 
(rather than in theory) (Respondent 4). Gold had none of these attributes except the last, 
which alarmed many whose votes were needed to approve gold sector entry. They 
worried that the wrong values on these four factors would prevent FLO from being able 
to scale the initiative in the way that was needed to strategically fulfill its mission (i.e. 
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fulfill the strategic goals for increased benefits to producers listed in FLO’s 2003-2008 
Strategic Plan) (Respondents 2, 3). These reasons for these organizational preferences 
and worries are as follows. 
 First of all, gold’s potluck nature meant that supply would be unsteady. This 
meant that income for the miners would be unsteady, and FLO wouldn’t be able to 
provide a price floor, which is something they were known for and a key poverty 
eradication strategy (producers need steady income in order to plan, invest, and survive 
shocks). This was a major problem for FLO’s French national initiative, which believed 
price floors were what differentiated fair trade from capitalism as usual, and were 
therefore their “raison d’être.” And everyone worried that if this departure from FLO’s 
usual practices confused or displeased consumers, it might have a negative spillover 
effect on FLO’s other products.  
 Second, gold’s luxury status presented three main problems. First, Carrigan and 
Attalla (2000) revealed a “values-action gap” among consumers of luxury goods wherein 
consumers who prefer ethical goods for more standard purchases forgo ethical purchases 
on luxury goods, focusing instead on aspects of the good that are a boon for the buyer’s 
vanity (e.g. label recognition, aesthetics). Second, for that small group of consumers who 
do want ethical luxury, it is more difficult to create a clean ethical slate. The problem, 
respondents said, was that if a coffee consumer goes ethical, she can empty help pantry of 
unethical coffee fairly quickly, such that all future cups give her the “warm glow” of 
remembering her altruistic decision. In contrast, luxury products are kept a long time. If 
FLO put out the narrative that all jewelry is bad, every time a consumer looks at their 
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wedding ring (which they likely won’t throw away like coffee) they feel bad. FLO 
worried that consumers would come to resent them for these new, negative feelings. 
Third, luxury products are more expensive per purchase than FLO’s typical certified 
product and therefore untested: would consumers still be willing to pay a social premium 
of 10-15% at price points of $500 and above?  
 Related to its luxury nature, another problem with jewelry is that it is a “slow 
turning” rather than a “fast moving consumer good,” meaning that it is bought 
infrequently (Respondent 3). Milk, for example, is a fast moving consumer good because 
it expires, whereas a gold ring never expires and can stay on store shelves indefinitely. 
This model can present cash flow problems to businesses using the Fairtrade license (and 
thus cash flow problems for FLO, which earns income from each licensed sale). And 
again, as with the problem of high-price point items, FLO had no organizational 
experience with slow turning goods nor the jewelry industry more generally, which 
meant it would need to invest in research.  
 And finally, gold jewelry’s supply chain is more complex than the other products 
FLO has worked with. Coffee, for example is grown, harvested and processed by 
producers, then the green beans are exported. An importer roasts them, and they arrive on 
store shelves. The product is not changed much from extraction to sale. Gold’s supply 
chain, by comparison, is much more complex with many more product transformations 
and thus actors preferences to align (see Chapter 3). As one respondent reported, “if all 
other things are equal, we’ll go with the product with the simplest supply chain” 
(Respondent 6). 
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2.5: Summary of Organizational Culture’s Role in Gold Sector Entry  
 Despite these factors working against gold, and despite the 2008 financial crisis 
that made FLO decide to enter only one instead of several new sectors to achieve its 
goals, gold survived the process to become FLO’s most recently governed sector.  
 Many organizational cultural factors worked against gold sector entry. The 
producer networks opposed gold based on their perceptions that miners were “criminals” 
and that deepening investment in agriculture was the best way to fulfill FLO’s mission. 
Others worried about gold’s commercial viability, opposing gold on the grounds of its 
potluck and luxury nature, its slow rate of sale, and its complex supply chain. It was also 
very different from FLO’s existing products, which meant the need to hire an industry 
expert and pay more money for advertising and marketing because gold could not easily 
be linked to existing campaigns (linking coffee and chocolate, for example, was seen as 
easier). The majority of the Board (the producers, traders, and “independent” members 
who were representatives from retail stores FLO sold products in) all stood to gain from 
expanding into a products they already worked with, while none of these actors stood to 
gain directly from expanding into gold because none of them made it or sold it. So why 
do it?  
 Several factors favored gold sector entry, too. A key component of FLO’s strategy 
for achieving its mission was to find a new non-food product to certify, and the leader of 
the organization that spearheaded new product research (Harriet Lamb of FF) was hand-
delivered the idea of ethical gold, which had proof of concept thanks to the work of 
ARM, the Oro Verde miners and CRED jewelry. After Greg Valerio convinced her of the 
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wisdom of governing gold, she championed the idea within her organization by 
highlighting FLO’s moral obligation to the miners and FLO’s familiarity and 
commitment to the issues associated with mining, if not the sector itself. Annual reports 
indicate that between 2006 and 2009, FLO was especially focused on the issue of child 
labor (a huge problem in mining) and was reworking their standards to make them more 
environmentally rigorous, particularly with regard to chemical pesticide use. Lamb 
argued that entering gold would draw increased attention to these efforts and keep the 
organization “fresh,” “relevant” and perceived as a bold leader of ethical trade, which 
would benefit all sectors in the long-run. In the end, the balance of voting power among 
gold’s proponents and opponents tipped the decision in gold’s favor. Producer networks 
had some, but less, power in 2009 than they do now, and gold proponents were able to 
convince the other Board members to vote in favor of certification.  
 The formal partnership between ARM and FLO was signed in November 2009, 
and in January 2010 Valerio resigned from CRED to become a consultant with FLO on 
the project (Valerio 2013). ARM and FLO worked together to build the capacity of 
miners and demand of ethical consumers. Their first jointly-labeled product hit UK 
jewelry stores in February 2011 (Valerio 2013; FLO 2015).  
  
 Analyzing organizational culture was critical to understanding why the idea to 
certify gold entered and gained traction in FLO—the story could not have been told by 
analyzing the actions of norm entrepreneurs alone. Neither, however, could the story 
have been told by analyzing organizational culture alone. Organizational culture does not 
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explain how the idea to certify gold entered FLO, nor does it explain why the factors 
favoring gold sector entry overcame those pushing against it. Taken together, however, 
analysis of norm entrepreneurs and organizational culture sufficiently explain why FLO 
decided to govern gold. The influence of the network gatekeeper effect, by contrast, adds 
nothing to the story of gold sector entry. This finding goes against Carpenter’s (2014) 
findings that organizational decisions on agendas are highly influenced by the agenda 
decisions of network leaders. The following section reviews the evidence on the 
gatekeeper hypothesis, and discusses potential reasons why our findings differ. 
 
Section 3: Network Gatekeeper Effects 
 Recall from Chapter 2 that a third factor discursive institutionalism and the 
advocacy literature suggest might influence sector entry decisions is the “follow the 
leader” or “gatekeeper effect,” wherein the agenda of the leader of a network influences 
the agendas of the less powerful organizations (Bob 2005; Carpenter 2014). Two types of 
networks might have influenced FLO’s decisions on gold sector entry 2006-2009: the 
ethical trade issue network, and FLO’s own organizational ego-network.  
 The Ethical Trade Network is a term this project uses to describe the group of 
governance actors working to transform global supply chains such that they do a better 
job of protecting the environment, fostering social equality, and alleviating poverty. Since 
FLO’s mission and strategy is to create better lives for producers by labeling products 
that are more ethical, they are clearly members of this network and may admire or wish 
to work in solidarity with other members of the network. The second type network is 
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FLO’s ego-network. Unlike the ethical trade issue network which is built around an idea, 
an ego-network is built around an actor, and is akin to an individual’s social or 
professional network. An actor may or may not be the most powerful member of their 
ego-network, and the same logic applies regarding agenda setting power: if FLO is not 
the leader, then they might take their agenda setting ideas from those more powerful than 
them or their peers in order to improve their reputation or simply secure funding 
(although the discursive and advocacy literature suggest that the gatekeeper effect is not 
associated with the desire to get money from the leader).  
 Obtaining data on networks that existed more than 5 years ago is an imperfect art. 
The three types of data the project collected are best approximations of the ideal data one 
would acquire, and deficiencies are noted where they occur. That said, the project’s 
conclusions are based on analysis of three types of network data. First, the project 
followed Carpenter’s protocol of using IssueCrawler software to conduct hyperlink 
analysis in order to determine, to the extent possible, who the network leaders were 
during the years when FLO was deciding on gold (2006-2009). Second, it analyzed all of 
FLO’s annual reports from 2006-2009, noting how many times and in what context actors 
were mentioned. Third, the author interviewed the FLO representatives who were the key 
decision-makers during that period. Unlike the effect of norm entrepreneurs and 
organizational culture, the gatekeeper effect did not play the predicted role in shaping 
sector entry decisions: none of the data show clear evidence of FLO being influenced by 
the agenda of network leaders (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4). The following sections explain the 
analysis undergone to reach this conclusion. After reviewing which actors emerged as 
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network leaders according to each type of data, it evaluates whether there appears to be a 
match between these leaders’ agendas and FLO’s decision to enter gold.  
3.1: Hyperlink Data 
 Because it is analyzing a decision that took place between 2006 and 2009, 
networks created using current hyperlinks are of limited use. To address this problem in 
the case of the ethical trade network, the project took two approaches: 1) it obtained an 
ethical trade network created in IssueCrawler in 2007 by fair trade researcher Lance 
Bennett, and 2) it created my own ethical trade network using IssueCrawler based on 
current links (i.e. links in existence 6 years after the gold decision was made).  
 Bennett’s network uses as “seeds” or starting points a group of mostly European 
NGOs working on ethical trade. It is a decent start, but the results would be stronger if he 
had included some IGOs and more global organizations as starting points. Nevertheless, 
if the true leaders of the networks are IGOs or non-European organizations, then these 
actors should end up in his captured network due to the way the software works (the 
starting points would all link to these true leaders, and any actor who receives two or 
more links from the seeds is considered a network member). The clear leader of 
Bennett’s network is the Fairtrade Foundation, which is followed by CAFOD, Christian 
Aid, Trade Justice Movement, and Oxfam.   
 The network created is based on a broader set of starting points— global IGOs, 
NGOs, and firms known for their CSR efforts were equally represented— and results in a 
very different set of actors as leaders. The UN system appears to lead the network, with 
the World Bank ranking as the gatekeeper and UNEP, ILO, FAO and the UN 
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headquarters website as strong actors. The Fairtrade group ranks highly, as it does in 
Bennett’s 2007 network, but this time it is Fairtrade International rather than Fairtrade 
Foundation (UK) that takes the lead, suggesting growth in the unified image of the 
organization in the last five years. The International Union for Concerned Scientists 
(IUCN), which is a hybrid environmental organization comprised of both government 
and non-governmental members, also ranks prominently. 
 
Bennett’s 2007 Ethical Trade Network   My 2015 Ethical Trade Network  
Fairtrade Foundation 28  World Bank 18 
CAFOD 20  UNEP 16 
Christian Aid; Trade Justice Movement 19  UN 15 
Oxfam 18  Fairtrade International 14 
   ILO, FAO, IUCN 13 
     Table 4.1 Ethical Trade Network 
 To assess whether FLO was influenced by its ego-network 2006-2009, the project 
again use Bennett’s work, but this time employ a network created by him in October 
2009 which solely uses Fairtrade member organizations as starting points (as is 
appropriate, making this network quite applicable and in line with best practices for this 
analysis). The leaders of the resulting ego-network are listed in the Table 4.2. Taken 
collectively, FLO and its members receive more than 7 times the number of in-links than 
the next highest actor, the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO). Taken separately, 
FLO and Fairtrade Foundation are still in the lead but more equally ranked, with FLO 
getting 45 in-links, FF getting 40, and WFTO getting 39. The European Union-sponsored 
European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and Oxfam came in next but well below the 
WFTO, with 22 and 21 in-links, respectively.  
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Leaders of IssueCrawler Ego-Network  
Actors In-links 
FLO Affiliates (FLO gets 45, FF UK gets 40) 309 
WFTO 39 
EFTA 22 
Oxfam 21 
 
     Table 4.2 Leaders of Ego Network 
3.2: Text Data 
 The second source of network data is FLO’s annual reports from 2006-2009. The 
author read each of these reports thoroughly, noting how often and in what context actors 
external to FLO were mentioned. The three main areas of reports in which external actors 
were typically mentioned were in the project highlights, the board member biographies, 
and in the list of donors. While the patterns across years vary, some general findings are 
clear.  
 Oxfam is clearly the most mentioned and arguably the most influential network 
actor to FLO 2006-2009.  Oxfam is mentioned 5 times in both the 2007 and 2008 annual 
reports, and two of these mentions are because two board members are ongoing or past 
Oxfam affiliates. Another Oxfam mention is because Fairtrade Foundation received grant 
funding from them, which they shared with FLO as a whole. And the remaining two 
Oxfam mentions are either citations for the reports they’ve written or appreciation for 
their partnerships on specific projects. Very few actors are mentioned more than once in 
the annual reports, so this high mention rate stands out and the presence of Oxfam 
representatives on the Board presents a clear opportunity for influence.  
 Many donors contributed to FLO during these years, and donors get particularly 
high mention rates in the 2009 annual report (which is the first report following the 2008 
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financial crisis). Donors ICCO and Irish Aid are mentioned three times in the 2009 
annual report, which is just one mention more than most other donors get (DFID, EED, 
HIVOS, MISEREOR, SECO and Denmark’s Roskilde Music Festival all get two; the 
remaining donors get one). FLO’s corporate partners who act as donors by paying 
licensing fees and placing large orders for certified projects receive frequent mention as 
well, with the leaders being Sainsbury, Marks and Spencer, Cadbury, and Starbucks.  
 Finally, the FINE network— comprised of FLO, WFTO, NEWS and EFTA— is 
mentioned only once in each report, but FLO uses intensity rather than frequency of 
language to emphasize their importance. This group of actors shares a fair trade advocacy 
office in Brussels, from which they construct joint campaigns to lobby for “trade justice 
policies” (e.g. lobbying against agricultural subsidies) and to promote their alternative 
trade offerings.  
Leaders of Annual Reports Ego-Network  
Actors Mentions 
Oxfam 11 (5, 5, 1) 
ICCO; Irish Aid 4 (1, 1, 3) 
Marks and Spencers; Sainsbury; ISEAL; Cadbury; Dfid; EED; HIVOS; 
MISEREOR; Roskilde Music Festival; SECO; Starbucks 
2 (various) 
FINE Network: IFAT/WFTO; EFTA; NEWS Noted specifically as 
important partners 
 
     Table 4.3 Leaders of Ego Networks in Annual Reports 
3.3: Interview Data 
 Perhaps the most important, although not least biased, type of data is from the 
interviews conducted with the individuals who were involved in FLO’s gold sector entry 
  
120 
decision 2006-2009. In December 2014, the author asked these respondents about how 
their networks impacted their and FLOs thinking with regard to sector entry: In thinking 
about the ethical trade movement, which organizations do you respect the most? Which 
organizations do you turn to learn more about ethical trade? Which organizations or law-
making bodies, if any, effect your sector entry decisions and how?  
 The answers were quite uniform across respondents: they didn’t “think about it 
that way” (Respondent 3). As Respondent 3 put it with regard to sector entry decision-
making, “It’s more about speaking to the [producers] and the observations of our teams. 
It’s internal.” Nevertheless, in the course of conversations certain actors did come up. 
Sainsbury and Cadbury were mentioned in the context of their absence, i.e. what they (or 
actors like them) weren’t saying. If FLO had a large retailer they were already working 
with ask them to certify a product, they’d look into it (Respondent 6). But this didn’t 
happen in the gold case. SECO was mentioned by Respondent 2 as an important donor, 
and the ILO was mentioned by Respondent 1 as an organization that “of course” FLO 
respects. Overall, however, respondents understood why these network theories existed in 
academia, but insisted that FLO didn’t operate that way on sector entry decisions. 
Instead, respondents emphasized the role that Greg Valerio played, and noted that he, and 
then Harriet Lamb, were responsible for the gold decision, that ARM came to FLO (not 
vice versa), and that gold was an atypical case anyway— that usually new ideas come 
from the producers on the ground. They did note that they took outside organizations and 
institutions more into consideration after the sector entry decision was made, when FLO 
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is drafting its standard for the new sector. This influence will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
3.4: Agenda (Mis)matches Between Leaders and Followers  
 Taken together, the hyperlink, text and interview data suggest that the following 
were important actors in FLO’s networks 2006-2009: FLO itself and especially the UK’s 
Fairtrade Foundation, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Trade Justice Movement, Oxfam, World 
Bank, UNEP, UN, ILO, FAO, IUCN, WFTO, EFTA, SECO, ICCO, Irish Aid, ISEAL, 
Marks and Spencers, Sainsbury, Cadbury, Starbucks, Dfid, EED, HIVOS, MISEREOR, 
Roskilde Music Festival. Of these, the true network leaders—defined here as those who 
either have a big lead in rankings or are mentioned in more than one data source, are: 
FLO itself and FF in particular, the World Bank, WFTO, Oxfam, ILO, SECO, Sainsbury, 
Cadbury. 
 If the gatekeeper hypothesis is correct, then the agendas of these organizations 
should match the agenda of FLO 2006-2009. More specifically, if FLO’s decision to 
enter the gold sector was influenced by the agenda of a gatekeeper, then the agenda of the 
gatekeeper should say something about the need for more governance of gold, minerals, 
the jewelry industry, or issues associated with ASGM, like mercury pollution or child 
labor (although these issues are present in other sectors too, so making that connection 
could be problematic). To test this hypothesis, the project gathered data on the 2006-2009 
sector agendas of the World Bank, WFTO, Oxfam, ILO, and SECO. Sainsbury and 
Cadbury were eliminated since these food companies would be neutral to negative about 
FLO’s gold sector entry decision (had FLO wanted to follow their lead and align with 
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their interests, they would not have entered gold). The resulting evidence for the 
gatekeeper effect was weak to non-existent.  
 The ILO is an agency of the UN promoting decent opportunities for work in 
contexts where human rights are enforced (ILO 2015). The ILO was definitely engaged 
with the issue of small-scale mining during the period of FLO’s decision, but again, 
reviews of annual reports and publications during the period suggest that it wasn’t a 
major priority relative to other sectors. In 1999, an influential report on the need for more 
governance attention to artisanal mining was published, and each of the years 2006-2009 
saw the annual publication of case study reports on the mining sector, and occasionally 
on ASGM specifically. While this would help FLO justify its gold sector entry, it is hard 
to argue that ILO’s agenda inspired it. It is unlikely the rousing effect of the 1999 report 
lasted through 2006-2009, and the main events and policy reports were on coal mining, 
not gold. So the evidence in support of the gatekeeper hypothesis is weak at best.  
 Evidence of the World Bank providing FLO with agenda inspiration is even 
weaker. The World Bank is UN organization aiming to “end extreme poverty by 
decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3%” 
and to “promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for 
every country” (World Bank 2015). To accomplish these goals, they “provide low-
interest loans, zero to low-interest credits, and grants to developing countries,” meaning 
that they typically lend to governments and not organizations, although firms and NGOs 
are eligible in certain cases (World Bank 2015). The link between the World Bank and 
ethical trade is in their investment in developing country export industries, such as 
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agriculture and natural resource extraction. If in the period 2006-2009 the World Bank 
had been very active in funding mining projects, then FLO may have been more 
amenable to entering the gold sector, since they may have been able to partner with gold 
producing countries to secure loans or grants for their capacity building activities, thus 
lowering FLO’s start-up costs and the risks associated with the new sector. The evidence 
in support of this mechanism is mixed. On the positive side, “Energy and Mining” does 
rank ahead of “Agriculture” in terms of budget priorities during the period. On the 
negative side, “Governance” and “Transportation” rank higher still, and there is no 
upward trend of increased spending on mining either in this period or before. Further, the 
World Bank tends to lend money in support of projects engaging large-scale producers as 
opposed to small-scale ones, which are the focus of FLO. Therefore it appears doubtful 
that FLO’s decision to govern mining was inspired by the World Bank’s agenda priorities 
during this period.  
World Bank Sector Spending Across Years, by Annual Budget Percent (created by author) 
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2006 25% 14% 13% 7% 9% 7% 8% 7% 
2007 22% 20% 7% 7% 11% 12% 8% 5% 
2008 21% 19% 17% 6% 7% 10% 8% 6% 
2009 20% 13% 13% 7% 13% 9% 7% 6% 
 Table 4.4 World Bank Spending 
 The World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) is a non-governmental fair trade 
advocacy and labeling organization that works closely with FLO, and both organizations 
note their desire to harmonize and coordinate their strategies and agendas. Their 2007-
2009 annual reports note the need for increased attention to the environment, and 
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encourage the labeling of handicrafts, but the majority of their attention is on improving 
trade issues that span economic sectors rather than encouraging members to expand into 
new economic sectors. Regarding advocacy for handicrafts (of which jewelry is 
occasionally considered a type) the impetus for advocacy was their flagging sales. 
Therefore this amounts to negative publicity for the idea of certified gold jewelry, and 
works against gold sector entry.  
 Oxfam is a large transnational NGO working to fight poverty by supporting the 
functionality of small-scale livelihoods (Oxfam Annual Reports 2006-2009). Oxfam was 
among the first organizations to set up a fair trade “global” shop of the type that sells 
ethically produced goods from producers in developing countries, so they share an 
affinity of mission with FLO. FLO had two Oxfam members on the its Board 2006-2009, 
but there is nothing in Oxfam’s annual reports from that time that indicate that the 
organization was in favor of more governance attention for mining. Mining doesn’t 
appear in any of these reports, although it is a sector receiving increased attention from 
the organization today. 
 Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) gives both advice 
and money to middle-income developing countries and former Soviet states in order to 
“promote economic growth that is socially responsible as well as environmentally and 
climate-friendly” (SECO 2015). In reviewing their reports during the 2006-2009 period, 
nothing was found on gold or mining. However, they did enter the gold sector in 2012 
with the launch of their Better Gold Initiative, a public-private partnership between 
SECO and the Swiss Better Gold Association aiming to make small and medium sized 
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mining operations both traceable and environmentally friendly. In a 2012 report they 
noted their intent to partner with new labeling initiatives like FLO’s. This is likely why 
the FLO respondent mentioned SECO, but due to the timing, SECO is clearly not 
causally linked to FLO’s decision to enter the sector. 
 This fact combined with FLO’s high network rankings and the interview data 
claiming that FLO gets its agenda ideas internally suggests that FLO itself may be the 
gatekeeper of its ego-network, and a powerful enough leader of the ethical trade network 
that it does not typically look outside of itself for sector entry ideas. Perhaps this is the 
case, or perhaps the gatekeeper effect is not found with certification organizations and the 
issue of ethical trade. Either way, my analysis provides a useful contribution to the 
conversation started by Carpenter (2014) and that is being continued by Auld and 
colleagues. Fransen et al’s (2016) research on ethical trade networks shows that 
certification organization networks are more diffuse than are networks for other human 
development issues (such as the human security concerns and organizations studied by 
Carpenter). If they are more diffuse than Carpenter’s networks, then it is understandable 
why I’d find less of a gatekeeper or diffusion effect present in certification organization 
decision-making. Further, Carpenter studied the decision-making rationale only for 
organizations who were not the gatekeeper. Therefore, if I accept that FLO is indeed the 
gatekeeper of its ego-network and the ethical trade network 2006-2009, then my analysis 
adds nice information about how agenda decisions are made within the gatekeeper 
organization itself. 
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Section 4: Summary of Findings on FLO 
To review, the evidence on the factors that shaped FLO’s decision on gold sector entry 
suggests that norm entrepreneurs and organizational culture worked together to turn the 
idea of certified gold into a reality. They were both necessary and jointly-sufficient 
conditions for sector entry. Greg Valerio’s personal characteristics, ideas about why and 
how to certify gold, and strategy for pitching these ideas resonated with Harriet Lamb’s 
ideas about the type of advocate to trust and the role FLO “should” play in the world in 
the present and future. With Lamb persuaded, the causal power of FLO’s organizational 
culture kicked in to shape the final decision on gold. While FLO’s ideas about what make 
a “good” sector to enter pushed both for and against certifying gold, FLO’s reliance on 
the Fairtrade Foundation’s expertise on new products and FLO’s voting structures at the 
time enabled Lamb, the leader of FF, to persuade a sufficient number of board members 
that the pluses of gold outweighed the minuses. Evidence suggests that the network 
gatekeeper effect did not influence FLO’s decision, perhaps because FLO itself is a 
network gatekeeper exerting agenda setting power on others. 
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CHAPTER 5: WHY GOVERN GOLD—RAINFOREST ALLIANCE CASE 
 
Recall from Chapter 4 that the methodological approach of this project is to learn about 
the drivers of sector entry decisions by studying positive and negative cases, i.e. to hold 
the sector constant, and study why one organization entered it (the positive case), and 
why a similar organization didn’t (the negative case). Now that the role played by 
discursive institutional framework factors in the positive case of FLO’s gold sector entry 
decision is clear, it is time to take the second step in this most-similar case study design: 
selecting a most-similar “negative” case (Gerring and Seawright 2008; Mahoney and 
Goertz 2004). The number of negative cases in the population of transnational 
certification organizations is larger than the number of positive cases, although it is still 
small (under 30 cases) making their study not well-suited to statistical analysis. Examples 
of most-similar negative cases include the Rainforest Alliance (RA), Certified Wildlife 
Friendly (CWF), Audubon International (AI), Utz, Electronic Product Environmental 
Assessment Tool (EPEAT), and more. 
 Of these negative cases, the best selection for a most-similar case is the Rainforest 
Alliance (RA), which shares more theoretically relevant “background noise” with FLO 
than any other case (Gerring and Seawright 2008; Mahoney and Goertz 2004). Both 
organizations share similar mission statements, are multi-product certifiers, operate in 
many of the same (mineral-rich, low human development) countries, and have shown a 
willingness to expand beyond their initial agricultural product base to enter new sectors 
(FLO has expanded into jewelry, and RA has expanded into tourism and leather) (FLO 
2015; RA 2015). RA further serves as a ‘most likely’ case to certify ASGM for three 
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reasons. First, from its inception RA has worked to protect tropical forests, which are 
significantly harmed by small-scale mining operations (Auld 2014; Hilson and 
McQuilken 2014). Second, it has one of the largest operating budgets of any CO in the 
population, therefore simple material constraints are unlikely causal mechanisms since it 
has higher financial capacity than other negative cases to enter sectors that align with its 
goals (RA Annual reports 2005-2010). So not only is RA the most similar case to FLO, it 
is also a “deviant case” (Gerring and Seawright 2008) and together the two form the 
empirical puzzle motivating this project. Finally, initial interviews with Rainforest 
Alliance staff revealed that the idea to certify ASGM had, in fact, entered the 
organization, so it would not be a case where the answer was simply “we never heard of 
the problem” (Respondents 7, 9, 12, 14). While it would be interesting to find out why 
they hadn’t heard of the problem but FLO did, the better comparison is a case that was 
aware of the problems in the sector yet decided not to enter it. Luckily, RA is such a case. 
The case study covers RA’s history as an organization, with special attention paid to the 
period between 2006 and 2009, during which FLO encountered and decided to pursue the 
idea of certified gold. 
   Figure 5.1 from Gerring and Seawright (2008) 
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Section 1: Norm Entrepreneur Attributes 
 As with FLO, there is strong evidence that the idea to certify gold entered the 
organization via a norm entrepreneur, i.e. an individual who actively lobbied for the 
organization to enter the sector. The norm entrepreneur active in the RA case, however, 
was both very different from the one in the FLO case and very different from the 
entrepreneurs who’d been successful in shaping RA’s sector entry decisions in the past.5 
These differences interacted with RA’s organizational culture to result in unsuccessful 
sector advocacy. Had the RA’s gold entrepreneur, organizational culture or network 
leaders been different in the particular ways specified in the following sections, RA likely 
would have entered the gold sector. However, as the following sections explain, the 
values on these factors during the 2006-2009 period were such that their combined effect 
was to make RA stay out of the gold sector and enter the tourism, cattle, and palm oil 
sectors instead.  
 While the gold entrepreneur in the RA case appears to not have possessed the 
right qualities to successfully persuade the organization to enter the gold sector, RA does 
have a history of entrepreneurs shaping sector entry decisions. In a very concrete 
example, RA entered both the flowers and tourism sectors at least in part because of the 
actions taken by a norm entrepreneur whose name is withheld for privacy. This flower 
and tourism entrepreneur (Respondent 7) is from Costa Rica, a country he describes as 
experiencing both “the best and the worst” of what connection to global value chains can 
                                                
5 The name of the norm entrepreneur advocating for gold sector entry in this case is withheld since the 
person was promised anonymity and they have not published a book explaining their story. They are simply 
referred to as the gold entrepreneur in this case study. Where appropriate, other entrepreneurs are likewise 
referred to by their sector entry preference, i.e. the cattle entrepreneur or the tourism entrepreneur. 
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provide. The entrepreneur’s interest in the ecotourism industry led him to Brandeis 
University where he wrote his master’s thesis on which “non-traditional products” the 
Rainforest Alliance should govern (the flower sector was his top recommendation, 
followed by tourism). In 1998, RA read the entrepreneur’s thesis, hired him, and took his 
advice by entering the flower sector (a project which the entrepreneur was put in charge 
of). Once RA’s flower program was successfully underway in 2000, the entrepreneur 
approached JP Morgan for a grant to fund a pilot project in one of his other leading non-
traditional sectors. The entrepreneur was thrilled when JP Morgan selected tourism, and 
began constructing his tourism pitch.  
 In the year 2000, RA was a relatively small and informal organization with a 
culture that enabled a lot of interaction between more junior and senior employees. The 
entrepreneur’s audience would be RA’s brand new Chief Executive, Tensie Whelan, and 
others directly responsible for sector entry decisions. The entrepreneur’s personal 
background and strategic communication and service provision all combined to make 
him a highly persuasive advocate to RA. The entrepreneur was not an “unlikely leader” 
in the way that Greg Valerio in the FLO case was, and with regard to tourism he came 
from within the organization rather than from outside of it. Despite coming from inside of 
the organization, the entrepreneur was somewhat dissimilar from RA’s American 
decision-makers in that he was Costa Rican and possessed on the ground, first hand 
experience with sustainability troubles in that country, and in the tourism sector in 
particular. He housed this expertise in his MA thesis, and provided RA with this free 
research report, external funding, connections to ready-to-certify tourism operations in 
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Costa Rica, and promised to oversee the launch of the project on top of his ongoing work 
in the flower sector. In essence, he made the financial and non-financial start-up costs to 
entering tourism exceptionally low (similar to the low that Greg Valerio brought them to 
for gold). Further, he pitched the idea and these services to RA decision-makers using the 
full force of his charisma and English language skills (which were comparable to Greg 
Valerio’s). Finally, the entrepreneur calibrated his ask by presenting more numbers than 
appeals to morality or emotion, and emphasizing how tourism would bring more business 
to producers RA was already working to serve (many of the ethical tour operations he 
had contact with were on RA-certified coffee plantations or forests). The entrepreneur’s 
advocacy was persuasive to RA, who entered the sector informally in 2008 and formally 
in 2010. The entrepreneur is now a valued member of RA’s leadership team, and admits 
that the best product entrepreneurs have “personal drive” (meaning they use their 
personal time to do the work required to construct carefully tailored pitches) which helps 
tip the decision in their favor when an organization is faced with several equally good 
sector candidates (Respondent 7). 
 Individual activists are not the only norm entrepreneurs RA listens to. Interviews 
indicate that it is fairly typical for RA to take meetings with firms wanting to partner with 
RA to pursue new ideas (Respondents 9). Respondent 9 told the story of a large retail or 
wholesaler firm (whom they refused to name) arranging a meeting with RA to pitch them 
an idea. The firm recognized the usefulness of having labels like FLO’s and RA’s which 
signal that a product has been made and traded according to the “best practices” housed 
in these standards, but there was no label in the marketplace to inform consumers that the 
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product was “not the worst.” In other words, the firm wanted something to segregate the 
market into “worst,” “not worst,” and “best,” and RA agreed that this might be helpful 
and decided to pursue the project. Why did they listen to this firm? The respondent said 
nothing about the persuasiveness of the firm’s argument or communication. Instead, they 
said that the firm was a client they really wanted to recruit because the firm had a lot of 
money to spend on certified products and that translated (in the respondent’s mind) into a 
lot of benefits for producers and ecosystems. Not all firms are automatically successful, 
however. Jewelry retailer Tiffany and Company approached RA circa 2005 to ask 
whether they thought a collaboration for certified mining of all of their gems and 
minerals might be a possibility (Respondent 14). RA conducted a cursory research report 
and concluded that there was nothing they could do to help Tiffany at that point in time 
(Respondent 14).  
 This verdict came as a disappointment to those within RA who believed that RA 
should enter the mining sector (Respondent 14). Chief among these people was the gold 
entrepreneur, identified by RA interview respondents as an individual continually 
advocating for mining sector entry (Respondent 7, 11, 12, 14). The gold entrepreneur 
joined RA in the early 1990s following work with major natural resources consulting 
firms and NGOs. Since joining RA, he has focused mainly on forestry. In line with this 
work, he visited many of the world’s forests and circa 2006 began perceiving an 
“increased negative influence of mining on forest stewardship around the globe” 
(Respondent 14). Issues the gold entrepreneur witnessed included miners “hunting 
endangered species for food, destroying watersheds, and using toxic chemicals like 
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cyanide and mercury”—all problems that directly threaten biodiversity (Respondent 14). 
With the growing demand for consumer electronics, he argued, these negative influences 
of mining will only increase and RA will have to “tackle them eventually” (Respondent 
14). Apart from being a problems in their own rights, the gold entrepreneur further 
witnessed the inability of FSC-certified forest managers to protect their borders from the 
activities of illegal miners, which challenged their ability to maintain their certifications, 
which in turn hurts RA’s effectiveness. “If it were up to me,” he says, “[RA] would be in 
the mining sector tomorrow” (Respondent 14).  
 The gold entrepreneur advocates for gold sector entry in each of RA’s leadership 
meetings in which sector entry decisions are made (more on these in the next section). To 
date, however, he has not been successful. This may be because of the differences in his 
attributes as a norm entrepreneur (differences in his background and strategies for service 
provision and communications) although it is difficult to point to any one factor as being 
causal. In terms of personal background, he is different from Valerio and the tourism 
entrepreneur in that there is nothing particularly remarkable about him (he appears to be a 
talented, dedicated employee, but he shares this with many RA staff members). He was 
not an “unlikely leader” like Valerio, nor did he come from a country important to the 
candidate sector, like the tourism did. Perhaps more importantly, he did not bring (and 
therefore didn’t emphasize) as many service provisions to the sector-negotiating table as 
Valerio and the tourism entrepreneur did. The gold entrepreneur is not an expert in 
mining, he does not have contacts within the mining or jewelry industries, he has not 
done any personal (or personally commissioned) sector research, and he has never 
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brought in any donor money to help launch the sector. This said, he knows more about 
mining than most, and could probably be communicating the services he could provide in 
better ways, making the problem more his discursive decisions and lack of effort than the 
cold hard facts of reality.  
 In sum, gold entrepreneur has done nothing to lower the costs of gold sector entry 
and makes several communication errors. For example, he talks too much about the 
problems without offering concrete solutions (there is no proof of concept of ethical gold, 
from what he’s seen), and he does not frame mining in a way that helps RA leaders see 
how the sector could benefit (or at least not detract from) RA’s ongoing projects with 
producers and retailers in different sectors. These are all things that the tourism 
entrepreneur did do, and Valerio did nearly all of them as well. According to the gold 
entrepreneur and others, however, the main reasons why gold failed to be selected 2006-
2009 (and tourism, cattle, and palm oil were entered instead) had to do with RA’s 
organizational culture (Respondent 5, 7, 11, 12, 14). These factors are considered next. 
 
Section 2: Organizational Culture 
2.1: Introduction  
 Recall from the FLO case study that organizational culture is the group of rules, 
values, and processes that constitute the “set of shared meanings that make it possible for 
members of a group to interpret and act upon their environment” (Schein 2010). As with 
the FLO case, analysis of this framework factor is necessary to understand the effects 
RA’s organizational culture had on their gold sector decision. Once the idea to certify 
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gold was inside the organization (which it was circa 2007 thanks to the gold 
entrepreneur), which aspects of RA’s culture persuaded the organization against it? Using 
the same format as the FLO case study, the following subsections use organizational 
cultural attributes to explain why the gold entrepreneur’s advocacy efforts were 
insufficient to persuade RA to govern gold. It begins by describing RA’s typical process 
for sector entry, then reviews the organizational cultural attributes that worked both for 
against the idea of governing gold. To conclude, it explains why the organizational 
factors pushing against gold overpowered both the factors pushing towards it and the 
gold entrepreneur’s efforts.  
2.2: Typical Process for Sector Entry  
 RA was founded in 1986 at a conference convened by a group of activists to deal 
with the growing problem of tropical deforestation (RA 2015). From their headquarters in 
New York, the organization created rules for sustainable forestry (known as the 
SmartWood standard). In 1993, RA worked with a group of NGOs to expand this work 
by creating the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), to whom they essentially outsourced 
their forest certification work and over whom they maintain significant, but not ultimate, 
control and influence. Throughout the 1990s, their work expanded into certifying 
bananas, coffee, and cocoa. In 1998, they repeated their outsourcing move that had 
worked successfully in forestry by creating the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), 
which was charged with creating and managing the details of RA’s agricultural standards. 
Unlike the FSC, however, the SAN remains a subsidiary of RA, their certification system 
being “jointly owned” by both organizations. Many organizations sit on the SAN’s board 
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and all have equal voting power over agricultural sector entry decisions. However, 
interview respondents say that because of the “special relationship” between RA and the 
SAN, RA members hold more (albeit informal) agenda setting power (Respondent 9). 
 In 2000, RA underwent a major change in leadership when founder Daniel Katz 
stepped down from his position as CEO and was replaced by Tensie Whelan (RA 2015). 
In this same year, RA launched a new formal process of managing agenda priorities via 
the creation of 5 year strategic plans. Over the course of Tensie’s tenure, there have been 
three such plans. During 2000-2005, RA expanded to certify maple syrup, flowers, 
pencils and snowboards, and gained Kraft as a major corporate client in 2003. In the next 
2005-2010 period (during which FLO was deciding to govern gold), RA acquired many 
more corporate buyers for their products (Scholastic, McDonalds, Holiday Inn, Whole 
Foods, Unilever, Costa Coffee, Nestle, Mars, American Airlines), began work on climate 
change by partnering with the Voluntary Carbon Standards, and entered five new sectors: 
paper (2007), palm oil in (2008), and tea, tourism, and cattle (beef and milk) (all in 
2010). In the final 2010-2015 period, they gained Caribou as a coffee client, deepened 
their work on climate change, began work on sustainable finance, and added spices and 
leather handbags to their sector array.  
 These strategic initiatives are the result of decisions made via RA’s agenda setting 
process. Every five years, they “crowd source” ideas from their community by 
conducting “internal scans” of the agenda preferences RA staff and “external scans” of 
the preferences of “key players in the NGO world as well as private sector decision 
makers, UN agencies and so on” (Respondent 7). RA’s goal is “retrofit” how they are 
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“positioned” according to their key stakeholders’ agenda preferences (Respondent 7). 
The 9 members of RA’s “leadership team” (President and Vice Presidents) organize the 
data from both scans into categories and discuss them with the “senior staff” (roughly 
100 leaders in the organization) at a planning retreat (Respondents 7, 11, 12, 14). Each 
idea is analyzed “vis a vis the availability of resources and the level of expected impact” 
(Respondent 12). Respondent 12 explained that they essentially plot two axes: “[We] put 
mission fit on one side, then ability to influence on the other, and you get four quadrants. 
If [a sector’s] in the top right hand corner, then that’s where we go.” Sectors in the right 
hand corner undergo SWOT analyses (assessments of the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats posed by a decision), and the leadership team conducts a final 
prioritization of the candidate sectors. They present their plan of action to RA’s 18 
member board for approval, but respondents described this step as a formality—all the 
decision making power is with the leadership team, and the board has historically 
approved all of their suggestions (Respondent 14). Task forces are then assigned for the 
new initiatives, which are implemented by existing staff (outside hires for new projects 
are rare, but occasionally occur) (Respondents 7, 12).   
 Respondents report that the idea to enter the mining sector has appeared on the 
scans and been debated at planning retreats since at least 2005 (Respondents 7, 11, 14). 
Each time it fails to become a priority. During the 2006-2009 period in which FLO was 
entering gold, RA was entering tourism, cattle, paper and palm oil instead (RA 2015). 
Why did gold lose out to these sectors? The previous section noted the weaknesses of 
gold’s norm entrepreneur relative to Valerio (of the FLO case) and the tourism 
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entrepreneur (who successfully advocated tourism to RA). But the gold entrepreneur 
himself blames RA’s organizational culture, a perspective that the data also supports. 
Taken together, the gold entrepreneur deficiencies and RA’s cultural attributes provide a 
clear explanation of why RA chose not to enter the ASGM sector.  
2.3: Attributes Favoring Gold Sector Entry  
 There are four key reasons that derive from RA’s organizational culture that 
might have made gold an attractive sector for them to govern. First, no one from RA or 
SAN mentioned the potluck, non-FCMG nor luxury nature of gold as being a barrier to 
sector entry.6 RA seems to be very comfortable operating in sectors characterized by high 
price points and a low frequency of purchases, given that it entered both the tourism and 
the leather goods sectors (RA-certified Gucci handbags hit the market in 2013) (RA 
2015). By contrast, FLO had been very worried about these attributes of the gold sector, 
marking a distinct difference in organizational cultures that should have made gold entry 
more likely for RA.   
 Second, RA already had institutional capacity on the ground in many mining 
countries. This was highlighted as important by Respondent 12, who cited the successful 
cattle sector entry as an example. RA had already made many investments in Brazil to 
make it an amenable working environment for their timber and agricultural operations. 
Offices were built, staff were transplanted, relationships with government officials were 
made and the capacity of local NGOs and farmers had been built. Therefore, Respondent 
                                                
6 Recall from Chapter 4 the following definitions: “potluck” means that supply is unpredictable in terms of timing and quantity; 
FMCG stands for fast-moving consumer goods, which means that customers by the product frequently and the product must be 
restocked just as frequently; luxury refers to non-essential items with high price points.  
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12 explained, there were incentives for RA to expand their range of certified projects 
sourced from Brazil. Since Brazil is also a country with high levels of ASGM (see table 
in Chapter 3), this same logic should apply in support of gold sector entry: country 
expertise and capacity are already in place, so why not expand governance operations to 
gold?  
 Third, proponents of gold sector entry, like the gold entrepreneur, emphasize 
mining’s centrality to RA’s mission. The RA’s formal, written mission is to “conserve 
biodiversity and ensure sustainable livelihoods by transforming land-use practices, 
business practices and consumer behavior” (RA 2015; RA Annual reports 2005-2010). 
RA further describes its work as seeking to “satisfy the ever-increasing global demand 
for commodities, manufactured goods and travel” by working “tirelessly to shepherd 
extractive and land-intensive industries toward a new model of sustainability” (RA 2015; 
RA Annual reports 2005-2010). As the gold entrepreneur said he has argued in leadership 
meetings, “the environmental impacts [of mining] are potentially greater than the impacts 
of any other industry that we work with today” (Respondent 14). He insists that mining 
didn’t lose in the leadership meetings because of its fit with the mission (Respondent 14). 
Other factors, he argues, eventually convinced leaders that other sectors should be 
entered first.  
 Finally, RA’s voting procedures should have worked in gold’s favor. As was 
demonstrated in the FLO case, small-scale agricultural producers rarely feel solidarity 
with small-scale miners, and instead view them as “criminals” and in zero-sum terms (i.e. 
a dollar spent helping miners is a dollar taken away from farmers) (RA Annual Report 
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2015). In the FLO case, the voting rules in place at the time of the gold decision were 
such that farmers had a vote, although not equal voting power relative to other FLO 
affiliates. This situation made gold sector entry controversial, but possible. In the RA 
case, producer representatives were not among the decision-makers at all (Respondent 
14). The leadership team is comprised solely of high-level RA staff, which should have 
minimized this point of view and therefore encouraged gold sector entry. As it turns out, 
however, RA’s organizational culture meant that several members of the leadership team 
held many of the same perspectives on gold that FLO’s farmers held. On top of these, the 
leadership team held several other perspectives that pushed against gold sector entry.  
2.4: Attributes Working Against Gold Sector Entry  
 Overall, four factors pushed against both the gold entrepreneur and the aspects of 
RA’s culture that favored gold to ultimately thwart sector entry. First of all, review of the 
full range of interview text data reveals that there is a problem with the gold 
entrepreneur’s argument that everyone in the leadership meetings agreed that gold was a 
perfect fit for RA’s mission. In fact there was major disagreement on the degree of gold’s 
mission fit, and the data further revealed a discrepancy between how RA’s mission is 
described on paper and how it is understood and articulated by its affiliates. Like the 
concept of “sustainable development,” RA’s mission as written—to “conserve 
biodiversity and ensure sustainable livelihoods”—is broad enough to support an array of 
in-practice interpretations. For example, there is nothing about forests in RA’s mission, 
which is admittedly surprising given the organization’s name. However, nearly all 
interview respondents when asked about the mission mentioned deforestation, and 
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Respondent 12  literally described RA’s mission as “keeping trees standing” 
(Respondents 5, 9, 11, 12). Respondent 12 went on to specify the mission geographically 
as well by saying, “We are doing cattle because it's the largest driver of our mission… it's 
the largest driver of deforestation in the Amazon.” While mining causes a significant 
amount of deforestation through clearing areas for both mining sites and the roads that 
lead to them, it causes a lower amount of deforestation than cattle or palm oil (it causing 
significantly more, however, than most tourism operations) (UCS 2016). While it may 
inaccurate with regard to RA’s official documents, the logic voiced by many respondents 
was clear: our mission is deforestation, so we should focus on the key drivers of that, and 
mining’s not one of them.   
 Another respondent articulated the mission in the same way that it was written, 
and surmised that the misfit between it and mining was over the word “sustainable”— 
minerals removed from the ground cannot grow back, so ASGM cannot really be 
considered a “sustainable livelihood” (Respondent 5). This respondent believed 
(incorrectly) that RA had a policy against working with the extractive industries because 
they are irrevocably “dirty” and “not renewable” (Respondent 5). In Respondent 5’s 
words: “I mean, they’re taking off tops of mountains. It just doesn’t fit.” This comment 
took place during a conversation about both small-scale and large-scale mining, but it 
was clear that the respondent didn’t know much about the ASGM processes (only large-
scale mining removes mountain tops) and his mind had automatically turned to images of 
large-scale mining when assessing “mining’s” fit with RA’s mission.  
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 This is likely because RA’s true, internalized mission (as articulated by 
respondents and certain strategy documents) seems to be “mainstreaming sustainability” 
by “tilting the needle” in a sector such that environmentally sound and socially benign 
practices become the norm for actors of all scales (large and small). For example, their 
strategy statement from 2007 states that RA pursues “systemic changes that can “tip” 
key markets toward sustainability, which can in turn change mankind’s relationship to 
the planet.” This true mission leads to a second major reason why RA rejected gold: RA 
only enters a sector if they can “tilt the needle” in it, and this, they believe, requires the 
partnership of large-scale actors (producers, wholesalers or retailers) (Respondents 12, 
14).  
 This is a major cultural difference from FLO, who was (during the 2006-2009 
period) fine with fulfilling their mission by partnering with small-scale producers and 
small-scale retailers exclusively if need be. FLO welcomed the participation of large-
scale actors, but they didn’t require it. Conversely, RA welcomes the participation of 
small-scale actors but doesn’t require it. RA believes that the participation of at least one 
“influential” large-scale actor is the only “responsible” way to enter a sector because it is 
the only way to “tilt the needle in it” (Respondents 12, 14). All other approaches, it 
believes, are wasting money and are therefore immoral, because that money could have 
been spent in other sectors where it would do greater good (i.e. mainstream change in the 
sector) (Respondent 12, 14). FLO, for its part, believes that an incremental (as opposed to 
radical) approach to change in a sector is appropriate and indeed the “right” way to 
govern since FLO believes in the power of example—respondents thought that large 
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scale actors will likely not invest in change until they see that it’s viable, whereas small-
scale actors may be more willing to differentiate themselves by taking risks (Respondents 
2, 3, 4). From FLO’s perspective, waiting for large-scale actors to join is both unwise and 
immoral, as it allows (even a small degree) fixable harm to continue.  
 In addition to RA’s fear that they won’t do enough good without large-scale 
program participants, they are also afraid of the negative consequences that could occur 
without the large-scale actors’ “buy-in” (Respondent 14). Respondent 14 emphasized a 
fear of corporate lawyers, noting that this was a particularly strong threat given the 
extreme wealth of multinational mining firms and the extreme image sensitivity of 
jewelry retailers. In a similar vein of argument, Respondent 14 spoke of the politicization 
of gold as a problem, noting that there is even more business-government corruption 
problems in mining than there are in forestry and agriculture, and that they aren’t an 
organization that thrives by making enemies. They want to take care of their pro-business 
and pro-government reputation, believing that the promise of benefits as opposed to the 
promise of pain is a better tool for leverage, and that governments are key partners in 
their mission since better governance makes certification easier for everyone (by, for 
example, making land permits more accessible and by protecting property rights more 
effectively) (Respondents 12, 14).  
 RA therefore likes to wait until large companies want to change, a circumstance 
that only happens when adequate pressure is put on such companies from advocacy 
groups. The gold entrepreneur claims that to date there hasn’t been enough advocacy 
pressure on mining companies to “get them afraid and coming to RA for help” 
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(Respondent 14). Since RA requires such “buy-in” from the large-scale companies in 
order to be “relevant” (i.e. mainstream ethical changes per their internalized mission) and 
“safe from [corporate] lawyers,” this is a major reason why RA has not entered gold to 
date (Respondent 14). FLO confirmed this facet of RA’s culture, surmising that “they’d 
never enter a sector unless they had 2 to 3 large companies signed on ahead of time” 
(Respondent 2).  
 A third problem for gold was RA’s funding structures and their cultural belief that 
spending donations from a retailer working in one set of sectors in an unrelated one is 
inappropriate (Respondents 7, 12). Unlike FLO, RA has no ‘new products team’ 
(formally or informally) and respondents said they do not expect to obtain nor normally 
apply for outside funding for exploring new initiatives (Respondents 7, 12). Instead, RA 
plans to fund all exploratory work from the main RA budget and the associated new-
sector tasks will be assigned on top of the staff’s normal obligations (Respondents 7, 12). 
In contrast to FLO’s practice of seeking external grants on a per project basis, it appears 
from the financial sections of RA’s annual reports that they instead seek external 
donations to RA as a whole. It also appears to be a norm to have their corporate retail 
clients make these donations, as these actors appear frequently among lists of biggest 
donors in a way that they don’t in FLO’s financial reports  (RA Annual Reports 2005-
2010). In return for these donations, RA does not charge licensing fees to these firms 
(Respondent 12), whereas FLO does (and hence doesn’t push them for donations to the 
organization on top of these).  
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 The result of RA’s funding model is that any money spent on researching new 
sectors will have originated, at least in part, from donors like Unliever, Mars, or Kraft. 
Several respondents noted this as the reason RA chooses the sectors that it does, and why 
entering mining would be wrong (Respondents 9, 12). Respondent 12 said is was “unfair” 
to “poach” resources from one part of the organization to “start a completely new 
adventure in an industry we hardly know.” This respondent felt RA should focus 
investment on its “core business”—the sale of food and forest products—for practical 
reasons too. It takes “ten times more effort to recruit a new customer than to keep an 
existing one.” 
 In addition to this idea that “poaching” resources from corporate clients was 
wrong, a fourth idea pushing against gold is RA’s cultural belief in the wisdom and 
righteousness of deepening benefits to all existing affiliates (corporations and 
cooperatives alike). One way in which this manifests is RA’s desire to expand into 
sectors that benefit existing wholesalers and retailers (Respondent 12). In evaluating gold 
versus cattle and palm oil during the 2006-2009 period, for example, many of RA’s 
existing wholesale and retail clients stood to gain from RA’s entry into the cattle and 
palm oil sectors (Unilever sells palm oil-based margarine, soap and milk-based Ben and 
Jerry’s ice cream; McDonalds sells beef burgers and palm-oil based fries) whereas none 
of these companies stood to gain from gold sector entry.  
 A second way in which the idea manifests is by deepening benefits to existing 
producers (Respondent 5, 7, 12). RA does this by prioritizing sectors in which its 
producers are already working. In the case of cattle, for example, many RA-certified 
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farmers were also cattle ranchers, so certifying cattle required no new recruitment of 
producers and just added to the income of existing ones. Similarly, most of the RA-
certified tourism operations run tours of or are located within RA-certified farms or 
forests, again adding income to existing producers and also serving as advertisement for 
these products. Another way RA tries to serve producer interests is by not spending 
money on actors that farmers and forest managers perceive as enemies. As was the case 
with FLO, a major enemy of both farmers and forest managers appears to be the artisanal 
miner. RA’s 2013 annual report featured a story on this topic, focusing on RA’s need to 
help the heroic small-scale farmers fight back against the “criminal” small-scale miners. 
Unlike in the FLO case, however, this view of mining interests as directly opposed to 
agricultural and forestry interests was pervasive throughout all levels of the organization, 
including the leadership team that makes sector entry decisions. While RA’s voting 
structures that kept producers and farmers away from sector entry decisions worked in 
favor of gold, the pervasiveness of the zero-sum nature between gold and existing sectors 
worked against it. Finally, in addition to certifying more of their products and not helping 
their enemies, RA wished to create more benefits for producers by deepening and 
expanding the organization’s efforts on particular issues. RA wanted to increase the 
market share of certified products in existing sectors to drive higher volume of sales to 
producers, to increase the program premiums producers earned, and to deepen their work 
on gender empowerment and climate adaptation.  
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2.5: Summary of Organizational Culture Factors 
 Overall, RA believes in entering sectors according to the following priorities. 
First, a sector must benefit the organization’s true, internalized mission of mainstreaming 
environmentally-friendly practices in sectors impacting deforestation. To do this, they 
believe that they must have partnerships with large-scale producers, wholesalers, or 
retailers before any sector entry action takes place. Assuming the voluntary buy-in of 
large scale actors, sectors that do not harm and in fact benefit (first) existing wholesalers 
and retailers and (second) existing producers are preferable to those requiring the 
acquisition of new buyers, sellers and producers. 
 In light of these four cultural priorities (internalized mission fit, large-scale actor 
buy-in, don’t harm and in fact help existing clients), it is easy to see why the idea of gold 
sector entry lost and RA entered the tourism, palm oil, and cattle sectors instead. While 
some in RA felt that gold did fit RA’s missions, an equal number or more felt that it 
didn’t, or at least was less of a fit than cattle or palm oil, which cause larger levels of 
deforestation than mining. Further, while RA wasn’t afraid of the potluck or luxury 
nature of gold and the jewelry industry, they were afraid of the fact that no large-scale 
mining or jewelry actors were requesting their help, and RA is loathe to be seen as an 
enemy to business interests. RA wants to be seen as a corporate friend, one that uses the 
money corporations give them to further the corporation’s interests. This means entering 
sectors in which their large-scale clients are already working, which is chiefly those 
associated with agriculture and forestry. RA also wants to deepen the benefits to these 
sectors, which requires investment of the money that would otherwise be spent on new 
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sectors. Farmers and forest managers would be especially upset if RA used money 
donated by food and timber sellers to drive benefits to actors they perceive as enemies 
(e.g. miners). While these producers don’t have voting power, their sentiments are shared 
by many RA affiliates who do. Gold sector entry would have risked making existing 
affiliates feel betrayed, required the recruitment of brand new constituencies, and 
furthered RA’s written mission, but less so their internalized mission. These problems are 
absent from the cattle, palm oil, and tourism sectors, which benefited both RA’s 
internalized mission and their existing constituencies.  
 
Section 3: Network Gatekeeper Effects 
 The preceding discussion of the role played by norm entrepreneurs and 
organizational culture tells the majority of the story of why RA decided not to govern 
gold. While gatekeepers appear to be a bit more influential in the RA case than they were 
in the FLO case, the gatekeeper effect pales in comparison to the explanatory power of 
norm entrepreneurs and organizational culture. This conclusion emerged by following the 
same network analysis procedure as in the FLO case. The project gathered hyperlink data 
on RA’s position within the ethical trade network and its own ego-network, text data 
from its 2006-2009 annual reports and 2007 strategic plan, and interview data from 
several RA affiliates who were involved in organizational agenda setting 2006-2009. The 
following sections identify the network leaders from these data sources, and then assess 
whether there’s evidence of the gatekeeper effect shaping RA’s decision on gold.  
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3.1: Hyperlink Data 
 As was discussed in the FLO case study, the leaders of the ethical trade network 
during the 2006-2009 decision-making period were approximated using Bennett’s 2007 
“fair trade” network and my 2015 ethical trade network, both based on hyperlinks. To 
review, the clear leader of Bennett’s network is the Fairtrade Foundation, followed by 
CAFOD, Christian Aid, Trade Justice Movement; and Oxfam. And the author’s Ethical 
Trade Network suggests that UN actors occupied most leadership positions, with FLO 
and the IUCN being an exceptions, ranking as the 4th and 5th most in-linked actors. RA’s 
position in these networks is much less central than FLO’s: in Bennett’s 2007 network, 
RA doesn’t even rank as a network member (i.e. it didn’t receive links from two or more 
starting points or network members), and the author’s 2015 ethical trade network, RA 
shares the position of an 8th most in-linked actor among several others (receiving 9 
inlinks compared to FLO’s 14 and the World Bank’s 18).  
 
Rank ETN IC   
1 World Bank 18 
2 UNEP 16 
3 UN 15 
4 FLO 14 
5 FAO, ILO, IUCN 13 
6 FTF, CBD 11 
7 UNFCCC, FSC 10 
8 RA, ISEAL, GEF, UNDP, 
WFTO 
9 
     Table 5.1 Ethical Trade Network Issue Crawler 
 Identifying the leaders of RA’s ego-network 2006-2009 is more difficult because 
no researcher did an IssueCrawler hyperlink analysis on RA during this time. The only 
hyperlink data available is from the ego-network the author created for them in 2014, 
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which identified the US EPA as the gatekeeper (9 links), the FSC as the 2nd most in-
linked actor (8 links), and the  Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), EnergyStar labeling system, and the Rainforest 
Alliance themselves as sharing the position of 3rd most in-linked actors (6 links each).  
3.2 Text data 
 The text data available for RA is more reliable than the hyperlink data, but still 
not ideal. However, certain leaders can be identified. Like FLO, RA’s annual reports 
were heavy on mentioning their corporate partners, all of which were food companies 
(and none of which were mining or jewelry companies). But RA took this to a greater 
extreme in terms of quantity and exclusivity of corporate partner mentions during the 
years 2006-2009. By this the author means that nearly no transnational NGOs, 
foundations or intergovernmental bodies were mentioned in the text of the documents 
with the exception of the FSC, which RA created in 1993, and UN actors, which were 
featured in the 2006 and 2009 reports (but not in the 2007 or 2008 reports). The 2009 
report, overall, was more explicit in naming RA’s partners and network members. RA’s 
partnership with the Clinton Global Initiative was highlighted as were their partnerships 
with organizations in South America and the members of the SAN. Other text documents 
mentioned Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). But overall, and 
especially compared to FLO, mention of non-corporate actors was relegated to the donor 
listing pages at the ends of reports. Of these, the biggest donors during the period (each 
giving more than 1 million dollars annually) were the Gates Foundation, the GEF, the 
IDB-MFI, Kendeda Fund, UNDP, and USAID.  
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3.3. Interview Data 
 Luckily, interview data provided a comparative wealth of information. While 
reconfirming the network centrality of corporate retail partners (Unilever, Lipton, Mars 
were emphasized) (Respondent 12) and UN actors (the UN Framework on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production was noted, and RA worked with the UN to create the 
Global Sustainable Tourism Council in 2007) (Respondent 7), the interview data also 
shed light on some of the transnational NGOs that RA sees as leaders in ethical trade. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) was mentioned as a leader, as were 
Greenpeace, Conservation International (CI), Oxfam, and FLO. RA acknowledged that 
FLO was a competitor in the marketplace, but saw them as a partner on the ground. This 
means that they often worked together to build the capacity of producer groups and even 
apply for grants together. But at the same time, they compete for funding from donors 
and to secure purchase order contracts from retailers. Their relationship to RA, however, 
seemed less like an organization to follow, and more like an organization to keep tabs on 
or keep up with. The WWF, Greenpeace, and Conservation International seemed to play 
more of an agenda setting role. More than one respondent said they watched 
Greenpeace’s work and campaign choices “very carefully” and respondents noted that 
RA takes its cues on where to operate geographically from CI and WWF, who 
periodically determine certain areas to be priorities due to their high conservation value 
(Respondents 5, 7, 9, 12). 
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3.4 Agenda (Mis)matches Between Leaders and Followers  
 Taken together, the hyperlink, text and interview data suggest that the following 
may have been important actors in RA’s networks 2006-2009: FLO and especially the 
UK’s Fairtrade Foundation, members of the UN system (World Bank, UNEP, ILO, FAO, 
Global Sustainable Tourism Council, GEF, UNDP), the Interamerica Development Bank, 
USAID,  CAFOD, Christian Aid, Trade Justice Movement, Oxfam, IUCN, US EPA, 
FSC, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), EnergyStar labeling system, Unilever, Lipton, Mars, Clinton Global Initiative, 
Gates Foundation, Kendeda Fund, WWF, Greenpeace, Conservation International, the 
SAN and the Rainforest Alliance themselves. Of this large and broad group, the true 
network leaders—defined here as those who were indicated to be most important (highest 
in-link, mentioned most, or emphasized) and or those who appeared in more than one 
data source— are: World Bank, UN, FLO, USEPA, Greenpeace, Unilever and Lipton 
(and an array of corporate clients), and the SAN.  
 If the gatekeeper hypothesis is correct, then the agendas of these organizations 
should match the agenda of RA 2006-2009 which, as the organizational culture section 
noted, was focused on timber, agricultural crops and the newly entered sectors of cattle 
and tourism. Additionally, the organizations should not advocate for more mining 
governance. To assess whether this situation is true, I reviewed text documents from the 
period of interest, once again foregoing analysis of the gatekeeper food companies as 
their opinion on entering mining was likely to be neutral to negative.  
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 As with FLO, the World Bank only arose as a leader from the hyperlink data from 
the 2015 ethical trade network, making this a rather weak piece of evidence (it may or 
may not have been the leader in 2006-2009, and no interview, text, or ego-network 
mentions make it’s causal role dubious). As the FLO case showed, the World Bank 
focused mostly on governance projects in the 2006-2009 period, although they were 
investing more in transportation, mining and energy than they were in agriculture during 
these years. Unlike FLO, RA would not have had a problem with the World Bank’s 
large-scale operational focus (they would have applauded it), so if the gatekeeper 
hypothesis was correct, RA should have focused on governance issues and tried to reform 
transportation and mining and energy sectors. But RA did not do this. So, this (albeit 
weak) piece of evidence works against the gatekeeper hypothesis.  
 The US EPA emerged as a leader from enough data sources to make it a decent 
piece of evidence, but deeper exploration of the context in which it emerged clarified that 
it likely did not have influence on sector entry decisions and therefore works against the 
gatekeeper hypothesis as well. The US EPA received more in-links from RA than any 
other actor, but these were mostly links being used as justification for the chemicals RA 
bans in its standards. While this clearly shows that the RA respects and follows the EPA, 
it also clearly shows the importance of digging deeply into the context in which actors are 
mentioned. The US EPA was never mentioned in interview data as an actor the RA 
follows for sector entry ideas. While reducing mercury pollution from ASGM was a 
major priority for US EPA during the 2006-2009 period (they were a “catalyst” in the 
UN’s Global Mercury Partnership launched in 2005), interviews stated that the idea to 
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certify gold was born and died inside of RA (Richard came into contact with it through 
his forestry work, and it entered the organization as a multi-pronged threat to forest 
health). The attention given to gold mining by the EPA helps to confirm its importance, 
but it was not how the idea entered the organization, nor was it why gold sector entry 
failed. The EPA has also been very active in tourism, naming it alongside mining as a 
regional priority in several areas (e.g. Gulf of Mexico, Latin America and Caribbean). 
But again, interview evidence shows that the idea to enter tourism came from an 
entrepreneur who highlighted its fit with RA’s culture and made the idea for tourism 
sector entry succeed. The entrepreneur likely pointed to the EPA’s work to justify the 
need for sector entry, but it was not the leading factor in RA’s decision.  
  Similarly, network leaders like the UN and particularly UNEP have given plenty 
of attention to logging, cattle, ASGM and tourism, and it is clear the RA respects the UN 
because the partner with them on sector projects offer. However, interview data again 
suggests that these agenda priorities were supportive rather than decisive. Nevertheless I 
reviewed UNEP’s priorities during the 2006-2009 period. Again UNEP’s 2005 creation 
of the Global Mercury Partnership meant that the subject of ASGM came up in each 
report (except for 2009). And again, as with the EPA, gold was not really the focus— it 
only became a focus because of mercury. During this period it was also seen as a rather 
small driver of the mercury problem, a view that changed with new data available in 
2013. Tourism, on the other hand, was a featured sector in its own right in 2007, as part 
of the larger discussion about UNEP’s 10 Year Framework on Sustainable Consumption 
and Production. Large-scale gold mining emerged as an issue mentioned in this report as 
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well, but in a much less highlighted way (no special section, just mentioned as an 
example of the need for cleaner production). In 2008, UNEP’s focus shifted to its Green 
Economy Initiative, launched in that year. This initiative is more issue focused but does 
target certain sectors (or ecosystems containing these sectors) such as the oceans 
(fisheries), forests (logging), energy (fossil fuels), and infrastructure. Both mining and 
tourism lost traction with this focus and are mentioned less in the 2008 report and not at 
all in the 2009 report (not even with respect to mercury). So both tourism and gold 
mining were given attention by UNEP , with tourism highlighted more than gold. 
However, as was the case with US EPA, interview data suggests that the UN’s and 
UNEP’s activities were things norm entrepreneurs pointed out to support their campaigns 
for sector entry, not spark their ideas for them. With both tourism and mining present in 
the reports, both were considered serious candidates. However tourism was a better fit for 
RA’s culture than was gold. While tourism also got featured more prominently than gold 
in the reports, and therefore lends a bit of support to the gatekeeper hypothesis, interview 
data suggests that it was the cultural fit that was the key deciding factor, not RA’s desire 
to “follow the leader” as the gatekeeper effect would predict.  
 It should also be noted that climate change and thus the energy sector dominated 
all of UNEP’s reports and network leaders 2006-2009. There was no indication from 
interviews that sector entry was decided based on sector issues (besides deforestation 
which of course effects climate change). But climate change was a leading issue, and 
mining is not a climate change issue relative to other sectors. This could be read several 
different ways with regard to whether RA was following UN or not: RA’s progressively 
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focusing more on the climate change issue and cattle is a major driver of deforestation, 
which fosters climate change, whereas mining is relatively unrelated to climate change. 
Again, this lends a bit of support to the hypothesis, but it is not decisive, and interview 
data suggests it was not a leading causal factor. 
 Interview data did, however, specifically note the importance of the leadership of 
WWF and Greenpeace. Regarding the WWF, however, this leadership was not on what 
sectors to enter. Rather, it was on where in the world RA should focus its efforts. WWF 
states that they have two approaches for conserving biodiversity (their mission, which 
aligns with RA’s written mission): conserving the earth’s “most outstanding places” and 
conserving species that are important for those places. It can then be assumed that RA 
follows WWF’s advice on where to work, and then chooses sectors important to that 
region that align with RA’s interests (whether formed by norm entrepreneurs, 
organizational cultural factors, or gatekeeper preferences). Despite the clarification by 
RA that it does not take sector entry ideas from WWF, it in interesting to note both the 
Amazon and the Congo are listed as priority places, and mining is an enormous threat to 
all species in those ecosystems (trees, animals, and people). Yet mining arises nearly 
nowhere in WWF’s annual reports 2006-2009 (literally one mention in 2006 and one in 
2009). Tourism and palm oil, by contrast, is mentioned multiple times in all reports 
(although cattle is even more absent than mining). This lack of reference to mining and 
higher mention of tourism and palm oil would provide mild support the gatekeeper 
hypothesis, although RA’s clarification that it only takes geographic advice from WWF 
renders the evidence un-useful.   
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 Greenpeace, however, was mentioned as an actor whose campaigns were actively 
“followed” (Respondents 5, 12). During the 2006-2009 period, Greenpeace focused 
heavily on the issue of climate change by targeting the energy and forestry sectors. It also 
cared about forestry in its own right, and within that issue framing, targeted the logging, 
palm oil, and cattle industries. There is a high degree of correlation between 
Greenpeace’s agenda priorities and RA’s sector entry decisions on these last two sectors: 
palm oil was emphasized in 2008 (the year RA entered the sector) and during this entire 
period Greenpeace was compiling a report on the cattle industry which was released at 
the end of 2009 (RA entered the cattle sector in 2010). Further, the lack of attention 
giving to mining is noticeable. Toxics are a huge issue for Greenpeace, but during this 
period they went from a split focus on the technology and clothing sectors to a sole focus 
on the technology sector, targeting personal electronics with their “Green Apple” 
campaign. Gold, jewelry and the mining sector as a whole were completely absent from 
these reports— nothing in the toxics section, and nothing in the forestry sections. This is 
exactly the type of evidence the gatekeeper effect would expect to find. While 
Greenpeace did not appear to be a leader in the hyperlink data (throwing some doubt on 
this technique of detecting the gatekeeper effect, although the only hyperlink data 
available was from 2014, well after the 2006-2009 period of interest), interview data 
strongly suggested that RA tries to coordinate its work with Greenpeace, and the agenda 
priorities listed in Greenpeace’s annual reports perfectly match RA’s sector entry 
decisions during the period of focus. This lends clear support to the gatekeeper 
hypothesis, although the phrase “we did it because Greenpeace said to,” or its equivalent, 
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is still missing from the data. Despite my following Carpenter 2014’s procedures, my 
data did not match hers, as her respondents were far more clear and explicit in stating that 
the gatekeeper effect drove their decisions on human security issue engagement.  
 The final actor that needs to be analyzed is FLO. FLO came up in conversation 
many times (occasionally, but not always, because I specifically asked) and it was also 
the leader of Bennett’s 2007 ethical trade network. If the gatekeeper effect is in play, and 
FLO is a gatekeeper, then RA should be following and copying FLO’s moves. But this is 
not what has happened. RA clearly didn’t follow FLO into the gold sector, nor did they 
site FLO’s gold entry as a reason to stay out of it, as in “FLO’s already doing it, so the 
sector is effectively saturated with governors.” Such language was used by Carpenter’s 
(2014) respondents and its absence from my data is noticeable.   
 
 To summarize, out of six actors identified as leaders of RA’s networks, one 
showed decent evidence in support of the gatekeeper hypothesis (Greenpeace), two 
showed weak evidence in support of it (UNEP, WWF), and three showed strong evidence 
against it (World Bank, US EPA, FLO). The actor with whom RA had an agenda match 
was the actor highlighted by interview data, which is more illuminating than the text data, 
and far more reliable than the hyperlink data, which is particularly deficient in the RA 
case given the lack of a time-appropriate ego-network. But even the evidence associated 
with this actor (Greenpeace) is not perfect— Greenpeace advocated the entry of palm oil 
and cattle, but said nothing about tourism, which RA also entered during this time period. 
Further, the interview evidence wasn’t as explicitly in support of the gatekeeper 
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hypothesis as Carpenter’s was. Respondents said they follow the work of Greenpeace 
closely and that it is a leader in ethical trade, but they did not say that they shape their 
actions directly in response to their campaigns.  
 What respondents did say about the role of network actors is the following. The 
idea that outside organizations influence RA’s decisions is “half true” (Respondent 9). As 
one respondent put it, “there are naturally charismatic leaders as well as financially 
important accounts that sit on our boards and in our leadership meetings—they influence 
decisions informally if not by having more voting power” (Respondent 9). And RA 
actively tries to cultivate good relationships with groups like Oxfam and WWF and some 
‘unmentionable’ groups (Respondent 9 wouldn’t name) are more persuasive than others 
and informally responsible for bringing in new ideas. But the “half false” is that “there's 
not really an 'oh we need to go in that direction'. We're now moving toward high 
conservation value areas but not because of WWF…you take into account what's 
happening and ask whether it makes sense right now” (Respondent 9). So persuasive and 
powerful network actors seem to influence sector entry decisions more with RA than with 
FLO, but their preferences are tempered by what “makes sense” to RA, i.e. it interacts 
with their organizational culture.  
 Respondents did suggest, however, that another type of “network effect” mattered 
more than the gatekeeper effect. For RA, the quantity of actors advocating sector reform 
can be equally important to the quality of the actor (i.e. their leadership position in the 
network) (Respondent 14). The gold entrepreneur explained that when RA has been 
successful in sector entry, it has been correlated with a preponderance of NGOs also 
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focusing on the issue, and at least a handful of corporations promising reformed behavior. 
He said that without a large number of NGOs promising to punish corporations who are 
refusing to follow the model set by the more ethical corporations in the sector, RA would 
be afraid of the corporation’s ability to outspend them by getting lawyers and changing 
the narrative such that they end up not needing to make meaningful reform, rendering any 
funds RA spent on trying to “tilt the needle” in a sector wasted since their (true) mission 
wasn’t achieved.  
 The gold entrepreneur noted that to date there hasn’t been enough advocacy 
pressure on mining companies to get them afraid and coming to RA for help. RA requires 
that “buy-in” from the large-scale companies in order to be “relevant” and safe from their 
“lawyers.” FLO echoed this point about RA, guessing that they’d never enter a sector 
unless they had 2 to 3 large companies signed on ahead of time. The companies they’d 
want need not be financial leaders, but need to be “influential,” which Respondent 14 
defined not in material terms but rather as leaders in ethical innovation. This is what 
they’d need to “mainstream,” which again is their culturally defined goal. “We need 
strong advocacy from lots of actors in place for a campaign to work. We don’t have that 
yet with mining. Not enough actors care enough” (Respondent 14). He said they’d need 
companies like Rio Tinto, Freeport Morgan and Tiffany onboard. While Tiffany did 
approach them to ask how RA could help them with their mining problem, the 
entrepreneurial and organizational cultural factors discussed in this chapter kept it from 
happening. So RA does believe in the importance of strong advocacy networks as well as 
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the persuasive power of leaders in those networks. However, their effect is tempered by 
organizational culture, and the quantity of actors is as important as their quality.  
 
Section 4: Summary of Findings on RA 
 To review, the evidence indicates that RA’s decision on gold sector entry was 
shaped primarily by the attributes of the gold entrepreneur and RA’s organizational 
culture, and to a lesser extent the preferences of network gatekeepers. All three factors 
combined to block gold sector entry from happening. Instead, RA entered the tourism, 
cattle and palm oil sectors, which were more attractive to them for a variety of reasons.  
 The most important of these were organizational cultural factors. RA’s 
interpretation of their mission and the most appropriate ways of achieving it differed, as 
did opinions on the extent to which mining fit with their mission. While RA’s written 
mission is simply to “conserve biodiversity and ensure sustainable livelihoods” their 
internalized mission can be summed up as mainstreaming environmentally-friendly 
practices in sectors impacting deforestation. The most appropriate way of achieving this 
“true” mission, RA believes, is by ensuring the participation of influential large-scale 
actors in any sector they enter, and by prioritizing sectors that bring benefits to actors 
they are already working with. These cultural beliefs made mining less attractive than 
other sectors for two main reasons: 1) not enough influential large-scale actors were 
ready to join an RA certification program, and 2) mining sector entry would not benefit 
RA’s existing clients, and was actively opposed by some of them.  
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 Not enough large-scale actors were willing to join an RA program because the 
advocacy networks promoting mining reform were not perceived by RA to be strong 
enough, and because the gold entrepreneur in the RA case did not take it upon himself to 
go out and secure clients and funding, the way that the successful entrepreneurs in the RA 
and FLO cases had. Further, the entrepreneur did not communicate about gold sector 
entry in a way that was persuasive to RA’s leadership. He focused on mining’s impact on 
biodiversity rather than deforestation (thereby catering to RA’s written rather than 
internalized mission) and did not create ideas about let alone emphasize how gold sector 
entry could benefit forest managers and retailers that RA was already working with (or 
how the clients he would recruit could create synergy with them or minimally not 
“poach” funds from them).  
 These deficiencies interacted with RA’s culture in a way that made tourism, 
cattle, and palm oil far more attractive than gold for entry. All three sectors had large-
scale actors ready to join a program, and many of those actors were clients (producers 
and retailers) RA was already working with. Further, tourism had a strong norm 
entrepreneur who charismatically provided RA with expert research, free labor, funding 
and proof of concept, as well as a strong rationale for how tourism would increase 
revenue to current clients.  
 The RA case provided some evidence in support of the gatekeeper hypothesis, but 
a causal link is far from clear. Out of the six actors identified as leaders in the hyperlink, 
text, and interview data, one showed decent evidence in support of the gatekeeper 
hypothesis (Greenpeace), two showed weak evidence in support of it (UNEP, WWF), and 
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three showed strong evidence against it (World Bank, US EPA, FLO). Greenpeace was 
identified as an actor whose work RA “follows very carefully,” and indeed they 
advocated increased governance of tourism and palm oil (although not cattle) during the 
2006-2009 period, and said close to nothing about the need for more governance of 
mining. In interviews, respondents said that the gatekeeper hypothesis was “half true”— 
the preferences of other powerful network actors is something they consider but it is not 
decisive. More important, they say, is the presence of a large enough quantity or high 
enough quality of advocacy NGOs that large-scale sector actors are afraid enough that 
they approach RA for help with reform. Until these large-scale actors are willfully 
wanting to participate in a certification program, RA will avoid the sector until such 
advocacy pressure is present. They want no trouble from lawyers, and want to be a friend 
to large corporations (not their enemy). So while they clearly care about network effects, 
evidence for the gatekeeper effect in particular is rather weak.  
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the influence of entrepreneurs exercising 
certain attributes interacts with organizational cultural factors to shape sector entry 
decisions. All respondents agree, however that RA’s (internalized) mission followed by 
their commitment to re-invest funds for the benefit of those who donated them and are 
already making use of them drives their sector entry decisions. In the case of gold, the 
norm entrepreneur was not persuasive enough to overcome these cultural aspects that 
swayed RA against gold.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE POTENTIAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF 
CERTIFICATION ORGANIZATION GOVERNANCE OF ASGM 
 This project has so far provided an account of why otherwise similar certification 
organizations made different decisions about whether to govern ASGM. By using process 
tracing of interview, document, and hyperlink data, Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the 
interaction of norm entrepreneurs and organizational culture, more than network effects 
shaped Fairtrade International’s (FLO’s) and the Rainforest Alliance’s (RA’s) sector 
entry decisions. This chapter narrows the focus to only those certification organizations 
who have decided to govern gold. It asks how their governance institutions (i.e. 
standards) are different, and what effects they are likely to have on human development 
in mining communities.   
 Recall from Chapter 3 that human development is defined as the enhancement of 
peoples’ capacities to live free and healthy lives (Sen 1999). Such enhancement is 
fostered by increasing peoples’ levels of income, education, and health, and by making 
their habitats more peaceful, free, and environmentally sustainable. The two certification 
organizations governing ASGM—Fairtrade International (FLO) and the Alliance for 
Responsible Mining (ARM)—launched their standards specifically to achieve these 
goals. So the question becomes: How effective are ARM and FLO likely to be at 
achieving their stated goals? 
 Borck and Coglianese (2007) write that the effects of voluntary governance 
programs are determined by three factors: program stringency, program uptake levels and 
spillover effects. Program stringency refers to the amount of behavior change a 
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program’s rules require. Program uptake refers to the number of actors that decide to 
follow its rules. And spillover effects are the benefits or costs caused by uptake that 
impact actors who are not program participants. The higher a program’s stringency and 
uptake levels, the bigger the program’s effects. But maximizing these two factors can be 
difficult. If stringency is too high, uptake might suffer because the required amount of 
behavior change may be seen as too expensive by would-be participants. If stringency is 
too low, uptake might still suffer if would-be participants fear the program will be seen as 
a farce by political consumers and not attract the rewards they were hoping for. Program 
uptake is further shaped by the number and attractiveness of alternative programs in the 
governance marketplace.  
 All of these factors plus spillover effects determine the amount of human 
development change that is likely to follow from any voluntary program, so this chapter 
assesses them in turn using the cases of FLO and ARM (the full population of ASGM 
governors) and data from interviews, official documents, and academic publications. 
After explaining the demise of the joint ARM-FLO program, the chapter evaluates and 
compares the relative stringency of the two competing certification standards that 
emerged to replace it. With data on program stringency in place, the chapter then creates 
estimates of the likely uptake patterns and associated human development effects that 
might occur. While analyzing empirical uptake patterns is preferable to relying on theory-
based estimates, the solo programs are so new that studying the low number of actual 
decisions made to date would yield few insights. So theory-based estimates are the next-
best means of assessing program effects, as well as a useful step that will make eventual 
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empirical research more meaningful by providing analytic leverage.7 To begin along this 
route, the chapter does present and discuss the empirical data available to date. The 
chapter concludes by recommending that ARM and FLO make three changes to their 
current behavior in order to maximize their positive effects on human development.   
 
Section 1: The Demise of the ARM-FLO Partnership and the Rise of Two 
Competing Certification Standards  
 
1.1 Content of the Original Joint Standard 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, FLO and ARM became the first private governors of ASGM 
by launching their joint “Fairtrade and Fairmined’’ certification standard and label in 
February, 2011 (Valerio 2013). The Basic certification standard (Fairtrade and Fairmined 
2011) demanded that miners organize democratically, gain legal mining permits, ban 
child labor on the mining sites, adopt a mercury-reducing piece of technology called a 
“retort,” and make an array of other behavioral changes. In exchange for these 
improvements, the first buyer of the gold had to pay the miners 95% of the London 
Bullion Market Price (LBMA) (far higher than the 70% miners received in the status quo 
system) plus 10% of the LBMA as a ‘premium’ which was to be spent by the mining 
cooperative on community development programs according to a democratic vote by the 
cooperative’s members. Miners willing to adopt more advanced technology that enabled 
                                                
7 Whether theoretical predictions match empirical reality is always of interest to scholars.  
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them to forgo mercury use altogether could upgrade to the Ecological standard, which 
increased their premium from 10% to 15% of the LBMA.   
1.2 Feedback on Original Standard 
In the year following the joint standard’s launch, ARM and FLO got a range of feedback 
from the market and the miners. Consumers complained that the dual label was confusing 
(they knew “Fairtrade,” but not “Fairmined”) and that the retail price of certified jewelry 
was too high (Respondent 3). On the production side, mining organizations complained 
that the certification process was too cumbersome and the investments required too costly 
(Respondent 8, 13). 
 None of these complaints came as surprises to the organizations. FLO had resisted 
ARM’s ideas about the joint label and preferable premium levels during their 
negotiations in 2009 (Valerio 2013; Respondent 8). FLO wanted the label to bear only its 
name in order to leverage its brand recognition to maximize sales. Many ARM members, 
however, opposed this, arguing that without their name on the label, all of the work they 
did to make ethical gold a reality would be credited to FLO. In interviews, FLO 
respondents said that ARM had an “ego” problem (Respondent 4), but that since FLO 
needed ARM’s on-the-ground expertise, FLO eventually conceded by agreeing to the 
joint label. FLO had also anticipated that the reluctantly agreed upon premium levels 
would make certified jewelry too expensive. They interpreted the low sales volumes that 
occurred in 2011 as an indication that they had been right (Respondent 3). ARM, 
however, disagreed, blaming instead the record high gold prices in 2011 and their 
decision to make the premium a percentage of these rather than a fixed amount 
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(Respondents 3 and 8). Regarding producer complaints, ARM agreed with the miners that 
FLO’s certification system required too much paperwork and not enough payment. As a 
small and “agile” “start-up” organization focused on rising quickly in international 
stature, ARM felt shackled by FLO’s multi-layered bureaucracies and slow pace of 
decision-making (Respondent 8).  
1.3 Different Visions of the Future 
These different views on the causes of problems led to different views on the best 
solutions. ARM demanded that the financial benefits to the miners be maintained or 
increased, and believed the best strategy for achieving this increasing the amount of 
premium payment, allowing the practice of mass-balancing gold (i.e. mixing certified 
gold with non-certified gold at refineries), and launching a “book and trade” scheme 
which separated the payment of premiums from the sale of gold (Respondents 3, 4, 8; 
Valerio 2013; McQuilken 2014). FLO, on the other hand, wanted to lower premiums 
rather than raise them, was against mass-balancing because it might further confuse 
consumers, and was ideologically opposed to the “book and trade” scheme, which it 
believed would allow unethical companies to “greenwash” their operations via corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), thereby removing the incentive for them to change their 
business models to profit from more ethical sourcing strategies (Valerio 2013; 
Respondents 3, 4). Pressuring companies to change their sourcing strategies, after all, was 
what FLO had been founded to do.   
 The partnership contract the two organizations signed in November 2009 was for 
three years, 2010-2013. When the time to renew the contract came in April 2013, FLO 
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would not agree to ARM’s proposals, and ARM believed its ideas were the only way 
forward. They agreed to end their partnership and move forward as separate entities (Fair 
Jewelry Action 2013). FLO and ARM state publically that their separation was amicable 
and that they will move forward cooperatively. But interview data revealed that they 
clearly view each other as “competitors,” and producers, retailers, and consumers must 
now choose which of the organizations to do business with (Respondents 3, 4, 8). 
 
Section 2: The Relative Stringency of ARM’s and FLO’s Standards 
Given that a choice between ASGM governors now exists, understanding how the two 
regulations compare is a service this project provides to consumers, retailers, miners, 
policymakers and scholars. This section evaluates the general and relative stringency of 
ARM’s and FLO’s rules for four key human development issues: conflict, labor, 
environment, and development. Because of FLO and ARM’s shared history, there are 
many points of similarities between the two certification programs, but also important 
differences that will likely shape their uptake patterns and effects. A full review of the 
standards is available from the author, while only the most critical points to the analysis 
are highlighted here.  All data in this chapter is drawn from the two standards: ARM’s 
Fairmined Standard fro ASGM version 2.0 (2014) and FLO’s Fairtrade Standard for 
ASGM version 8.11.2013 (2013). 
2.1 Similarities between Certification Programs 
Before comparing their relative merits, it is important to note that both ARM’s and 
FLO’s standards reflect a basic and meaningful level of stringency on human 
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development issues. In other words, neither standard is a farce nor aims to “greenwash” 
the sector, as is sometimes the case with certification organizations (Auld 2014). In the 
case of ASGM, both organizations entered the sector to make meaningful improvements 
in the lives of miners and global stakeholders. Their goals for mining communities are 
therefore unsurprisingly similar: both aim to reduce poverty while increasing market 
opportunities, formalization, political capacity, social and labor protection, peace, and 
environmental “responsibility” (ARM) or “sustainability” (FLO). These goals map quite 
clearly onto the concept of human development, as is shown in Table 1.8  
 
Alignment between Certification Organization Goals and Aspects of Human Development 
Human Development 
Aspects 
ARM and FLO Goals ARM and FLO rules in support 
of aspects and goals 
Income Poverty Reduction, Market 
Opportunities 
price minimum and premium 
rules, trading models (against: 
child labor) 
Education Child labor  ASMO governance rules, child 
labor rules, reporting rules (FLO) 
Health Social and labor protections  
Peace Peace conflict rules, labor rules 
Political freedom Lobbying capacity formalization as an ASMO 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Environmental “sustainability” and 
“responsible” “management” 
Environment rules 
   Table 6.1 Certification Organization Goals and Human Development  
 
The organizations further have similar procedures for program uptake. As a first step 
toward uptake, both ARM and FLO require miners to collectivize into “artisanal and 
small-scale mining organizations (ASMOs)” which are umbrella organizations 
                                                
8While education and health are not explicitly mentioned in the standards’ “Purpose” sections, they are 
either implicitly covered through requirements like reporting or banning children from the mining site so 
they can attend school, or explicitly, as in the actual occupational health and safety rules housed in the 
labor sections. 
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connecting smaller mining groups as well as individual, self-employed miners. The 
second step is for these ASMOs to acquire the “legal and contractual rights and 
environmental permits to mine,” which can be held be either directly (by the head of the 
ASMO) or indirectly (by the heads of each mining group comprising the ASMO). As is 
the case with agricultural products, not all of what’s produced by the certified actor (here, 
the ASMO), must be made in compliance with the certification standard. Therefore the 
third step in certification is to create a “System of Production” (comprised of 
geographical areas, communities, miners and processing units) which separates gold 
produced according to an organization’s standard from gold produced legally, but not 
according to the standard. Finally, miners much choose which of each organization’s 
standards to certify under, since both ARM and FLO offer a Basic standard as well as a 
more environmentally stringent Ecological standard as options. 
In addition to goals and procedures, the organizations further share the same 
geographic scope for their operations. Any ASMO located in a country with a low or 
medium per capita income, as determined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Development Assistance Committee, is eligible to apply for 
certification. Both organizations, however, exclude ASMOs operating within certain 
environmentally or socially sensitive areas, although their criteria for these “Areas 
Temporarily Excluded” (ATEs) do differ (see next sections).  
Finally, both FLO and ARM require that eligible organizations not only comply 
with entry-levels rules, but that they keep improving over time. Therefore both 
organizations increase the number of rules ASMOs must abide by in Year 1, Year 3 and 
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Year 6. ARM and FLO do differ, however, in what they require by when, and these and 
other differences between the standards are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2: Differences in Strength on Key Human Development Issues 
 
Conflict 
 
 Both standards created conflict rules to prevent the selling of gold mined by 
certified ASMOs into supply chains associated with conflict. If there is conflict in the 
region surrounding the ASMO, it is very likely that a participant in that conflict will use 
the threat of violence to obtain the ASMO’s gold and sell it to further their cause. Even if 
an ASMO has become certified, an auditor cannot be there all the time, and so cannot 
ensure that such transactions are not taking place. Therefore, to ensure that customers 
who buy certified gold are not contributing to conflict by donating to ASMOs who are 
(albeit involuntarily) mining in support of conflict, both FLO and ARM have deemed 
conflict zones as Areas Temporarily Excluded (ATEs) from certification. This lowers the 
chance that forced transactions are taking place.  
 While both organizations therefore address the issue, FLO’s standard is stronger 
on conflict than ARM’s for two reasons: 1) it requires all ASMOs to report on their 
conflict context as an entry condition, and 2) it requires them to report on multiple types 
of conflict, such as those that might arise from proximity to large-scale mining or 
indigenous groups. ARM’s conflict rules, by contrast, are only triggered when an outside 
actor (e.g. ARM, an NGO, or government actor) raises suspicion. This means that it is 
more likely that an ASMO certified by ARM is operating in a conflict zone since it is no 
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actor’s primary responsibility to evaluate and report on risks in the ASMO’s 
surroundings. ARM further does nothing explicit to prevent conflict between the ASMO 
and large-scale mining companies or other stakeholders in the ASMO’s vicinity.  
 It is important to note that while FLO is stronger than ARM on conflict for these 
reasons, both organizations still clearly allow mining in conflict zones to take place via 
the practice of granting exceptions. In this way, they differ (and less stringent) than the 
Dodd-Frank regulation in the U.S., which requires reporting if there is a risk of conflict 
and bans sourcing from that mine if risk is found (cite). The certification organizations, 
by contrast, allow ASMOs in conflict zones to apply for exceptions, so sourcing from the 
region can continue, albeit with protective measures in place. Which governance 
approach is better for reducing conflict—engagement (with risk mitigation) or bans—is a 
judgment that will need to be made by political consumers. While some may want to 
punish the zone for conflict (or simply to guarantee that no conflict support is happening) 
via sourcing bans, others may want to send money to miners in such zones in order to 
ease their hardship and support their transition out of those circumstances.  
 
Labor 
 
 It is more difficult to uniformly categorize one standard as stronger or weaker in 
the realm of labor, although differences in the organizations’ strategies for protecting the 
well-being of workers are clear. On health and safety issues, the standards are similar, but 
FLO emerges as slightly stronger. FLO requires more paperwork and reporting than 
ARM, which, in theory, should make members more aware of the problems (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2012). The standards are further similar on discrimination rules, although 
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ARM includes a clause that appears to make it alright for ASMOs to not hire 
“handicapped” people until the ASMO’s third year in the program, at which time 
discrimination against them must end. FLO bans this sort of discrimination as an entry 
requirement, making it appear stronger than ARM, although ARM likewise bans 
“discrimination” generally as an entry requirement, so its stance is ambiguous. 
 On contracts and child labor, evaluations are more complex. On contracts, ARM 
provides miners with more options and flexibility, whereas FLO provides them with 
fewer options and less flexibility. Miners prefer shorter, more flexible contracts so that 
they can switch mining sites if the one they are working has less gold than expected and 
another appears to have more. While this provides the possibility of getting more cash 
sooner, it creates uncertain working and income conditions over the long-term, making it 
more difficult for ASMOs to plan. Which set of rules is stronger depends on the political 
consumer’s preferences: Is it best to give miners what they want (shorter, more flexible 
contracts for more cash sooner (ARM’s position)) or to give them incentives for taking a 
longer-term approach (longer, less flexible contracts to experience a more stable life 
(FLO’s position))? From the human development perspective, the more choices and 
income a person has the better, so ARM’s rules might be considered stronger. But others 
might see security of employment as more or equally important to choices and higher 
short-term gains, so strength on this issue is subjective. 
 On the similarly subjective issue of child labor, FLO is stronger in that it demands 
more programs to be created than ARM, but is weaker in that it allows children aged 7-14 
to “help their families” on mining sites, whereas ARM bans this practice. For consumers 
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who view child labor in absolutist terms, ARM is clearly stronger because fewer children 
are present at the mining site. But for consumers who see child labor as a symptom of 
poverty, allowing the children to help in safe ways might alleviate the root cause of child 
labor by helping mining families earn more money via the extra help and spending less 
on childcare. From the human development perspective, FLO provides more choice to 
families and increases community education by requiring more programs, but ARM 
provides more protection of children’s health and support of their education (if there is no 
option of helping on the mining site, they might put that time toward school work or 
other learning activities). On balance, this analysis judge’s ARM’s program as stronger 
on child labor, but they may not be the preferred organization for all child labor 
advocates.  
 
Environment 
 
 Judging the relative stringency of rules protecting the environment (and 
environmental health) is more straightforward than comparing labor protections. Overall, 
FLO’s rules for environmental protection are stronger than ARM’s.  
 One area in which they are stronger is in protecting critical ecosystems. To decide 
whether or not an ASMO should be granted an exception so that they can mine in an 
ATE (e.g. a national park), FLO requires an environmental impact assessment and third-
party verification that the ASMO’s mining operations are environmentally benign. ARM 
requires neither of these, and instead prioritizes the issue of livelihood generation over 
environmental protection. For example, it requires ASMO’s to make arguments such as 
“it is alright to mine in this national park because there are no other livelihoods nearby” 
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versus “it is alright to mine in this national park because the operations are 
environmentally benign.”  ARM would likely counter that they’ve created this rule 
because they believe that the best way to protect the environment is to reduce poverty. 
But the end result of a successful application for exception will be mining and therefore 
income generation, so FLO is actually doing more than ARM by ensuring that short-term  
as well as long-term environmental outcomes are positive.  
 On chemicals, ARM is stronger on cyanide but it is weaker on mercury, which is 
the far more important chemical to govern in this context because its harm to populations 
is more intense, widespread and long-lasting (Hinton 2003; Selin 2009). FLO demands an 
eventual phase-out of mercury under its Basic standard whereas ARM demands no such 
change, instead supporting the continued use of mercury as long as cleaner technology is 
in place. FLO additionally provides a stronger financial incentive for miners to upgrade 
to their chemical-free Ecological standard than ARM does in the majority of gold price 
scenarios. While both organizations pay miners 95% of the LBMA for all standards, 
ARM offers a fixed premium amount of $6,000 for miners willing to upgrade to their 
Ecological standard, whereas FLO offers 15% of the LBMA, which is a larger dollar 
amount when the gold price is above $40,000/kg, as it has been since 2011.  
 As for restoring the environment within the mining site after the mineral deposits 
have been exhausted, it is not clear which organization is stronger. FLO does require a 
report on restoration activities whereas ARM does not, making it slightly stronger. But 
ARM demands restoration activities begin once miners have been certified for a few 
years, whereas FLO demands that they start two years after the mine’s closure, which 
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may be interpreted as a slightly weaker stance. What is clear is that both organizations are 
equally bad when it comes to protecting water quality (e.g. siltation), protecting wildlife 
(e.g. endangered species living near the ASMO that miners might hunt for food), and 
preventing the spread of malaria (the pools of water used in mining operations create 
ideal breeding habitats for mosquitoes). Neither organization has rules to combat these 
important issues, making them both suboptimal on environmental stringency.  
 
Development 
 
 While FLO’s rules for environmental protection are clearly stronger than ARM’s, 
the reverse is true for development: ARM is clearly stronger than FLO. This judgment is 
supported by both ARM’s premium amounts for its Basic standard and by its array of 
trading models which reach more donors than those offered by FLO.  
 As of 2016, very few miners are in a financial or geological position to upgrade to 
either organization’s Ecological standard, which means participating miners will likely be 
rewarded under a Basic standard. The difference between the organizations is always in 
the premiums. Under ARM’s Basic standard, miners receive $4,000/kg, whereas under 
FLO’s they only receive $2,000/kg. When ARM was asked why a consumer should 
choose a ring mined under its Basic standard rather than under FLO’s, ARM answered, 
“Because you will literally be doubling your impact in the mining community.” And, on a 
short-term, per-sale basis, they are right.  
 In addition to its higher Basic standard premium, ARM’s trading models enable 
more global actors to channel their money in support of ethical ASGM than FLO’s 
models do. ARM and FLO have each split the market into value chain actors with three 
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types of needs and created a trading model for each of them. The main differentiator 
between the models is the traceability of the gold. Both organizations offer fully traceable 
and semi-traceable models, while only ARM offers a model that is completely 
untraceable.  
 
1) Fully Traceable Models: FLO’s “Fairtrade Licensees” and ARM’s “Fairmined 
Labeled” 
Both organizations offer fully traceable trading models that track specific pieces of gold 
from the ASMO through all value chain actors (e.g. traders, refiners, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, retailers). Whichever actor makes the final alteration to the gold and stamps 
the certification organization’s label on it (making it as a co-branded product) must pay to 
be licensed by them. For FLO, license fees are generally 1-2% of the revenue earned 
from the sale of Fairtrade labeled products, although this varies according to the product, 
the national marketing organization, and the total volume of sales of the company (FLO 
2009). In the UK market, for example, there is a flat license fee of $160 for companies 
with annual sales under $8,880 (equivalent to 1.8% of sales). For companies with 
Fairtrade sales higher than $8,880 per year, the fee is 1.7% of these sales. A discount is 
available if the company sells 100% certified product (e.g. all of their gold is Fairtrade). 
ARM’s fee requirements are very different because they are not based on sales. Instead, 
ARM charges a flat annual fee of $60 per license and an additional Fairmined 
Development Fee based on the quantity of gold the first buyer purchases from the 
ASMO. The rate is $700/kg in this trading model, and less in the others. For the typical 
wedding ring used as an example in Chapter 3, ARM’s Development Fee amounts to 
$2.10 for a ring costing around $500 (or 0.4%, which is much lower than FLO’s 1-2%).  
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2) Semi-traceable models: FLO’s “Registered Goldsmith” and “Fairtrade Sourcing” 
Model, and ARM’s “Fairmined Incorporated” Model 
A second segment of the ethical jewelry market is comprised of retailers (and their 
associated consumers) who don’t need or want a fully traceable, labeled product, but 
want something more ethical than the status quo. Rejection of the fully traceable model 
might happen because an actor thinks the gold is too expensive, does not want to co-
brand with ARM or FLO, or needs to source large volumes of gold to make its business 
plan work. To reach these actors, both organizations offer mass-balancing models.  
 FLO’s and ARM’s Fairtrade Sourcing and Fairmined Incorporated models are 
nearly identical. In these models, companies that sell above 500 grams of gold for FLO 
(or any company for ARM) can purchase gold from (authorized and audited) refineries 
that combine certified and uncertified gold but keep track of the proportions so that 
buyers can make CSR claims about the proportions of certified gold they source. Since 
the gold is untraceable after it is mass-balanced, participating companies cannot make 
claims about how much certified metal is in a particular piece of jewelry, so they can’t 
label anything. Despite this, if the actors use FLO’s or ARM’s name in CSR material, 
they must pay a licensing fee. These models are especially attractive to larger value chain 
actors who need larger volumes of gold than the fully traceable model allows to make 
their business plans work.  
 For smaller scale actors who avoid the fully traceable model because the costs of 
licensing and labeling are too high, FLO created its Registered Goldsmith model (ARM 
has no comparable model). This model targets small jewelry manufacturers, designers, 
and wholesalers (who may also be retailers) who sell less than 500 grams of gold per year 
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(the cut-off for participation in the Fairtrade Souring model). Such businesses can source 
semi-finished, fully traceable Fairtrade gold items (e.g. gold sheet or basic rings) from 
certified midstream value chain actors (e.g. refiners or manufacturers) and create 
whatever kind of product they want with it (they can choose to mix it with uncertified 
sources or not). This model waives the license fee for participants and allows them to use 
FLO’s name in CSR material, but it does not let them label or make claims about an 
particular piece of jewelry. 
 It is important to note that from the perspective of the miner, there are no 
differences between the fully-traceable and semi-traceable models. For every sale, they 
get 95% of the LBMA plus the premium associated with either the Basic or Ecological 
standards.  
 
3) Untraceable, Fully Separate Model: ARM’s “Fairmined Certificates” 
ARM’s final model, “Fairtrade Certificates,” is completely different from all of the other 
models since it decouples the sale of gold from the premium that miners receive. Any 
actor in the international community who would like to financial support a certify ASMO 
(or one working towards certification) may make a donation to ARM which is recorded 
as a “Certificate.” Miners wishing to participate in the program choose to sell their gold 
on the open (but legal) market at whatever price they can fetch (maximally 70% of 
LBMA), and receive a premium for the amount of gold sold from the Certificates 
account. In this way, miners can choose to make less cash from their gold sale, but earn 
more income to invest in their communities than they would without the help of ARM. 
This model is attractive to donors who want to support more ethical ASGM, but for 
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whom sourcing gold from certified mines does not make business sense (either because 
they are happy with their current sourcing strategies, or because they are not in the 
mining or jewelry industries).  
 
 Proponents of ARM’s approach to development might argue that from a human 
development perspective, ARM’s rules are stronger than FLO’s because ARM provides 
miners with higher premiums under their Basic standard and the additional option of 
participating in its Certificate model. Because this model enables ARM to reach as many 
segments of the ASGM donor market as possible, they are able to drive the maximum 
amount of development funding to ethical miners. While FLO does make a special effort 
to reach the small-scale jewelry retailers through its Goldsmiths Scheme, these actors 
have far less money to invest in ethical ASGM than the larger actors that ARM’s 
Certificate program targets (and ARM’s Certificate program is open to these goldsmiths, 
too). Therefore ARM’s rules do more to help development than FLO’s rules.  
 Opponents of ARM’s Certificate model, however, might argue that the model 
provides an incentive to miners to keep participating in the exploitative ASGM economy 
that the certification programs were designed to combat. While it is true that miners 
participating in ARM’s  Certificates model might earn more money, it is also true that the 
model enables traders, refineries, and other supply chain actors to continue with business-
as-usual. Therefore the model does nothing to reform the sector as a whole and actually 
supports unethical practices. In the normal fair trade supply chain system, a legal but 
exploitative trader, for example, can no longer buy from the certified ASMO. This lowers 
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the number of sales the unethical trader can make and so reduces his income. While he 
could travel to another mining community to make up the lost sale, if it was profitable for 
him to do this, he’d already be doing it. So the original fair trade model punishes such 
unethical traders financially by reducing their ability to do business and rewards more 
ethical traders and subsequent value chain actors who are willing to buy (and sell) at the 
higher rate of 95% of the LBMA plus a social premium. ARM’s Certificate model breaks 
this governance tool by keeping the number of miners the unethical trader can buy from 
the same, so he is not hurt financially.  
 A similar line of argument is made using the example of the retailers at the 
opposite end of the supply chain from the traders. In a normal fair trade system, the 
retailers incorporate certified jewelry into their store offerings, and so have to adjust their 
business models to maintain acceptable profits while sourcing similar but more expensive 
products such as ethical gold. This requires some effort, but hopefully moral or financial 
payoff as well. Providing these actors with the Certificate model option, however, 
removes the need for them to change their business strategies. Instead, they can continue 
sourcing from their cheaper and dirtier large scale or small scale mining sources while 
improving their image among political consumers by advertising the donation they gave 
to ethically certified ASMOs. While most analysts would agree that giving something to 
certified ASMOs is better than nothing, opponents of ARM’s Certificate model argue that 
it enables all of the negative “green-washing” aspects of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to continue. Since meaningful change is either expensive (Vogel 2006) or requires 
a true revision of business strategy (Porter and Kramer 2011), critics of CSR argue that it 
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allows companies to put a relative cheap “band-aid” on a wound rather than investing in 
more expensive or creative ameliorative strategies that heal the wound from within and 
improve the health of systems to avoid similar wounds in the future. In the case of 
mining, critics would argue that a business deciding to donate to certified ASMOs is a 
cheap or uncreative solution relative to the decision to restructure business operations 
such that they can source from these ASMOs while maintaining their own profitability. 
This second approach, in which a creative rethinking of business strategies creates better 
outcomes for all actors (e.g. the retailer, its value chain partners, and global stakeholders) 
is referred to in the business literature as “Creating Shared Value” (CSV). CSV is the 
reigning ideological competitor to what many scholars feel is the outdated (and 
ineffective) CSR approach (Porter and Kramer 2011).  
 Opponents of ARM’s Certificate model would argue that it thwarts the CSV 
movement. However proponents would likely push back, arguing that the model gives 
more money to more ethical miners, which creates larger volumes of ethical gold, which 
makes sourcing from these ASMOs more feasible for the array of jewelry retailers who 
have decided to incorporate certified gold into their business strategies. In this way, 
ARM’s model rewards and supports a shared-value approach; it just creates more options 
for financing it. In the end, with regard to the question of which organization’s rules do 
more right now to reduce poverty among participant miners, the answer is clearly ARM 
due to its higher premium and more varied trading models that enable more money to 
flow to certified ASMOs. If political consumers care about more nuanced questions about 
the effects of ARM’s and FLO’s programs on ASGM and the jewelry industry more 
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generally, they will have to grapple with the aforementioned debates, which show that 
true strength is more subjective and less clear. 
2.3 Stringency Summary 
The results of this comparative analysis suggest that ARM and FLO differ in strength 
across issues. Therefore, it is up to political consumers to decide which issues are most 
important, and which organization takes the best approach to governing them. The 
relative strengths and weaknesses of each organization are summarized in Tables 2 and 3, 
and their relationship to uptake and human development impacts is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
 
 
 
   Table 6.2 Relative Stringency of Certification Organization Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of the Relative Strengths of Certification Organizations 
Organization: Relative Strengths: 
ARM Development, Contracts, Child Labor  
FLO Environment, Conflict, Education 
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The Relative Strength of Certification Organization Standards 
 ARM FLO 
Conflict Weaker. Fewer types covered, process 
triggered only by external party 
suspicion. 
Stronger. More types covered, 
process is entry requirement. 
Labor   
Contracts More flexibility Less flexibility 
Health & Safety Similar, less paperwork Similar, more paperwork 
Discrimination Slightly weaker due to ambiguity Slightly stronger with no ambiguity 
Child labor Mixed. Bans children 7-14 from 
mining site, but fewer programs 
Mixed. Allows children 7-14 to 
“help” families mine, but more 
programs 
Environment   
ATE Weaker. No impact assessment, no 
third parties; focus on livelihoods 
Stronger. Requires impact 
assessment, involves third parties, 
focus on environmental effects 
Chemicals Weaker on mercury: no eventual ban. 
Stronger on cyanide: eventual ban on 
tailings leaching 
Stronger on mercury: demands 
majority phase out. Weaker on 
cyanide: allows leaching of tailings  
Restoration Unclear: no report, but tied to length 
of time in program rather than to mine 
closure 
Unclear: report required, then 
restoration required within 2 years of 
mine closure 
Other (water, 
wildlife, …) 
Equally bad: issues are not governed 
directly 
Equally bad: issues are not governed 
directly 
Financial 
Incentives 
Weaker. $6,000 = better if gold price 
lower than $40,000/kg (less common) 
Stronger. 15% LBMA = better if gold 
price above $40,000 (more common) 
Development   
Cash Income Same: 95% of LBMA Same: 95% of LBMA 
Premium Income Stronger Basic: $4,000 
Weaker Ecological: $6,000 = better if 
gold price below $40,000 (less 
common) 
Weaker Basic: $2,000 
Stronger Ecological: 15% of LBMA, 
better if gold price above $1,134 
(more common) 
Trading Models Mixed. Potentially more money 
upfront.  
Mixed. Potentially less money 
upfront.  
Fully Traceable 
Models 
Fairmined Labeled Fairtrade License 
Semi Traceable 
Models 
Fairmined Incorporated Fairtrade Sourcing 
  Registered Gold Smiths  
No Traceability 
Model 
Fairmined Certificates   
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Section 3: Uptake 
The previous section’s study of the actual and relative stringency of ARM’s and FLO’s 
rules is a necessary first analytic step to understanding the potential human development 
impacts of these standards. It also helps consumers understand what they are buying. But 
the only rules that will actually be available to consumers are the rules chosen by the 
miners. Therefore, analysis of the likely program uptake decisions of the miners is a 
necessary second step towards understanding their potential impacts. For the moment, 
because ARM and FLO are still new in their operations, there are few solid uptake 
numbers to study. Therefore this analysis is theoretical rather than empirical, and 
employs basic decision analysis. It assumes that the miners are fully rational actors who 
maximize their utility (i.e. they get as much of what they want as they can).9 It also 
assumes that neither the miners’ utility nor their costs are purely financial. Indeed, both 
are likely functions of their current levels of and desire for things like education, social 
contact, health, community care, and so forth. These desires and capacities are valued 
numerically. Since miners are likely to be heterogeneous in their capacities, the analysis 
creates a hypothetical community of minimal, low, medium, and high capacity miners for 
whom the true costs of uptake are different. 
Research on certification in the coffee and timber industries as well as interview 
data suggest that the costs of joining certification programs prohibit producers from 
                                                
9 Of course there is ample research showing that humans are only boundedly rational and often are utility 
satisficers rather than maximizers (Simon 1956). Indeed, the theoretical approach taken in this project up 
until now has been the pursuit of why the rationally expected outcomes did not happen. That research was 
able to be done because there was empirical evidence available for collection and study. When there is not 
empirical evidence (such as for this particular question of uptake that the project focuses on now) basic 
assumptions of rationality and utility maximization are the well accepted first steps of analysis, to be 
refined as more data becomes available. 
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certifying with more than one program. In addition to their capacity levels, their choice 
will be a function two factors: 1) the miners’ governance context, i.e. the certification 
organizations present in the mining community, and 2) the price of gold. The governance 
context can be of three types— a FLO monopoly, an ARM monopoly, or governance 
competition (in which both FLO and ARM are present). The price of gold can take an 
array of values, but the impact of three important prices over the last ten years are studied 
here: the ten-year-low in 2006 of roughly $20,000/kg,  the ten-year high in 2012 of 
roughly $55,000/kg, and a medium price over the last ten years, $40,000, which is also 
the current price and the price at which the premium payments of ARM’s Ecological 
standard (which does not flow with the gold price) and FLO’s Ecological standard (which 
does flow with the gold price) are equal. 
In studying the potential implications of these uptake estimates, the analysis 
focuses on two of the most important aspects of human development in the ASGM case: 
increasing income and protecting human and environmental health. It therefore works to 
assess which of the four sets of rules (ARM’s and FLO’s Basic and Ecological Standards) 
are most likely to be chosen by the miners, and how much poverty and pollution 
reduction is likely to occur as a result of this uptake.  
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    Figure 6.1 Gold Prices Over 10 Years (Line indicates price in October of 2015) 
 
3.1 Uptake and Poverty 
 To estimate uptake decisions and their potential impacts on poverty, recall from 
Chapter 3 the example of the 4 gram, 18k gold wedding ring. Under the status quo 
system, the miner sells the amount of gold used in this ring to (often illegal) traders for 
about $84 (70% of the LBMA at a medium gold price of about $40,000).10 As the gold 
travels through the value chain, each actor adds value to it, resulting in a final retail price 
of around $500. This means that the miner’s proportion of what the customer pays is 
around 17%, whereas the wholesaler takes around 25%, and the retailer takes around 
50%. Since the status quo system keeps the miner in poverty, and poverty drives the 
miner to use production methods that harm themselves and the global community, ARM 
                                                
10 Unless otherwise noted, $40,000 is the default price used for calculations in this section. 
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and FLO launched their certification programs to reduce poverty among miners. But how 
likely are ARM and FLO to attain this goal?  
 With regard to the organizations’ Basic standards, any miner with the option of 
certifying under either ARM or FLO should do so because both organizations pay more 
than the status quo. Under a FLO monopoly, the miner’s income from the wedding ring 
will rise from $84 to $120.11 This is a $36 increase over the status quo, equivalent to 43% 
more income for the same amount of gold. Under an ARM monopoly, the miner does 
even better, getting $126 instead of $84, which is a $42 more, equivalent to a 50% 
increase. Under governance competition (i.e. when both FLO and ARM are options in a 
community), ceteris paribus, all but the minimal capacity miners in a community should 
certify under at least a Basic standard, and they should do so with ARM because its rules 
pay them more for the same amount of gold.12 In light of these incentives, uptake of 
certification organizations’ Basic standards is likely to be high.  
 With regard to the organizations’ Ecological standards, uptake patterns similarly 
depend on miners’ capacities and the governance context, but will likely vary more with 
the gold price FLO’s Ecological premium is a percentage of the LBMA rather than fixed 
dollar amount, like ARM’s. In every community, there will likely be some high capacity 
miners for whom it always makes sense to upgrade from a Basic to an Ecological 
standard, regardless of the governance context or gold price. Similarly, there will likely 
be some low capacity miners for whom it never makes sense to upgrade. For medium 
                                                
11 This income measure is a combination of the payment to the miner (95% of LBMA) plus the premium 
value (varies by organization) that must be invested in the business or community. 
12 An additional reason they should choose ARM is the option of participating in ARM’s Certificate model, 
which gives them an extra option for earning income. 
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capacity miners, the upgrade decision will depend on both the gold price and governance 
context. For all miners who decide to upgrade, the following will likely occur. When the 
gold price is $40,000, both ARM’s and FLO’s Ecological standards will increase their 
income from the typical wedding from $84 to $132, an increase of $48 (57%) over the 
status quo. If the gold price falls to $20,000/kg, then ARM’s Ecological standard is the 
better choice, as it pays 79% more than the status quo compared FLO’s Ecological 
payment of 57% more. But if the gold price rises $55,000/kg, then FLO is the better 
option, because it raises income by 57% over the status quo compared to ARM’s 51%. 
Table 4 summarizes these results. 
 
 While these calculations indicate that miners will clearly earn more by certifying 
under any organization’s programs, are these income increases enough to move them out 
of poverty? As Chapter 3 explained, the World Bank sees people as existing in one of 
three categories depending on their daily incomes: Extreme Poverty (less than 
$1.25/day), Moderate Poverty (less than $2.50/day) and those earning above $2.50/day, 
which the project terms Poverty Free. While there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding 
actual number of miners in the ASGM sector and the proportion of the world’s mined 
gold they produce, some general estimates for different scenarios can be made. Using the 
Artisanal Gold Council’s measure that ASGM accounts for 12% of the world’s mined 
gold, Table 5 displays the income shifts for miners using scenarios with varying miner 
populations and gold prices. The results of the analysis indicate that adoption of any 
program will increase a miner’s income by at most one category shift. In other words, 
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uptake can move miners from Extreme to Moderate Poverty, or from Moderate Poverty 
to Poverty Free, but the rules do not seem to be able to move miners two categories up, 
i.e. from Extreme Poverty to Poverty Free. A single category shift occurs in 4 of the 9 
scenarios (5 of the 9 show no category shift). In 3 of the 9 scenarios, uptake is sufficient 
to keep or shift miners into the Poverty Free category.  
 Despite the uncertainty surrounding ASGM population size, production levels, 
gold prices, and how much additional income miners are earn from other sectors (e.g. 
coffee), this analysis gives a rough and useful sketch of the potential magnitude of 
ARM’s and FLO’s impacts on poverty in mining communities. While the programs 
aren’t strong enough to move a miner from extreme poverty to poverty free status (a two 
category shift), they are strong enough to move the miner about one category up. We can 
therefore conclude that ARM’s and FLO’s rules are fairly effective at achieving their 
poverty reducing goals, since they lift some, though not all, miners out of poverty.  
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INCREASES IN INCOME FROM SALE OF A TYPICAL WEDDING RING 
Price = 
$20,000/kg 
   
Certification 
Standard 
Income earned from 
ring 
Increase from 
Status Quo 
Increase from  
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$42   
ARM Basic $69 $27 64% 
FLO Basic $63 $21 50% 
ARM Ecological $75 $33 79% 
FLO Ecological $66 $24 57% 
    Price = 40,000 
per kg 
   
Certification 
Standard 
Income earned from 
ring 
Increase from 
Status Quo 
Increase from  
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$84   
ARM Basic $126 $42 50% 
FLO Basic $120 $36 43% 
ARM Ecological $132 $48 57% 
FLO Ecological $132 $48 57% 
    Price = 55,000 
per kg 
   
Certification 
Standard 
Income earned from 
ring 
Increase from 
Status Quo 
Increase from  
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$116   
ARM Basic $169 $53 46% 
FLO Basic $163 $47 41% 
ARM Ecological $175 $59 51% 
FLO Ecological $182 $66 57% 
   Table 6.4 Increases in Income for a Ring  
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INCOMES PER DAY AND POVERTY CATEGORY SHIFTS 
Extreme Poverty = under $1.25; Moderate Poverty = under $2.50; Free of Poverty = above 
$2.50  
Price = $20,000/kg Miner Populations:  
Certification 
Standards: 
Low 
(15 million) 
 Medium  
(22.5 million) 
 High  
(30 million) 
 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$0.96 Extreme $0.64 Extreme $0.48 Extreme 
ARM Basic $1.58 Moderate $1.05 Extreme $0.79 Extreme 
FLO Basic $1.44 Moderate $0.96 Extreme $0.72 Extreme 
ARM Ecological $1.72 Moderate $1.14 Extreme $0.86 Extreme 
FLO Ecological $1.51 Moderate $1.01 Extreme $0.76 Extreme 
       
Price = $40,000/kg Miner Populations:  
Certification 
Standards: 
Low  
(15 million) 
 Medium  
(22.5 million) 
 High  
(30 million) 
 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$1.92 Moderate $1.28 Moderate $0.96 Extreme 
ARM Basic $2.88 Free $1.92 Moderate $1.44 Moderat
e 
FLO Basic $2.75 Free $1.83 Moderate $1.37 Moderat
e 
ARM Ecological $3.02 Free $2.01 Moderate $1.51 Moderat
e 
FLO Ecological $3.02 Free $2.01 Moderate $1.51 Moderat
e 
       
Price = $55,000/kg Miner Populations:  
Certification 
Standards: 
Low  
(15 million) 
 Medium  
(22.5 million) 
 High  
(30 million) 
 
Status Quo 
(No Certification) 
$2.64 Free $1.76 Moderate $1.32 Moderat
e 
ARM Basic $3.86 Free $2.58 Free $1.93 Moderat
e 
FLO Basic $3.73 Free $2.48 Free $1.86 Moderat
e 
ARM Ecological $4.00 Free $2.67 Free $2.00 Moderat
e 
FLO Ecological $4.15 Free $2.77 Free $2.08 Moderat
e 
   Table 6.5 Incomes per Day and Poverty Category Shifts 
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3.2 Uptake and the Environment 
Uptake of either FLO’s or ARM’s Basic standards will improve human and 
environmental health because miners will use mercury reducing devices (retorts) more 
than they are using them in the status quo. However, retorts are infamous for being 
difficult to use correctly, and if used incorrectly, the actual mercury reduction can be 
quite low. Further, the continued use of mercury is not ideal because legal supplies will 
be dwindling as international actions like the Minamata Convention enter into force. Its 
continued use not only goes against growing international norms, but will lessen the 
poverty gains mentioned in the last section and potentially keep black markets alive. 
Therefore, the best thing for the environment is encouraging miners to use chemical-free 
mining methods. Both ARM and FLO recognize this and provide financial incentives for 
miners to upgrade from the Basic Standard to the Ecological Standard. But which 
governor’s incentives induce the most upgrading? And how does competition between 
governors effect the amount of upgrading?   
The answer to these two questions depends on whether the price of gold is below or 
above $26,666/kg:13 
1. For prices below $26,666/kg, ARM is better than FLO; for prices above 
$26,666/kg FLO is better than ARM. 
2. For prices below $26,666/kg, competition is good for the environment; for prices 
above $26,666/kg it is bad for the environment. More specifically, for prices 
below $26,666, competition creates an equal amount of upgrading as an ARM 
                                                
13 The derivation of this price is explained next, below these findings.  
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monopoly and more upgrading than a FLO monopoly. Above $26,666, 
competition creates perverse incentives for upgrading among a subset of medium 
capacity miners. These miners would upgrade to the Ecological standard under a 
FLO monopoly, but under competition, ARM’s Basic standard is more attractive 
to them, so they choose that instead. Thus, competition is worse for the 
environment than a FLO monopoly because fewer miners upgrade to chemical-
free methods. The project refers to this as the “missing miners” effect.  
 
These findings emerge from the following analysis which estimates the decisions of all 
miners in the aforementioned hypothetical community. Their decisions depend on their 
implied cost of upgrading denoted by X (which incorporates the financial, psychological 
and physical costs a miner accrues by upgrading from a Basic to an Ecological standard). 
It also depends on the gold price per kilogram denoted by p. A final reminder is that 
ARM pays miners a premium of $4,000 for its Basic Standard or $6,000 for its 
Ecological standard, whereas FLO pays them $2,000 for its Basic standard or 15% of the 
gold price (p) for its Ecological standard.   
Under a FLO monopoly, miners will upgrade to the Ecological standard if their 
costs are less than the difference in profits between the two standards, i.e. if X < 0.15p - 
$2,000. Under the ARM monopoly, miners will upgrade if X < $6,000-$2,000, i.e. if X < 
$2,000. Comparing these two thresholds reveals that more miners will upgrade under an 
ARM monopoly than under a FLO monopoly if $2,000 > 0.15p - $2,000, i.e. for p < 
$26,666. For p > $26,666, more miners choose to upgrade under a FLO monopoly than 
under an ARM monopoly. 
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Under competition, miners are facing the following decision tree: 
 
Figure 6.2: Decision Tree for All Situations 
 
This tree makes clear that in contexts of governance competition, any miner considering a 
Basic standard should always choose ARM because ARM’s $4,000 always pays more 
than FLO’s $2,000—the choice doesn’t depend on X or p. But the choice between the 
two Ecological options depends on p. ARM and FLO pay the same amount for their 
Ecological standards when p = $40,000.  
If p < $40,000 and miners are choosing between Ecological options, all miners, 
regardless of X, will choose ARM over FLO. The choice of whether or not to upgrade 
from ARM’s Basic standard to ARM’s Ecological standard, however, depends on X. If X 
< $2,000, miners will upgrade. Thus, the ecological outcome under competition is the 
same as the outcome under an ARM monopoly. As the previous analysis showed, for p < 
$26,666, this amount of upgrading is better than a FLO monopoly, whereas for p between 
$26,666 and $40,000, it is worse than a FLO monopoly. 
Ecological Basic 
FLO
O 
FLO
O 
ARM ARM 
0.15p-X $6,000-X $2,000 $4,000 
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On the other hand, if p > $40,000 and miners are choosing between Ecological 
options, all miners, regardless of X, will choose FLO over ARM. The choice of whether 
or not to upgrade from ARM’s Basic standard to FLO’s Ecological standard again 
depends on X. If X < 0.15p – $4,000, miners will upgrade. Recalling that under a FLO 
monopoly miners upgrade if X < 0.15p – $2,000, the analysis reveals that the ecological 
outcome is worse under competition than under a FLO monopoly. This is because miners 
with X between 0.15p - $4,000 and 0.15p - $2,000 choose to stay with a basic standard 
(ARM’s) under competition, but would have upgraded to an ecological standard (FLO’s) 
under a FLO monopoly. The project calls these miners who forego upgrading under 
competition “missing miners.” Despite the sub-optimality of this ecological outcome, it 
still generates more upgrading than an ARM monopoly because 0.15p - $4,000 > $2,000. 
Competition in this price context is therefore better for the environment than an ARM 
monopoly, but not as good as a FLO monopoly.  
To summarize, for p < $26,666, the ecological outcome under competition is the 
same as under an ARM monopoly, and this outcome is better than a FLO monopoly. For 
the interval of prices between $26,666 and $40,000, the ecological outcome under 
competition is again the same as under an ARM monopoly, but this outcome is now 
worse than a FLO monopoly. For prices above $40,000, the ecological outcome under 
competition is now better than under an ARM monopoly, but still worse than under a 
FLO monopoly. Put differently, for p > $26,000, a FLO monopoly creates the best 
ecological outcomes, and its lead over other governance contexts grows larger the higher 
the gold price climbs. 
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To make this analysis more concrete, the next sections detail a miner’s decision 
process for a gold price that falls within each of the above three intervals. As in the 
previous section on uptake and poverty impacts, these three price scenarios are Low Gold 
Price ($20,000/kg), Medium Gold Price ($40,000/kg), and High Gold Price ($55,000/kg).  
 
LOW GOLD PRICE SCENARIO: $20,000/kg 
 
Governance Context: FLO Monopoly 
In this scenario, miners in the hypothetical community have only one decision to make: 
whether to adopt FLO’s Basic standard or FLO’s Ecological standard. While at this gold 
price the Ecological standard clearly pays more than Basic standard ($3,000 compared to 
$2,000) the miner’s uptake decision will be a function of their implied upgrade costs (X). 
If the Basic standard’s premium ($2,000) is taken as status quo payoff, then the miner 
will upgrade to the Ecological standard if the reward for doing so ($3,000-X) is greater 
than $2,000. This can be modeled as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Low Price FLO Monopoly 
An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $3,000 – X > $2,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $1,000.  
Ecological Basic 
$3,000 - X $2,000 
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Governance Context: ARM Monopoly 
In this scenario, miners still have only one decision to make, but it’s a different one: 
whether to adopt ARM’s Basic standard or its Ecological standard. While the Ecological 
standard again pays more ($6,000 compared to $4,000 regardless of gold price), the 
upgrade decision is still a function of a miner’s costs X: 
Figure 6.4 Low Price ARM Monopoly 
 
An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $6,000 – X > $4,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $2,000. 
Comparing the ARM and FLO monopoly scenarios at this price, it is clear that 
more miners upgrade under ARM than they do under FLO: only the highest capacity 
miners with costs between $0-$1000 upgrade under FLO, but under ARM, those with 
costs from $0-$2,000 upgrade. Therefore, an ARM monopoly convinces more of the 
population to upgrade (i.e. those with costs $0-$1,000 and those with costs $1,000-
$2,000).  
 
Context: Governance Competition 
In this scenario, miners need to make two decisions: 1) whether or not to upgrade from a 
Basic to an Ecological model, and 2) whether to do so with ARM or with FLO. The 
Ecological Basic 
$6,000 - X $4,000 
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numbers in the below decision tree represent the payoffs to the miner from making these 
two decisions sequentially, where X is again the cost of upgrading. Looking at these 
payoffs, it becomes clear that miners who decide to stick with a Basic standard will 
always certify with ARM (because $4,000 is greater than $2,000), and miners who decide 
to upgrade to an Ecological Standard will again always choose ARM (because $6,000 is 
greater than $3,000). These winning strategies are circled in red: 
 
Figure 6.5 Low Price Competition Step One  
 
The question now is whether miners in this scenario will choose the $4,000 payoff from 
ARM’s Basic standard, or decide to upgrade to get the $6,000-X payoff from ARM’s 
Ecological Standard:  
Figure 6.6 Low Price Competition Step Two 
Ecological Basic 
$6,000 - X $2,000 
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An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $6,000 - X > $4,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $2,000. 
Comparing these three governance contexts, it is clear that FLO operating in a 
monopoly is the worst context for reducing mercury pollution. Having ARM as either the 
sole governor or introducing ARM into the governance context provides higher 
incentives for miners to upgrade to an ecological standard. More specifically, miners with 
costs from $1,000-$2,000 will upgrade if ARM is present because they’ll get enough 
money to cover their costs. They won’t upgrade if only FLO is present, because FLO 
doesn’t offer enough reward until the gold price reaches $26,6666. Therefore, in this low 
price scenario, competition creates positive incentives for mercury reduction. 
 
MEDIUM GOLD PRICE SCENARIO: $40,000/kg 
 
Governance Context: FLO Monopoly 
Using the same logic as the low price scenario, in this medium price scenario miners 
again have only one decision to make: whether to adopt FLO’s Basic standard (for 
$2,000) or FLO’s Ecological standard (for $6,000-X). This can be modeled as follows:  
 
Figure 6.7 Medium Price FLO Monopoly 
 
Ecological under ARM Basic under ARM 
$6,000 - X $4,000 
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An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $6,000 – X > $2,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $4,000. 
 
Governance Context: ARM Monopoly 
In this scenario, the analysis is exactly the same as in the low price scenario because the 
ARM incentives do not depend on the gold prices: miners will upgrade to the Ecological 
model if X < $2,000. 
Comparing the ARM and FLO monopoly scenarios at this price, a different result 
emerges from the low price scenario. This time, it is clear that more miners upgrade 
under a FLO monopoly than under an ARM monopoly because $0-$4,000 represents 
more of the population upgrading than $0-$2,000 (i.e. more medium capacity miners 
decide to upgrade under FLO than they do under ARM). 
  
Governance Context: Governance Competition 
In this scenario, miners again need to make two choices: 1) whether or not to upgrade 
from a Basic to an Ecological model, and 2) whether to do so with ARM or with FLO. If 
they choose to upgrade, they’ll get $6,000-X, no matter which organization they choose 
(at a gold price of $40,000, both ARM and FLO pay the same amount for upgrading). If 
they instead choose to stay with a Basic standard, they’ll always certify with ARM, 
because $4,000 is bigger than $2,000. These winning outcomes are circled in red:  
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Figure 6.8 Medium Price Competition Step One 
The question now is whether miners in this scenario will choose the $4,000 associated 
with ARM’s Basic standard, or decide to upgrade to get the $6,000-X payoff from either 
ARM’s or FLO’s Ecological Standard:  
Figure 6.9 Medium Price Competition Step Two 
 
An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $6,000 - X > $4,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $2,000.  
Comparing these three governance contexts at this medium price of gold, it is 
clear that FLO operating in a monopoly now encourages the highest number of people to 
upgrade to an Ecological standard, while an ARM monopoly and competition encourage 
an equally lower amount. Under competition, some medium capacity miners who would 
Ecological under either 
ARM or FLO 
Basic under ARM 
$6,000 - X $4,000 
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have upgraded to an Ecological standard had FLO been their only option decided not to 
upgrade because they could do better by certifying with ARM’s Basic standard. These 
missing miners are responding to the perverse incentives for mercury reduction that the 
presence of ARM’s standards creates in a community in which FLO is an option as well. 
The gold price that makes miners to stick with ARM’s Basic standard rather than upgrade 
is $26,666. At any higher price, including the $40,000/kg used in this example, more 
mercury reduction would have occurred under a FLO monopoly. In other words, at any 
price higher than $26,666, competition creates perverse incentives for mercury reduction. 
   
HIGH GOLD PRICE SCENARIO: $55,000/kg 
 
For every gold price above $26,666, the “missing miners” phenomenon that results from 
perverse incentives gets worse. The high price scenario illustrates this, as well as what 
happens in the case where the FLO Ecological standard pays more than the ARM 
Ecological standard.  
 
Governance Context: FLO Monopoly 
Using the same logic as the previous scenarios, under a FLO monopoly, miners have only 
one decision to make: whether to adopt FLO’s Basic standard (for $2,000) or FLO’s 
Ecological standard (for $8,250-X). This can be modeled as follows:  
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Figure 6.10 High Price FLO Monopoly 
 
An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $8,250 – X > $2,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $6,250. 
 
Governance Context: ARM Monopoly 
In this scenario, the analysis is exactly the same as in the low and medium price scenarios 
because the ARM incentives do not depend on the gold prices: miners will upgrade to 
their Ecological if X < $2,000. 
Comparing the ARM and FLO monopoly scenarios at this price, a similar result to 
the medium price scenario emerges: far more miners upgrade under a FLO monopoly 
than under an ARM monopoly, because $0-$6,250 represents more people upgrading 
than $0-$2,000 (i.e. the medium capacity miners with costs between $2,000 and $6,250 
decide to upgrade under FLO whereas they wouldn’t under ARM). 
  
Governance Context: Competition 
In this scenario, miners again need to make two choices: 1) whether or not to upgrade 
from a Basic to an Ecological model, and 2) whether to do so with ARM or with FLO. At 
Ecological Basic 
$8,250 - X $2,000 
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this high gold price, if they choose to upgrade, they will always certify with FLO, 
because $8,250 is larger than $6,000. If they choose remain certified with a Basic 
standard, they’ll always certify with ARM, because $4,000 is larger than $2,000. These 
winning strategies are circled in red:  
Figure 6.11 High Price Competition Step One 
 
The question now is whether miners in this scenario will choose the $4,000 associated 
with ARM’s Basic standard, or decide to upgrade to get the $8,250-X payoff from FLO’s 
Ecological Standard:  
Figure 6.12 High Price Competition Step Two 
 
Ecological Basic 
FLO FLO ARM ARM 
$8,250 – X  $6,000-X $2,000 $4,000 
Ecological under FLO Basic under ARM 
$8,250 - X $4,000 
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An upgrade to the Ecological model will only occur if $8,250 - X > $4,000. Solving for 
X, a miner will upgrade to the Ecological model if X < $4,250.  
Comparing these three governance contexts at this medium price of gold, it is 
clear that FLO operating in a monopoly is again the best for mercury reduction while the 
ARM monopoly is now the worst. Competition, in this high price scenario, falls in the 
middle. Once again the missing miners phenomenon is present: some miners who would 
have upgraded to the Ecological standard had FLO been their only option decided not to 
upgrade because they could do better by certifying with ARM’s Basic standard. In other 
words, at prices above $40,000, competition creates perverse incentives for mercury 
reduction, but is better than an ARM monopoly. 
 
Environment and Uptake Summary 
 
The graph below the amount of ecological upgrading that occurs under the three price 
scenarios explored in the previous sections. For each price scenario, the upgrading 
decisions of miners are shown for each of the three governance contexts. The X-axis 
represents the full population of miners in a hypothetical community in which their 
implied costs of upgrading from a Basic standard to an Ecological stand (X) range from 
$0 to $7,000. If the graph is green above a certain X, that means the miner has decided to 
upgrade. If it is grey, they have decided to stick with a Basic standard and continue using 
mercury.  
On the left side of the graph, the decisions of high capacity miners with costs $0 
to $1,000 are shown. These miners have costs so low that they upgrade in each of the 
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three price scenarios, evidenced by the green bars always above their x-axis category. On 
the right side of the graph, the decisions of low capacity miners with costs from $6,250 to 
$7,000 are shown. These miners have costs so high that they never upgrade in any of the 
price scenarios, evidenced by the grey bars always above their x-axis category. In the 
center of the graph, the decisions of medium capacity miners with X’s $1,000 to $6,250 
are shown. These miners are sensitive to changes in both gold price and governance 
contexts, so their decisions depend on their circumstances. In the low price scenario, 
competition or an ARM monopoly makes more of them upgrade than in the FLO 
monopoly. But in the other two price scenarios, competition creates the “missing miners” 
phenomenon. In the $40,000 scenario, miners with costs from $2,000 to $4,000 would 
have upgraded under FLO, but are sticking with ARM’s Basic standard instead (their 
costs are lower and ARM pays them plenty). In the $55,000 scenario, competition 
encourages more upgrading than an ARM monopoly, but not as much upgrading as a 
FLO monopoly. In this price scenario, the “missing miners” are those with costs from 
$4,250 to $6,250.  
Thus in the medium and high price scenarios (and for prices greater than $26,666 
more generally), competition creates perverse incentives for mercury reduction. This is a 
surprising, counter-intuitive finding given that the competing governors are NGOs 
founded to improve human development, not hurt it. If one or both of the governors were 
firms or business-backed NGOs, the finding would be less surprising. But in this case of 
civil society governance, this analysis shows that more is not always better: there can be 
too much of a good thing.  
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Figure 6.13 Estimated Uptake Summary 
 
3.3 The Empirical Realities of Uptake to Date: 
The findings emerging from this research on likely uptake patterns and their potential 
impacts on poverty and the environment are, of course, are best guesses. Gold’s 
governance context beyond the certification programs, in addition to gold supply, 
demand, and price are all likely to vary and influence each other, creating a wide array of 
real world effects. These factors, for example, will effect how much a miner is actually 
able to earn from certifying, since a higher premium, for example, might result in higher 
per sale earnings but fewer sales overall (or vice versa). Also miners (like all people) are 
Ecological Upgrading Decisions in a Hypothetical Mining Community 
Medium capacity 
“missing miners” 
who would have 
upgraded under a 
FLO monopoly but 
succumbed to 
perverse incentives 
High 
Capacity 
Miners 
Medium Capacity Miners Low 
Capacity 
Miners 
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likely to act irrationally, to satisfice rather than maximize utility, or  to make decisions 
for reasons not captured in this analysis. 
 A more fine tuned analysis of probable uptake of the Ecological standard, for 
example, would take into account miners’ risk tolerance and levels of optimism and 
pessimism regarding future gold prices. If a miner is highly risk averse, they might 
choose to certify with ARM because its payments do not vary. Even in a scenario in 
which the gold price makes FLO the more profitable option, a risk-averse miner might 
certify with ARM because they want to be able to predict their future income as 
accurately as possible. A similar decision might be made by a pessimistic miner: FLO 
might pay more today, but if the miner thinks that the price will only get lower and lower, 
then they may decide to certify with ARM instead. A more risk-tolerant or optimistic 
miner might likewise make the opposite move: ARM might pay more today, but if they 
believe the gold price will rise tomorrow, FLO might be a better option.  
 Being aware of these different possibilities and their likely impacts on human 
development is an important component of analyzing the merits of the governance 
contributions of FLO and ARM. More analysis should be undertaken as more data on 
uptake becomes available. The following sections conclude this discussion of uptake by 
summarizing the available data on actual uptake patterns and their human development 
impacts to date. 
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Actual Uptake of the Basic Standard:  
4 Cooperatives Certified under ARM, 2 Cooperatives Certified Under FLO 
 
As of February 2016, five years after the first sales of ethical ASGM gold under the joint 
ARM-FLO program, miners have made the following uptake decisions on the Basic 
Standards. ARM has maintained its relationship to two cooperatives certified under the 
joint program in 2011 (Aurelsa and Sotrami) and has added two new cooperatives in 
Colombia (Cooperativa Agrominera and La Llanada) (ARM 2016). Additionally, ARM is 
working with 14 mining cooperatives in following countries to build their capacity to 
certify:  Bolivia (2), Burkina Faso (2), Colombia (5), Senegal (2), and Peru (3).  
 FLO is working with far fewer communities (FLO-CERT 2016). Its only certified 
cooperatives are Aurelsa and Sotrami, who they were working with under the joint 
program and who are also certified under ARM.14 FLO is working to expand its presence 
in the Great Lakes region of East Africa by working with 9 cooperatives in Tanzania, 
Kenya, and Uganda. These cooperatives are reaching the end of their pilot phasing and 
finished their trial-run certification audits in early 2015. They have not to date, however, 
been able to receive the certification and start selling under FLO’s label.  
 An important finding from the available empirical data is that reverse uptake has 
occurred. In 2011, a cooperative in Bolivia named Cotopata had been certified under the 
joint ARM-FLO program (ARM 2011). But at some point between 2011 and 2014, they 
decided to drop out of certification altogether, and certify with neither ARM nor FLO 
(ARM 2016; FLO-CERT 2016). This instance of reverse uptake throws doubt on a key 
                                                
14 This situation of cooperative certifying under both ARM and FLO is believed to be unique and an artifact 
of the organizations’ shared histories.  
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assumption of the uptake analysis: that certifying with either organization is attractive to 
all but minimal capacity miners. Since the Bolivian cooperative had been of sufficient 
capacity to certify once, unless an event occurred to lower their capacity, they cannot be 
classified as minimal capacity miners, and therefore should be expected to both gain and 
maintain certification. Such a surprising result is a perfect example of why more 
empirical research on uptake will be needed, and how this project’s theory-based analysis 
provides a useful context in which to situate it.  
 
Actual Uptake of the Ecological Standard:  
1 Mining Cooperative Certified under ARM 
 
Interestingly, the number of cooperatives certified under an Ecological label has 
remained the same between 2011 and 2016 (one), but the identity of the cooperative has 
changed (ARM 2016; FLO-CERT 2016). As was the case with the Basic standard, the 
Ecological standard has experienced reverse uptake. This again erodes the assumption 
that certification program uptake is always preferred to the status quo. While the 
programs clearly increase income, the magnitude of this increase does not appear to be 
enough to keep all miners participating. 
 Recall the story of Oro Verde, the cooperative of Colombian miners who inspired 
the ethical ASGM movement by mining in a rainforest without the use of chemicals. 
When the joint ARM-FLO label launched in 2011, Oro Verde’s gold went on sale to the 
public and the miners earned the high levels of income associated with the joint 
program’s Ecological standard (95% of the LBMA plus a 15% premium, which is the 
same as FLO’s rules today). Oro Verde’s 90 families (1,300 people) were earning about 
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57% more than they were they previous year thanks to program participation, and yet 
three years later, not a single Oro Verde family had decided to renew their certification 
with either organization (ARM and FLO, by this time, were operating separately). In 
other words, uptake of both programs’ Ecological standards reversed from 90 participants 
to 0 in the course of three years (Levin 2013; SEED 2009; ARM 2016; FLO-CERT 2016) 
. 
 During this period from 2011 to 2014, the gold price began and ended around 
$40,000/kg but experienced a record rise and fall of nearly double this amount in 
between. At some point during this ride, the reports of jewelry industry consultant Estelle 
Levin (2013) and Respondents 3 and 4 suggest that large-scale mining operations 
approached the Oro Verde miners and asked to buy the mining rights to their land. While 
interviews did not reveal the exact nature of these larger mining operations (e.g. whether 
they had strong or weak environmental and social plans, etc.), they did make clear that 
these operators offered Oro Verde more money than the cooperative could make under 
either ARM’s or FLO’s Ecological labels. Some Oro Verde miners initially resisted the 
offers because they liked participating in the certification programs and lived in the 
region, so they didn’t want it polluted. In the end, however, they sold the rights and de-
certified. The financial and other incentives provided by ARM and FLO were not enough 
to win out over other bids, and the following analysis may indicate why.  
 Respondent 4 estimated that Oro Verde was selling about 10 kg of gold a year 
through the joint certification program. If the gold price was $40,000/kg on average, that 
amounts to an income of $440,000 from certification program participation that is spread 
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across 90 mining groups of approximately 7 adults each. The result is a mining income of 
around $700 per adult per year, which by the World Bank’s measurements puts the 
miners in the Moderate Poverty category, and by the Colombian government’s 
measurements puts them in the category of Destitute (poorer than the poor, who earn less 
than $1,716 per year) (DANE 2010). When put in this empirical perspective, it is easy to 
see why a third actor may be able to buy-out would be certifiers without much effort. If 
the miners use this money to make long-term investments and transition to other 
livelihoods, then this is a positive outcome for human development. But if they don’t use 
the money wisely, or if it’s of too low a quantity, then miners are right back where they 
started. The nature of the human development impacts from buy-outs also depends on 
who is doing the buying and why. If it is a large scale mining organization, that’s 
probably a net loss for human development. But if it is a government buying them out to 
enforce a protected area, then the impacts are less clear.  
 After the loss of Oro Verde, another mining cooperative did very recently gain an 
Ecological standard certification: the XAMODX cooperative in Mongolia certified under 
ARM (ARM 2016). FLO, for its part, is working to assist a cooperative in Uganda to 
certify under its Ecological standard. This project began in the summer of 2015 and was 
supposed to be complete by December 2015, but Ecological gold from FLO has yet to 
emerge from it. 
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Cooperatives and Countries working with ARM: 
Country Cooperative Standard 
Type 
# people in 
cooperative 
(men/women) 
Countries selling 
Mongolia XAMODX  Ecological 300 Austria, Canada, 
Colombia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Singapore, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, US  
Colombia Cooperativa 
Agrominera 
Basic 84/5 
 La Llanada Basic 43/3 
Peru Aurelsa Basic 
 
114/17 
 Sotrami Basic 694/1 
Table 6.6 Uptake With ARM 
 
 
 
Table 7: Currently Certified Under FLO: 
Country Cooperative Standard 
Type 
# people in 
cooperative 
(men/women) 
Countries selling 
Peru Aurelsa Basic 114/17 Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, 
Hong Kong, 
Netherlands, UK, US 
 Sotrami Basic 694/1 
Table 6.7 Uptake With FLO 
 
Actual Premium Investments: How Uptake May Impact Human Development 
Beyond Compliance with the Standard 
 
In addition to the positive human development impacts that would follow from uptake 
and compliance with both the Basic and Ecological standards, positive human 
development impacts are likely to follow from the spending of program premiums. 
Linton (2014) is among the first scholars to generate knowledge on the ways in which the 
premiums generated by certification organizations are helping human development. Her 
research analyzed the premium spending of over 200 certified coffee cooperatives, and 
revealed interesting patterns. First, all of the cooperatives spent at least a portion of the 
premium back on business investments like trucks, processing equipment, storage 
facilities, and educational material. Beyond these business expenditures, the vast majority 
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(62%) of cooperatives invested in public goods that benefited the entire community 
whereas a minority of cooperatives (38%) invested only in “club goods” that only 
benefited the members of the cooperative. Cooperatives that focused on club goods spent 
most of their money on school expenses, health services, home improvements, and credit 
programs. If the premium amount was deemed too small to be usefully invested in such 
purchases, it was often distributed as cash. Cooperatives that focused on goods that 
would benefit the community as a whole often spent their money on building schools and 
hiring teachers, community infrastructure (e.g. roads, water and electricity systems), and 
health clinics.  
To date, the mining cooperatives seem to be spending their premiums in similar 
ways to Linton’s coffee cooperatives. In the five years since Aurlesa and Sotrami became 
certified under the joint ARM-FLO program, they’ve made both business and community 
investments. FLO reports that Sotrami used premium income to build a pre-school that 
not only educated local children but served as a daycare. Sotrami is hoping to spend 
future premiums on more teachers and a reliable water supply for the school, electricity 
systems, and internet connectivity. Some women also hope that money can be spent on 
training programs that would provide women with non-mining skills so that they could 
find alternative jobs. 
ARM reports that Aurlesa has made similar investments. To benefit their 
businesses, Aurlesa’s invested in a desorption plant that increases the efficiency and 
profitability of their mining procedures, road construction, workplace health and safety 
equipment, and financial and security systems. They’ve additionally invested in their 
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community by building three schools and improving the local health clinic and grocery 
store.   
These are all positive outcomes that likely would not have occurred had 
certification organizations not entered these communities. The only outcomes that might 
be viewed ambiguously are the building of roads in biologically sensitive areas. While 
increasing access for miners makes it easier for them to earn money, it also breaks apart 
animals’ habitats and results in deforestation. Both outcomes hurt the dimensions of 
human development that are based on the environment’s well-being. Overall, however, 
these premiums appear to be a net positive influence on human development that will 
hopefully generate virtuous cycles in which increased income, health and education 
progressively expand the capacity of miners to make empowering life choices.  
 
Section 4: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This project set out to explore not only why some certification organizations were 
entering the ASGM sector, but also what effects they were likely to have on human 
development. This chapter’s analyses have shed some light on potential human 
development effects through comparison of the relative stringency of standards, analysis 
of likely and actual uptake patterns, and review of premium spending to date. Several 
findings emerge from the chapter.  
 One is that for the production of a typical wedding ring, certifying with any 
organization is likely to increase a miner’s income 41%-79% over the status quo, which 
is equivalent to a one category poverty shift that may lift some, though not all, miners out 
of poverty. The chapter also showed that the degree of environmental protection as well 
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as which organization is best at providing it depends on the gold price and the 
governance context. A second finding is that when the governance context is 
characterized by monopolies, ARM induces more Ecological upgrading than FLO if the 
gold is below $26,666/kg, and FLO induces more than ARM if the price is higher. A 
third finding is that if gold is below $26,666, competition is as good as an ARM 
monopoly at inducing upgrading, but above that price, competition creates perverse 
incentives for mercury reduction because some miners who would have upgraded under a 
FLO monopoly will not upgrade under competition. These “missing miners” continue to 
use mercury under ARM’s Basic standard, creating a suboptimal outcome for the 
environment. This finding about the harmful effect of NGO competition is surprising, 
since both organizations aim to create the best human development outcomes possible. 
This analysis of governance competition shows that there can, indeed, be too much of a 
good thing.  
 Overall, any uptake of any standard is a boon for human development and should 
be encouraged. Since many of the human development problems associated with ASGM 
(like child labor and mercury use) are poverty driven, improving miners’ incomes by any 
amount is a good thing, and both programs do this. Likewise, uptake of any standard is 
akin to uptake of retorts which, even if used imperfectly, help raise awareness about the 
dangers of mercury and likely reduce pollution by at least a small amount.  
 Which organization will produce more of these positive outcomes is an open 
question. While the chapter showed that ARM’s rules provide more poverty relief per 
sale than FLO’s, and that in most price scenarios FLO provides higher incentives for 
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environmental protection than ARM, these differences are best understood as alternative 
strategies for achieving the same goals. ARM’s strategy is to give more money to miners 
per sale, and to offset any resulting lower sales volume with income from its Certificate 
program. FLO’s strategy pays less per sale, but hopes the resulting lower priced gold will 
induce higher sales volumes. Which strategy is best for raising income levels is an open 
question, as is the most impactful mix of Basic standard versus Ecological standard 
uptake (high levels of pollution reduction could occur through either high volumes of 
Basic standard uptake or by lower volumes of Ecological standard uptake).  
 By increasing income and reducing chemical pollution by any amount, both 
organizations are helping to create virtuous cycles which promote human development. 
With more income, miners have less pressure to enlist their children’s help in mining. 
Their children can then spend more time on school work, and can use their education to 
get better jobs and earn more money in the future. More money also helps miners invest 
in cleaner technologies, which results in less pollution. Less pollution means healthier 
communities, which means more productive workers. More productive workers will 
likely earn higher incomes, which will keep the virtuous cycle in motion.  
 Beyond these benefits of compliance, the existence of these programs is also 
likely to have positive spillover effects. Mining communities, like coffee producers, are 
investing their premiums in public goods like schools, health clinics, and infrastructure 
that benefit their wider communities. Healthier, more affluent communities will raise 
human development in their region by spending more on local businesses and spreading 
the message that better mining techniques and lifestyles are options. And because 
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chemical pollution is both a global and long lasting problem, reductions achieved from 
compliance in one mining community are of benefit to current and future generations 
worldwide. Finally, the presence and advertising efforts of these organizations in 
consumer markets is likely to put positive pressure on the broader jewelry industry to 
reform. Citizens who come into contact with these campaigns, whether they are buying 
gold jewelry or not, are likely to think twice about the ethics of their consumption more 
generally, and may shift to more ethical practices in an array of product categories. There 
is no evidence to date to support FLO’s original fears that putting a slow-turning luxury 
good in the market will make people feel bad about themselves and reject the ethical 
consumption movement as a whole. Participation in the programs is likely to be a good 
thing and should be encouraged. 
 That said, there are three key things that ARM, FLO, and all global governance 
organizations should do to maximize their positive effects on human development: 
 
1) Don’t fail—encourage compliance and prevent reverse uptake by generating 
multidimensional program buy-in. 
 When working to generate uptake among producers, certification organizations 
need to go beyond advertising immediate financial benefits in order to gain and maintain 
producer compliance over the long-term. Creating multidimensional buy-in—i.e. the 
desire to comply for reasons beyond an immediate increase in income—is important for 
several reasons. First, if the certification organizations only focus on short-term financial 
gains, they may be outbid by more nefarious actors able to offer more cash to miners up 
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front, as was the case with Oro Verde in Colombia. Certification organizations should 
address this threat by emphasizing how their program can make the financial lives of the 
miners (and their families) more secure and successful over the long-term through 
mechanisms like credit programs and the opportunity to upgrade to their more lucrative 
Ecological standards. Organizations further need to emphasize the non-financial benefits 
of complying with their programs’ rules. The Sotrami and Aurlesa miners who have been 
certified for several years report that they like the changes in their everyday work 
experience that rule compliance has generated (ARM 2016b; FLO 2016). Data from the 
experience of coffee miners echoes this—in the case of Mexican farmers, the profits from 
certified and uncertified sales can frequently be identical, but they choose to maintain 
their certification and comply with the rules because of the better social life and 
educational opportunities that compliance creates (Jaffe 2007). In the case of mining, 
similar benefits are likely to accrue and should be emphasized alongside the major boons 
in health miners are likely to enjoy from safer mercury practices. Additionally, 
organizations should take care to tailor this education to the community’s cultural 
context, as the myths that abound regarding mercury (e.g. it gives miners superpowers), 
the facts that will induce the most change (e.g. mercury can cause impotence), and the 
typical patterns for behavior change (e.g. elders change things first) are likely to vary by 
context (Sippl and Selin 2012). True, scholars returning from the field say that the top 
concern of miners from all contexts is earning more money (Siegal and Veiga 2010; 
echoed in informal interview with Marcello Veiga in 2011). Nevertheless, inducing 
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multidimensional buy-in will be critical to the long-term success of ASGM governance 
projects as well as those targeting other sectors. 
 Without multidimensional buy-in, the reverse uptake phenomenon may continue, 
which may thwart the success of all governance projects in a region. When any 
community has a bad experience with a governance project, research shows they are 
loathe to forget it and that it negatively impacts their willingness to participate in future 
projects because of the erosion of trust and optimism (Scott 1998; Respondent 3). FLO 
experienced such problems when pitching their certification program to miners in 
Uganda (Respondent 3). Many development organizations had tried to work with this 
Ugandan community in the past with either bad or short-lived results, which left the 
Ugandans bitter that they had invested their energy and hope in the possibility of a better 
future. They were highly reluctant to trust FLO because of these past experiences, so 
FLO partnered with a local NGO the Ugandans did trust to broker a relationship with the 
community slowly. Eventually this approach worked: the miners became willing to invest 
in learning the techniques certification required and began practice-audits in 2015. 
Despite this breakthrough, FLO remains worried about their relationship with this 
community, specifically about whether they will ever successfully pass an audit, and if 
so, whether they will maintain certification over the long-term. If this group decides that 
the costs of uptake outweigh its benefits and de-certify, they’ll likely return to hazardous 
mining practices and never trust an outside organization again. This, on average, is 
probably harmful to human development in both local and global communities.  
Therefore building multi-dimensional buy-in is critical to governance success. 
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 As a final point, if one of the drivers of reverse uptake is too little income 
accruing to the miner, then jewelry retailers should be pushed to change their business 
practices. In the status quo, jewelry retailers determine a ring’s selling price by simply 
doubling or tripling their costs. They rationalize this protocol by noting the costs 
associated with their consumer-facing business, such as rental fees for storefronts and 
advertising expenses to attract customers. On balance, however, their defense is not very 
convincing. If the miners need to get more money in premiums and that increase in cost, 
under current calculations, makes the resulting ring more expensive than customers want, 
then the retailers should change their current calculations to make the ring price attractive 
again. They can likely lower their margins from 3 or 2 times their costs to around 1.5 and 
still remain profitable. The difference will likely not be much for them, but it could make 
a huge difference in the capacity of miners to gain and maintain certification, thereby 
increasing human development in their communities and beyond.  
 
2) Do Better—cooperate rather than compete to maximize human development  
 In addition to not failing, ARM and FLO should strive to do the best that they can, 
and right now they can do better. As is, compliance with their standards will likely reduce 
mercury at least a little since they both require retorts. However, this project’s analysis of 
probable Ecological upgrading decisions shows that more mercury reduction could 
happen if the organizations fixed the perverse incentives created by their competition.  
 One solution might be for the organizations to remain separate entities but to 
agree to adjust their premiums in cases of geographic co-location to eliminate perverse 
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incentives and the “missing miners” phenomenon. In doing so, they would be aligning 
with the Rainforest Alliance’s view of competition. Rainforest Alliance said in interviews 
that they “compete with other organizations in the marketplace, but not on the ground” in 
production communities. On the ground, they argue, all actors should work together to 
share knowledge and get as many producers adopting better practices as possible. This 
approach would seem wise for ARM and FLO, who could still offer their market partners 
different trading models, pricing options, and advertising narratives while cooperating on 
the ground to improve upon the status quo. 
 The best solution is also the most radical one: ARM and FLO could end their 
existence as separate entities and go back to being a joint certification program. This 
would be wise for a several of reasons. First, it would create a simplified story for the 
consumer, who is already struggling to adjust to the idea that gold and jewelry have 
ethical downsides in the same ways that coffee, fish, and timber do and should be 
certified and labeled accordingly. ARM would need to let go of its quest for brand 
independence and accept a quieter identity as the world’s premier ASGM capacity 
building organization. FLO’s label is the only one that should go on the gold—certifying 
a new product is complicated enough and the governance project needs to simplify and 
amplify its message. 
 Second, the main reason for the demise of the joint partnership was FLO’s 
resistance to the idea mass balancing, but they have since changed their views and offer a 
mass balancing model themselves, so the issue is moot. FLO might still ideologically 
oppose ARM’s Certificate program, but they should try to embrace the idea. The pros and 
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cons of ARM’s Certificate model were discussed previously, but on balance it is a win 
for human development. It is an essential means of raising money for ASGM capacity 
building and eventual certification, and has a proven track record of success. Luxury 
jewelry company Chopard’s participation in the Certificate program enabled a mining 
community to become certified that would have been able to otherwise (ARM 2016c). 
While this does allow Chopard to “greenwash” their operations without truly changing 
their business practices, as the relationship between Chopard and ARM develops, ARM 
can perhaps nudge the Chopard into sourcing a small amount of gold from the 
cooperatives and assist the company with incorporating such a move into their business 
plan. In this way, the trading models offered in a reunified ARM-FLO partnership could 
operate similarly to global environmental treaties, in which the initial framework 
conventions are often weak, but more stringent protocols are gradually added as parties to 
the treaty gain more trust in one another and experience in evolving their practices. The 
reunified ARM-FLO partnership would have four trading models total: the Certificate 
model (no traceability), the Sourcing Partnership model (mass-balanced and traceable to 
the refinery), the Goldsmith Registration model (mass-balanced and traceable to the 
refinery but aimed at small-scale jewelers), and the Licensee model (a fully traceable a 
labeled gold product).   
 Third, reunification would pool financial and intellectual resources, likely 
resulting in a better financial situation for the certification organizations via, for example, 
reduced costs of advertising and administration. The savings could be passed on to the 
miners in the form of higher premiums or invested in methods of inducing 
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multidimensional buy-in. While both ARM and FLO mentioned in interviews that 
competition had pushed them to improve and innovate, more gains would likely be won 
from their reunification.  
 A final way ARM and FLO should do better is by cooperating not only with each 
other, but with public and private actors with shared interests. While partnering with 
private actors will happen naturally through implementation of ARM’s Certificate 
program, more work needs to be done to explicitly link ARM and FLO with the UN 
Minamata Convention. The Minamata Convention requires that countries with even 
minimal amounts of ASGM create National Action Plans to reduce the worst practices in 
the sector (UNEP 2014). As Chapter 3 explained, countries with ASGM are often also 
countries with governments struggling with low capacity, which means their ability to 
create the changes the Minamata Convention requires is likely low. Such situations create 
excellent opportunities for the delegation of authority from the public to civil society 
actors. While delegation has well-known principal-agent problems and corruption can 
always arise, partnering with NGOs like ARM and FLO will likely minimize these risks 
because their interests are closely aligned with both the government’s and the Minamata 
Convention’s. All parties should make partnership with ARM, FLO, or joint ARM-FLO 
program a central feature of their Convention-mandated National Action Plans. Not 
explicitly partnering with the Minamata Convention is as suboptimal an outcome as the 
missing miners phenomenon.  
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3) Aim to be irrelevant: incorporate alternative livelihood training into capacity building 
and certification rules because ASGM should be a transitory, not permanent, livelihood. 
If ARM and FLO have done their best job possible at governing ASGM, the evidence 
will be miners transitioning out of the livelihood altogether. This may take a generation 
or more, but it should nonetheless be the ultimate goal of governance because even 
improved mining is dangerous and destructive to the environment, and the minerals will 
not last forever. True, in the short term, the idea of transitioning miners to “alternative 
livelihoods” may be unhelpfully naïve. As Siegel and Veiga (2010) wrote, in most cases 
“mining is the alternative livelihood,” meaning that miners are already agricultural or 
textile workers who use mining to subsidize the inadequate income from these 
livelihoods. Mining is seldom a first choice for people; it is usually the livelihood of last 
resort.  
Nevertheless, for certification organizations to make a lasting impact on human 
development in mining communities, they must make education about transitioning out 
of small-scale mining an integral part of their program. Certification organization staffs 
likely have a lot of knowledge about routes out of poverty, and it would be unethical for 
them not to share this knowledge with the miners. And even if the staffs don’t have 
anything to share, the miners in many cases likely know plenty about how to succeed, 
and may just need a nudge or specific kinds of support to overcome internal and external 
obstacles to making livelihood transitions that are in their best interest. Therefore, at a 
minimum, programs should include collaborative brainstorming and career planning 
sessions about the miners’ futures. Supporting people’s capacity to hope for and create a 
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better future is a critical aspect of empowerment, and enhancing their array of choices is a 
central goal of human development.  
ARM and FLO must include this horizon expanding component in their programs 
in order to achieve their maximum governance potential. Currently neither of the 
programs include such training, and this needs to change. One way that this change could 
manifest would be supporting the following trajectory for miners: compliance with the 
Basic standard, mandatory education and planning sessions for upgrading to the 
Ecological standard, compliance with the Ecological standard, and mandatory education 
and planning sessions on how miners can transition themselves or their children out of 
mining. Miners should never be removed from a program by force, but they should be 
forced to think about and plan for a cleaner, brighter future. If ARM and FLO make these 
changes, they will be doing as much as they can for human development in the sector. 
And doing anything less is not doing enough. 
 
This chapter’s analysis of the relative stringency, likely uptake patterns, likely human 
development impacts, and ways of improving ARM’s and FLO’s institutions for 
governing ASGM conclude the empirical portion of this project. Chapter 8 summarizes 
the project’s findings and recommendations, resituates them in the broader context of the 
governance literature, and highlights fruitful paths for future research.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This project was motivated by a desire to understand why global governance 
organizations vary in their sector entry decisions, and how these decisions might impact 
human development. The institutional literature on global governance indicates that both 
the number and type of governors in a sector shape their effectiveness (Young 2002, 
2010; Vogel 2008; Alter and Meunier 2009; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Buthe and Mattli 
2011; Cadman 2011; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013). Therefore, 
understanding why global governance patterns occur sheds important light on how to 
adjust them to maximize human development outcomes. To serve this purpose, the 
project sought to explain the contribution of civil society actors to governance patterns in 
the gold mining sector. Using the empirical case of certification organization response to 
artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM), the project asked: Why did Fairtrade 
International and the Alliance for Responsible Mining decide to govern ASGM while the 
Rainforest Alliance decided not to, and what are the likely human development impacts 
of these decisions?  
 
Section 1: Hypotheses and Summary of the Arguments 
 
To answer these questions, the project constructed two hypotheses based on insights from 
the global governance literatures on institutionalism and transnational advocacy, and 
drew upon data collected from interviews, hyperlink analysis and document review. The 
findings that emerged from this research are summarized below.  
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Hypothesis 1: Norm entrepreneurs, organizational culture and network gatekeeper 
effects shaped sector entry decisions equally.  
Status: Reject. 
Revision: The interaction of norm entrepreneurs and organizational cultures are jointly 
sufficient to explain sector entry decisions, whereas the gatekeeper effect played little to 
no role in them.  
 
The comparative case studies of Fairtrade International’s (FLO’s) and the Rainforest 
Alliance’s (RA’s) sector entry decisions showed that differences in the attributes of norm 
entrepreneurs tipped the balance within organizations to be for and against gold sector 
entry, respectively. Without the influence of norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultural 
inertia (i.e. the repeated best response to internal organizational incentives) would have 
kept both organizations out of the gold sector. This argument echoes the theory of 
organizational evolution presented by Auld (2014), although he doesn’t apply it to sector 
entry decisions.  
When Auld’s theory is applied to sector entry decisions it doesn’t explain the 
observed empirical outcomes—analysis of norm entrepreneurs must be added in. Within 
both FLO and RA, there were organizational cultural attributes that pushed both for and 
against gold sector entry. Pushing in favor of gold, both organizations had voting rules 
that prevented farmers from having equal voting power on sector entry decisions. Gold 
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further fit both of their written mission statements, and was associated with human 
development issues that both organizations cared about and had experience with. On the 
other hand, both organizations also had cultural attributes pushing against gold sector 
entry. For example, while voting rules blocked farmers from opposing gold, they gave 
ample power to retail actors, who similarly preferred entry into other sectors that would 
financially benefit them more directly. Further, neither organization had expertise in gold, 
nor did they have funding available to acquire such expertise. Therefore gold entry would 
be relatively expensive relative to other sector entry initiatives.  
Where FLO and RA had differences in organizational culture, FLO’s differences 
generally pushed in favor of gold sector entry, whereas RA’s differences pushed against 
it. FLO believed that its best strategy for growth was to enter new non-food sectors, begin 
by working with the smaller scale actors in that sector (adding larger actors later), and to 
use its unofficial new products team in the Fairtrade Foundation office to acquire funding 
for the venture, which would lower sector entry costs.15 RA, by contrast, had no specific 
desire to enter a non-food sector but believed instead that any new sector should benefit 
existing clients, since it was they who would fund the new initiatives (not outside grants) 
(Respondents 12 and 7; RA Annual Reports 2006-2009). Further, RA’s beliefs about 
growth strategies were the opposite of FLO’s: RA believed it was wisest to begin by 
working with large scale actors (adding smaller actors later) (Respondents 2, 3, 12, and 
14). This belief in the need to partner with large-scale actors is also central to RA’s 
                                                
15 FLO did have reservations about the degree to which gold was the best non-food sector to enter. Gold’s 
attributes of being a potluck, non-FMCG, luxury good with a complex supply chain and few linkages to 
existing products or producers made it unattractive. Its non-food nature and proof of concept status, 
however, worked in its favor. 
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internalized mission: mainstreaming better sector practices to mitigate deforestation (see 
Chapter 5). Since RA did not have any large-scale gold sector actors asking for its 
partnership, entering the sector would fit well with its mainstreaming mission. Further, 
mining is a major cause of deforestation, but interviews revealed that RA believes it is 
not the biggest driver among the sectors they might consider entering. Cattle, for 
example, was considered alongside mining in meetings, and, because it was argued to be 
the “largest driver of deforestation in the world” (Respondent 12) was seen as a better fit 
for their mission than gold. But perceived deforestation impact rankings do not, alone, 
determine sector entry decisions. Tourism was agreed to have an even lower impact than 
mining and yet was entered. This, it appears, is because of the persuasive efforts of the 
tourism norm entrepreneur (see Chapter 5). This is all to say that organizational culture 
makes organizations more or less predisposed to enter certain sectors, but it is not 
necessarily determinate. If a norm entrepreneur intervenes, they can tip the decision in a 
non-natural direction, as is illustrated by the case studies of FLO and RA. 
But the research in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that not just any norm entrepreneur 
can shift an organization’s sector entry decisions: certain attributes seem to be required. 
In the FLO case, Greg Valerio aimed his pitch at the leader of the organization 
responsible for launching new products (Harriet Lamb of the Fairtrade Foundation), 
emphasizing the similarity of mining issues to the issues FLO was already prioritizing 
and arguing that because of FLO’s expertise, it had a moral obligation to enter the ASGM 
sector. There is precedent of moral pitches alone resulting in successful advocacy (Busby 
2007) but Valerio went further, lowering the costs of sector entry for FLO by providing 
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them with industry expertise, a pre-written mining standard, a ready-to-certify mining 
cooperative (Oro Verde), and a ready-to-sell jewelry store (Valerio’s CRED Jewelry). 
This was enough to convince Harriet Lamb to advocate for gold sector entry, and she and 
Valerio, together, were successful. Despite FLO’s misgivings about gold’s product 
attributes and the pushback from factions within the organization who had vested 
interests in agriculture, the interaction of norm entrepreneurs with the organizational 
cultural factors pushing in gold’s favor was sufficient to cause sector entry.  
While the tourism entrepreneur in the RA case exhibited a similar set of attributes 
to Valerio, the gold entrepreneur was different in some important respects. Although the 
gold entrepreneur argued frequently for gold sector entry, he did not frame his arguments 
in ways that resonated with RA’s beliefs that new sectors should benefit existing 
stakeholders, mitigate deforestation, and mainstream environmental change. The 
entrepreneur articulated many legitimate and rational reasons for gold sector entry, but 
because they were not well-matched to the organization’s culture, they did not persuade 
RA’s leadership team. Further, the entrepreneur did nothing to lower the start-up costs of 
gold sector entry: no partnerships with large-scale actors were forged, and no free labor 
(e.g. research, pre-written standards, etc.) was offered. Given that RA’s organizational 
culture was already pushing against gold sector entry, the norm entrepreneur in this case 
did not do nearly enough to tip the RA’s decision toward governing gold. 
In summary, the story of gold sector entry (and non-entry) in the cases of FLO 
and RA could not have been told by analyzing either organizational culture or norm 
entrepreneurship alone. Organizational culture does not explain how the idea to certify 
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gold entered FLO, nor does it explain why the factors favoring gold sector entry 
overcame those pushing against it. Norm entrepreneurship, for its part, does not explain 
either organization’s pushback to a sector which, on paper, it ought to support. Studied 
together, however, these factors sufficiently explain why FLO and RA made divergent 
decisions on gold sector entry.  
The network gatekeeper effect, by contrast, adds nothing to the story of gold 
sector entry. If the gatekeeper effect were influencing decisions, the network leaders 
would be mentioned as a causal forces in interviews and the agendas of the gatekeepers 
would emphasize the need for more gold governance. Such evidence was clearly found in 
Carpenter’s (2014) research, but neither type was found in this project’s research. Later 
sections of this chapter will discuss why this might be.  
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Norm Entrepreneur Attributes Favoring Gold:  
(If Yes, then Helps Gold) 
FLO = 10 
yeses 
RA = 3 
yeses 
Personal Background   
Credentials Mixed Yes 
Media Skills No No 
Outsider Status Yes No 
Similarity to Target Yes Unknown 
Unlikely Leader Persona Yes No 
Communication Strategies   
Charisma Yes Unknown 
Calibrated ask  Yes No 
English skills Yes Yes 
Preferred Setting Yes Yes 
Resource Strategies   
Valuable Celebrity or Network Mixed No 
Industry Expertise Yes No 
Research report Yes No 
Funding No No 
Proof of Concept Yes No 
Organizational Cultural Attributes Favoring Gold:  
(If Yes, then Helps Gold) 
FLO = 9 
yeses 
RA = 3 
yeses 
Structures   
Voting rules: Farmers could not veto Yes Yes 
Voting rules: Retailers could not veto No No 
New Product Team  Yes No 
Funding: external sought per project  Yes No 
Resources (Start-up Costs)   
Available Funding No No 
Expertise in Organization No No 
Free labor (research, standards, proof of concept, etc.) Yes No 
Beliefs   
Mission Fit-Written Yes Yes 
Mission Fit- Internalized Yes No 
Strategy: beginning with only small-scale actors is ok  Yes No 
Strategy: explicit hunt for new non-food product Yes No 
Value of risk No No 
Issue Attributes (victims, perpetrators, complexity, harm, linkages) Yes Yes 
Sector attributes (not potluck, complex, luxury, but FMCG with 
proof of concept and linkages) 
No No 
   Table 7.1 Framework Factor Influence 
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Hypothesis 2: Certification organizations improve human development, and the more of 
them the better.     
Status: Reject. 
Revision: Certification organizations improve human development, but competition 
fosters suboptimal outcomes when the price of gold is above $26,666 per kilogram. 
 
While empirical evidence of human development impact is limited due to the short length 
of time since the launch of FLO’s and the Alliance for Responsible Mining’s (ARM’s) 
competing standards, the available evidence as well as estimates indicate that they are 
positive forces for human development. The analysis in support of this claim focused on 
the goals of poverty reduction and environmental protection, but also assessed the 
stringency of the rules on a range of human development issues (see Table 7.2).   
Chapter 6 showed that uptake of either program’s Basic or Ecological standard is 
likely to increase a miner’s income by 41%-70% (depending on their choice of standards 
and the price of gold). This is not enough to move miners living in extreme poverty 
(earning less than $1.25 a day) out of poverty (earning more than $2.50 per day). 
However, it may in many cases be enough to give them a one category shift 
improvement, i.e. move them from extreme to moderate poverty, or from moderate 
poverty to poverty free. The actual impact of these programs on poverty will depend on 
how many miners have the capacity to adopt a Basic standard, how many will have the 
capacity to upgrade to an Ecological standard, and how they spend their social premiums. 
To date, several (though not all) mining cooperatives appear to have the capacity to adopt 
a Basic standard, but nearly none have the capacity to upgrade to an Ecological one 
  
237 
(Respondents 3, 4, and 8; FLO-CERT 2016; ARM 2016). On a brighter note, most 
miners appear to be spending their premiums in pro-social ways that support human 
development in their broader communities (e.g. investing in schools, health clinics,  
infrastructure) (FLO 2016; ARM 2016b). Chapter 6 showed that ARM’s Fairmined 
Certificates program plus its higher Basic standard premium payment make its rules 
stronger on poverty than FLO’s rules, but the impact of these rules will be determined by 
the uptake levels of both miners and consumers. Both organizations chose their rules 
strategically, with the goal being to reduce poverty in mining communities as much as 
possible. Both sets of rules will likely help, and determining which organization helps the 
most will be a promising path for future research.  
Similarly, with regard to environmental (and human health) protection, uptake of 
either organization’s Basic standards is good because they require the adoption of retorts, 
which (as explained in Chapter 3) lower the amount of mercury used in mining as well as 
the amount that ends up in the environment. Even if used incorrectly, something is better 
than nothing. The maximum level of environmental protection will be achieved via 
uptake of either organization’s Ecological standard, since both of these standards require 
that chemical-free mining methods be used. The analysis in Ch. 6 showed that the amount 
of upgrading from a Basic standard to an Ecological one will be a function of the miner’s 
capacity, the gold price, and the governance context.  
At gold prices below $26,666, ARM’s Ecological standard pays more than FLO’s 
Basic and Ecological standards. Therefore, miners wanting to upgrade will always do so 
with ARM if it is an option, and competition creates better or equal outcomes than 
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monopolies (i.e. either an ARM monopoly or competition creates more upgrading than a 
FLO monopoly). At prices above $26,666, the missing miners effect begins to happen: 
the high payment of ARM’s Basic standard creates perverse incentives that cause some 
miners who would have upgraded under a FLO monopoly to forgo upgrading, leaving 
more mercury in the system than there would be otherwise. Therefore competition is 
worse than a FLO monopoly because it creates suboptimal outcomes: more mercury 
reduction would occur under a FLO monopoly.  
Human 
Development 
Aspects 
ARM and 
FLO Goals 
Strength 
of ARM’s 
Rules 
Strength 
of FLO’s 
Rules 
ARM and FLO Predicted 
Achievement 
Income Poverty 
Reduction, 
Market 
Opportunities 
Basic: 
Strong 
Ecological: 
Moderate 
Basic: 
Moderate 
Ecological: 
Moderate 
Miners’ incomes likely to rise by 
41%-70%, a one category shift that 
may move some, but not all, out of 
poverty 
Education Child labor  Moderate Moderate ARM bans children age 7-14 (FLO 
allows them to “help” if 
supervised); both will likely reduce 
or make safer older children’s 
participation 
Health Social and 
labor 
protections; 
responsible 
environmental 
management 
Basic: 
Moderate 
Ecological: 
Strong  
Basic: 
Moderate 
Ecological: 
Strong  
Protective equipment helps. See 
environment section for mercury 
protection.  
Peace Peace Weak Moderate FLO creates more banned/or 
increased vigilance areas than 
ARM; both likely to help but could 
be stronger.  
Political 
freedom 
Lobbying 
capacity 
Weak Weak Unclear benefits. 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Environmental 
“sustainability
” and 
“responsible” 
“management” 
Basic: 
Moderate 
Ecological: 
Strong 
Basic: 
Moderate 
Ecological: 
Strong 
Adoption likely reduces mercury 
pollution by requiring retorts. 
Competition or an ARM monopoly 
creates maximum mercury 
reductions if gold price is below 
$26,666; otherwise a FLO 
monopoly is best, competition is 
suboptimal, and ARM provides the 
least incentives for change.  
Table 7.2 Certification Organization Strengths 
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Section 2: Contributions to the Literature and Suggestions for Future Research 
This project’s analyses generated several theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
global governance literatures on institutionalism, transnational advocacy, and private 
regulation. The contributions in Table 7.3 along with promising avenues for future 
research are discussed in the next sections.  
 
Contributions Literature 
1. Filling gap in the certification literature on sector entry 
 
Private Regulation 
2. Identifying seven sector attributes that make sector entry more 
likely 
Private Regulation; 
Transnational Advocacy 
3. Empirical focus on ASGM and recommendations for 
improving sector: stop failing, cooperate, transition 
Private Regulation; 
Transnational Advocacy 
4. Placing scope conditions on the gatekeeper effect Transnational Advocacy 
5. Demonstrating DI’s usefulness as a coordinated application of 
new institutionalisms 
Institutionalism 
6. Debate: Is more always better? No; more NGOs can create 
suboptimal outcomes when gold prices are above $26,666. 
Institutionalism 
7. Debate: Which type of governor is best? Depends on contexts, 
capacities, interests. Certification may increase miners incomes 
by 41-70%, but this will lift only some, not all, miners out of 
poverty. 
Institutionalism;  
Private Regulation 
   Table 7.3 The Project’s Contributions to the Global Governance Literatures 
 
2.1 Institutionalism 
 
This project showed the usefulness of a coordinated application of the new 
institutionalisms. Neither rational choice, historical, nor sociological institutionalism 
were sufficient to explain the sector entry decisions of FLO and RA. Yet the discursive 
institutional approach, which combines the best aspects of all three while directing 
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analytical focus to the causal force of ideas, enabled a compelling story of sector entry 
decisions to be revealed. From a rational choice standpoint that focuses on organizations’ 
material resources and the political opportunity structures they face, neither organization 
should have entered gold, and if one did, it ought to have been RA, since their budget is 
twice the size of FLO’s, making the fixed cost of sector entry relatively lower for them. 
From a historical institutional standpoint that focuses on organizational rules, the 
engrained incentives inside both organizations mostly pushed against gold entry, since 
the actors with the most voting power would have preferred to entry sectors that 
benefitted them more directly. From a the sociological institutional perspective that 
focuses on static definitions of cultural values and practices, both organizations had 
nearly identical written missions, and so should have made similar decisions regarding 
gold. While all of these institutional lenses informed the analysis (material resources, 
voting rules, and values all shaped decisions), the clearest story of sector entry emerged 
when a discursive institutional (DI) lens was applied. DI encouraged analysis of the role 
of agents and their communicative structures, thereby revealing how the idea to certify 
gold entered the organizations. It further focused on the ideas that passed between agents 
and what gave those ideas power. Harriet Lamb was persuaded to govern gold due the 
way that Greg Valerio presented the idea. It is likely that she cared about both resources 
(e.g. start-up costs) and ideas (e.g. the moral obligation to help the miners and how much 
she could trust Greg Valerio). Valerio was able to pitch the idea to Lamb in a way that 
matched what she cared about, and in this way he imbued the idea with strong causal 
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force.  In the case of RA, the idea was not presented (or received) as powerfully, so it did 
not gain traction in the organization.  
This analysis provides an empirical example of the power of tracing the causal 
pathways of ideas—research on agents and ideational rules and exchanges can help to 
explain otherwise puzzling empirical outcomes. As a final layer to the other approaches, 
DI enabled a compelling explanation for why FLO’s and RA’s gold sector decisions 
diverged. Future research in all political science realms should consider the approach, as 
it is likely to add helpful dimensions of understanding. 
 
2.2 Transnational Advocacy 
 
The research in this project corroborated the general argument in the advocacy 
literature that the messenger is as important as the message for agenda setting within 
governance organizations (Carpenter et al 2014). However, the project’s findings do not 
corroborate the argument in a strand of this literature that says if the messenger is a 
gatekeeper in a network, then its preferences dictate the agenda of all of its followers 
(Carpenter et al 2014; Carpenter 2014). This project used nearly the same methods as 
Carpenter (2014) to identify the gatekeepers in the ethical trade network, but it did not 
find a match between their agendas and the agendas of the project’s case organizations 
(as there should have been), nor were gatekeepers cited as important causal forces in 
interviews (as they were in Carpenter’s research). In other words, whereas as the 
gatekeeper effect clearly shaped the agendas of global governance organizations in the 
human security network, it did not shape the agendas of certification organizations in the 
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ethical trade network. This finding therefore places scope conditions on the gatekeeper 
effect and raises interesting questions that warrant attention in future research.    
Fransen et al (2016) provides some insight on why the applicability of Carpenter’s 
findings across issue networks might be curtailed. Their research shows that the ethical 
trade network is much less dense than other issue networks, and therefore the diffusion of 
ideas may be more difficult, slowing the process of contagion and norm cascades that 
Carpenter’s work depends on. Another explanation for the project’s empirical findings 
might be that the case organizations themselves are the gatekeepers. They did rank highly 
in both the ethical trade and their own ego networks, so they may be close enough to the 
top of the lists to be considered the agenda-setters themselves.  
Carpenter (2014) dealt with gatekeeper decision-making in her book as well, 
citing their decisions as somewhat dependent on other network leader’s decisions and 
highly dependent on the skillful intervention of norm entrepreneurs. As in the case above, 
the project’s interviews largely do not corroborate her findings on network effects. They 
do however, echo her findings on the importance of norm entrepreneurs as well as one of 
her more tangential findings on the importance of an issue’s linkability to other issues 
being governed by an organization (i.e. the importance of the details of an organization’s 
culture). This project further found that sector linkability (one of seven sector attributes) 
was also central to FLO’s agenda decisions. Carpenter did not assess the role that 
attributes of economic sectors linked to her issues played in organizational agenda 
setting. In addition to placing scope conditions on the gatekeeper hypothesis, an 
additional contribution of this project is the identification of seven key sector attributes 
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that are important to the agenda decisions of certification organizations, minimally, and 
potentially to other advocacy organizations as well.16 Of these, linkability to existing 
products was an important attribute that gold lacked, making sector entry dependent on 
the persuasive power of norm entrepreneurs to convince FLO to enter the sector. These 
and factors internal to the organization (e.g. the sector’s mission fit, commercial viability, 
and ability to bring benefits to existing stakeholders) were the leading factors shaping 
decisions.  
In light of this project’s contributions, two promising avenues for future empirical 
and theoretical research would be 1) formally assimilating the network findings of this 
project with those of Fransen et al’s and Carpenter’s to ask about the conditions under 
which gatekeeper effects hold, and 2) whether sector attributes are important to other 
types of global governance organizations beyond certification organizations.  
 
2.3 Private Regulation 
One of the fastest growing types of private regulators are certification organizations 
(Auld 2014), and this project makes two key contributions to the burgeoning literature on 
their dynamics. While Auld’s (2014) sweeping account of the evolution of certification 
organizations in the coffee, timber and fisheries sectors made many insightful 
contributions to the field, it left open one key question: why do certification organizations 
                                                
16 As was explained in Chapter 4, FLO views sectors more favorably if the product:  1) has production 
levels that are of a predictable (rather than “potluck”) nature; 2) is a basic necessity (rather than luxury) 
good; 3) is a “fast-moving consumer good (FMCG)” (rather than a slower moving good that stays on store 
shelves longer); 4) has a simple (rather than complex) supply chain; 5) is one that FLO is familiar with (as 
opposed to one that will require research and hiring of new staff); 6) is linkable to existing products such 
that existing producers, retailers, and advertisers will benefit, and 7) has proof of concept, i.e. a functioning 
ethical supply chain that exists in reality (rather than in theory). ⁠ 
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select some sectors as opposed to others to govern? This project made progress toward 
filling this gap by contributing the case studies of FLO’s and RA’s decision-making 
processes, which were shaped mainly by norm entrepreneurs and organizational culture. 
These case studies, however, should be considered the first project in a larger research 
agenda on the subject of certification organization sector entry decisions and their effects. 
Future research should examine how generalizable the findings on norm entrepreneurs, 
organizational culture, and network gatekeeper effects are beyond FLO and RA: Do they 
hold for other multi-sector organizations? Do they hold for single-sector organizations 
that nevertheless need to make smaller decisions on sub-sectors to govern (i.e. species of 
fish or trees?) Do they hold in reference to issues besides artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining (ASGM)? 
The project’s prolonged focus on ASGM and its three recommendations for 
governance improvement are further contributions to this literature. Minimally 15 million 
people across 25 countries depend on the sector to meet their own and their family’s 
basic needs. At the same time, the sector causes an array of harm to human development 
locally and globally through its association with mercury pollution, child labor, conflict, 
poverty traps and other issues. Relative to large-scale gold mining, diamond mining, and 
other developing country livelihoods such as coffee production and forestry, ASGM 
receives little attention, so this project contributes to balancing the academic focus. 
Future research needs to maintain this balance by monitoring the activities of civil 
society, private sector, and public sector engagement of ASGM. This project provided a 
unique and original analysis of the sector by revealing the details of its value chain 
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including the proportion of a typical wedding ring’s price that goes to each actor in the 
chain. It further provided an estimate of how certification with ARM or FLO might 
improve upon this status quo: Chapter 6 estimated that miner incomes might rise 41-70%, 
a one category shift that may move some, though not all, miners out of poverty. Future 
research should move beyond estimates to assess the empirical realities of certification 
organization governance of the sector as it unfolds over time. At the level of the mining 
community, measurements should be taken of uptake numbers, income increases, 
premium spending, pollution reduction, educational improvements, etc. Research should 
also assess the response of private and public sector actors and consumers. Are existing 
and emerging governors acting cooperatively or competitively? Is the norm of purchasing 
certified gold cascading? Are there opportunities for improvements that should be acted 
upon? 
As a result of the analysis of likely uptake patterns in the sector and their potential 
human development impacts, another contribution is the project’s identification of three 
opportunities for improved governance that certification organizations should consider. 
First, they should stop the phenomenon of reverse uptake by inducing multi-dimensional 
buy-in. Miners must want to join with and stay with the program for a variety of reasons 
beyond short-term financial gain. If, however, the financial rewards of programs are just 
too low, retailers should be challenged to renovate their business models such that a 
larger proportion of the proceeds from jewelry sales go to the miners and a small 
proportion to the retailers. The actual jewelry price, if at all possible, should remain the 
same to encourage sales and foster the norm of buying certified jewelry. Second, ARM 
  
246 
and FLO should end their existence as separate entities and instead join forces as one 
strong, united front. This will make life simpler and more profitable for all actors in the 
value chain including political consumers. Not only will this help sales and thus the norm 
to cascade, but, if structured properly, it will mitigate the missing miners effect that 
competition creates at gold prices above $26,666 and thereby achieve more optimal 
levels of mercury reduction. Third and finally, the resulting ARM-FLO organization 
should aim to be irrelevant by incorporating training for alternative livelihoods into its 
standard. Because the minerals will eventually run out and mining hazards will remain 
under even the best of conditions, ASGM should be considered a transitory, not 
permanent, developing country livelihood.   
 
Section 3. Insights for Global Governance Debates 
This project was created in the context of three trends in global governance patterns: 1) 
an increasing number of governance actors, 2) an increasing proportion of governance 
actors sourcing their authority from private and civil society realms, and 3) an increasing 
proportion of private and civil society actors choosing to govern by writing rules for the 
sectors they target (Young 2002, 2010; Avant, Finnemore, Sell 2010; Green 2014; Auld 
2014). By studying certification organizations, the project was able to study each of these 
trends at once. The findings emerging from the project contribute insights to two of the 
global governance debates that emerge from these trends: 1) What type of governance is 
best? and 2) Is more governance always better?  
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3.1 Debate: Which type of governance is best?  
When thinking about what type of governance might be best for a sector or issue, debates 
tend to focus on whether governors source their authority from the public, private or civil 
society realms (Mattli and Woods 2009). While research in this vein has generated useful 
insights, at the present point in time, a more useful approach to answering the question 
might focus on the governance contexts as well as the capacities, intentions, and interests 
of potential governors.  
With regard to context, this project adds to Young (2002) by arguing that the best 
governance type is less about the authority source and more about institutional fit and 
interplay. The characteristics of the industry, its associated issues, and the institutions 
already in place should lead the choice of governance strategy, not whether the strategy’s 
propagator sources its authority from public or private realms. Future research should 
focus on highlighting and aggregating findings on which governance strategies (e.g. 
command-and-control public regulation, cap-and-trade schemes, investments in research 
and development, voluntary codes of conduct, divestment campaigns, ‘name-and-shame’ 
campaigns, simple capacity building projects, etc.) fit which problems and existing 
governance patterns best.  
With regard to fitting new institutions to existing ones (an aspect of context), the 
existing governors’ capacities need to be considered. This project’s research is most 
applicable to governance contexts in which public governors have low capacities (i.e. the 
research is most applicable to problems with source points in developing countries). 
Laws on mining, for example, in such contexts may be weak, poorly written, strong but 
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not enforced, or missing altogether (Sippl 2015; Sippl and Selin 2012). In such cases, the 
best governor is simply the one with the capacity to do better. If that governor is a party 
to or affiliated with the Minamata Convention, for example, and therefore involves some 
members of the mining country’s national government in a capacity building program, 
there is no reason to look down upon that higher capacity governor just because it is a 
public governor. Concern should arise only if these public governors do not have the 
desire, will or ability to deliver on their promises. If civil society or private actor has the 
capacity to create change, they too should be welcomed.  
 
Some may dispute this results-based argument on grounds that such governors 
may not be democratically elected and accountability mechanisms for private and civil 
society actors are fairly weak. Such actors may make changes, but not the ones that are 
best for society as a whole. It is true: an actor like the Gates Foundation or Bono may 
wreak havoc on global efforts to enhance human development by commandeering the 
global agenda and redirecting resources towards issues important to a small group of 
private citizens. But democratic deficits can hurt public governance efforts as well, and 
with some creative thinking these problems can be at least somewhat mitigated. As a 
requirement of their special tax status, for example, such problematic civil society actors 
could be required to have at least one publicly elected advisor on their board. Of course, 
to some extent this defeats the purpose of civil society actors, whose reason for being is 
often working against government policy or the tyranny of the masses. There are no right 
or easy answers in these debates, so a results-based approach helps focus remain where it 
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should be— on whether or not lives are being improved. Perhaps when everyone in the 
world is living on more than $1.25 per day, these debates on proper sources of 
governance authority can be revisited.  
If private or civil society actors fail to produce results, however, who should be 
held accountable and how? This is another common complaint against such governors, 
and again it is not cause for alarm. In addition to the best governors being those with the 
highest capacities, the best governors are also the ones for whom it’s in their interest to 
create change. Firms, for example, may not be the best governors of many problems if 
they haven’t changed their business plans such that earn more profits from better 
behavior (see Chapter 6’s discussion of corporate social responsibility versus corporate 
shared value). In the case of civil society actors who were founded to create change, they 
might be more welcoming of feedback than the critics of private governance think. If 
potential solutions to their failures are offered alongside critiques of them, they will likely 
improve of their own accord, without the threat of outside punishments (which could, for 
example, be delivered through the loss of their tax privileges).  
While the project doesn’t go as far as Mathews (1997) by saying the era of 
governance by sovereign state is over and their demise should be celebrated, it does agree 
with the view of a dispersion of power to many actors and sees this dispersion as 
potentially positive. If the last millennia of human history is any indication, it is in 
power’s nature to wax and wane and shift from some actors to others. The sovereign state 
system came after many different governance systems had reigned, and many new 
systems will likely following it. It is the global community’s job to keep seeking the best 
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outcomes for its least enfranchised members. Whichever type of actor is doing that 
should be applauded.  
3.2 Debate: Is more governance always better? 
So if all effective, high capacity, well-meaning governors are good, as the last section 
argued, is more of them always better? Ch. 2 introduced this debate, noting clear 
optimists and pessimists with regard to whether a simple rise in the number of institutions 
governing a sector is a good thing. Conca and Dabelko (2002) argued that ‘more is better’ 
since the costs of causing harm rise by the number of institutions the harm disrupts. 
Hoffmann is similarly in favor of governance proliferation, seeing it as experimentation 
that will yield useful insights (Hoffmann 2011). But others urge caution, arguing that 
institutional quality may be more important than quantity. Young (2002), notes that not 
all methods of governance (e.g. voluntary codes of conduct) are a good “fit” for every 
sector, and that the “interplay” between institutions may create an array of problems. 
Alter and Meunier (2009) note that too many institutions can reduce “the clarity of legal 
obligation by introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictions governing an 
issue,” and Selin (2010) notes that problems with the governance of one sector can 
sometimes be carried over to another through actors and institutional linkages.  
This project sides with the pessimists but for a new reason—adding additional 
institutions to the governance pattern of a sector can accidentally create perverse 
behavioral incentives. In the case of gold governance and price scenarios above $26,666, 
more mercury reduction might occur if ARM stayed out of the sector and let FLO govern 
as a monopoly. This is a surprising finding given that both organizations were founded by 
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civil society actors with the pure intention of improving human development in the sector 
(as opposed to, for example, the industry backed certification programs that emerged in 
the forestry sector; the perverse incentives their sector entry created was expected (Auld 
2014, Humphreys 2006, Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013). The finding does, however, align 
with Cooley and Ron (2002), who found that increasing numbers of NGOs in a context of 
a fixed number of contracts was creating incentives for them adjust their governance 
strategies in ways that created suboptimal human development outcomes (i.e., NGOs in 
their study said they could do a project quicker and for less money than their competitors 
in order to win the contract, but this speed and lack of funds resulted in poor results). The 
findings on the likely impact of competition between ARM and FLO echo the idea that 
under certain circumstances, there can be too much of a good thing. Fewer rules in some 
scenarios means more clarity as well as better incentives for environmental protection. 
However, ARM’s significant ability to contribute to ASGM governance shouldn’t 
be ignored. Their rules are preferable to FLO’s for other reasons. They pay miners more 
for minimal changes in behavior, and a larger number of small changes may add up to 
better outcomes in the end. Further, they’re a very innovative organization replete with 
expertise, and providing consumers and miners with as many choices as possible is a 
value in line with the human development paradigm.  
So the best route forward may be to encourage not “less” governance per say, but 
more governance concentration. ARM should not just pack up their bags and move on to 
govern another sector. Instead, they should minimally cooperate and coordinate their 
rules with FLO, and better yet, combine to become one entity. This result would be an 
  
252 
increase in mass of governance (the mass of two organizations rather than one) but a 
decrease in the number of governors and rules facing producers and consumers. Cashore 
(2008) reached a similar conclusion after his in-depth research on forest certification. 
More mass means more power which is a good thing, but this power needs to be 
concentrated and directed strategically in order for governance to be most effective. So 
more governors should by all means join the party, but they should do so in a coordinated 
way that concentrates their collective power.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Research Design Justification 
Bennett (2013) argues that “no single grand theory can capture the complexities of 
political life” and that explanatory weight is actually carried by the more “fine-grained” 
theories about causal mechanisms housed within them. Causal mechanisms are the 
“ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which 
agents with causal capacities operate in specific contexts to transfer energy, information, 
or matter to other entities in ways that change these entities’ characteristics, capacities, or 
propensities” (George and Bennett 2005). 
According to Bennett, for a theory about a causal mechanism to be strong, 
researchers must observe the hypothesized process linking a specific cause (independent 
variable) to a specific outcome  (dependent variable) in actual empirical cases. “Theories 
about mechanisms are suspect if it can be shown that individual actors did not make the 
calculations, evince the preferences, respond to the stimuli, or engage in the behaviors 
posited by structural theories” (Bennett 2013). Mahoney agrees, noting that such within-
case analysis is an essential “mode of causal inference” akin to the work of criminal 
detectives. “Like a detective solving a crime… researchers use detailed fact collection 
and knowledge of general causal principles to explain outcomes” (Goertz and Mahoney 
2013). Not all pieces of evidence count equally. Some forms of evidence are like 
“smoking guns” that strongly suggest a theory is correct; other kinds of evidence are “air-
tight alibis” that strongly suggest a theory is not correct (Goertz and Mahoney 2013). 
King et al (1994) use the example of research attempting to solve the mystery of the 
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extinction of dinosaurs. If the meteorite theory is correct, iridium must be present in a 
particular layer of the earth’s crust, since all meteorites leave behind traces of iridium. If 
no iridium is detected, no meteorite crashed at that time, and the theory of extinction via 
meteorite is falsified. If iridium is detected, this is one vote in favor of the theory, but it is 
not a ‘smoking gun’— more causal process observations need to be collected to build a 
strong argument in support of the theory’s validity.  
To gain additional causal process observations, researchers can either test 
additional hypotheses within the same case, or they test a single hypothesis in an 
additional case (i.e. cross-case or comparative analysis). Cross-case analysis is rooted in 
the basic logic of Mill’s methods of agreement and difference and Przeworski and 
Teune’s (1970) most similar and most different case studies (Seawright and Gerring 
2008). If the empirical evidence found in the cases deviates from a hypothesized pattern 
of necessary or sufficient causation, explanatory factors can be eliminated and theory 
should be revised accordingly. In this way, comparative case studies are useful for 
“theory building” because they can be used to “test the validity and scope conditions of 
single or competing theories” (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). 
To help build international relations theories on governance patterns (i.e. theories 
of institutions and organizational agenda-setting), my dissertation tests whether the causal 
mechanisms associated with norm entrepreneurs, organizational cultures, and network 
effects function in the empirical world in the way that theory predicts. While much could 
be learned from tracing the process by which these factors shaped decisions in a single-
case, more could be learned from studying them in two cases, assuming those cases are 
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strategically selected (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). I therefore construct two comparative 
analyses (one for each research question and chapter) by strategically selecting one sector 
case (ASGM) and three organization cases (Fairtrade International (FLO), Alliance for 
Responsible Mining (ARM), and Rainforest Alliance (RA)).xxxiii  
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Appendix 2: Citing of Interview Respondents17 
Respondent 
Number 
Organization  Interview Date 
1 FLO, Strategy Team December 8, 2014 
2 FLO, Strategy Team December 8, 2014 
3 FLO, Gold Team December 10, 2014 
4 FLO, Gold Team December 11, 2014 
5 RA, Product Manager December 12, 2014 
6 FTUSA,18 New Products Team January 14, 2015 
7 RA, Leadership Team January 14, 2015 
8 ARM, Strategy Team January 22, 2015 
9 SAN,19 Leadership Team January 26, 2015 
10 ARM, Operations Team January 27, 2015 
11 RA, Leadership Team January 27, 2015 
12 RA, Leadership Team January 28, 2015 
13 ARM, Operations Team January 28, 2015 
14 RA, Leadership Team March 3, 2015 
15 Jewelry Store Owner, Activist August 24, 2015 
16 Jewelry Store Owner and 
Designer 
August 26, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17  Coded for confidentiality per agreement with ethics review board and respondents. Transcribed 
interviews are available to dissertation committee upon request; identifying information is available to first 
reader only.  
18 Fair Trade USA (FTUSA) was part of FLO during the period of interest in this project, but became an 
independent competitor organization in 2011.  
19 Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) is RA’s standard writing unit. During the period of interest for 
this project, SAN was a formal part of RA, although in 2015 it became a separate entity.  
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Appendix 3: Gold Supply Chain Calculations Overview 
 
Spreadsheets used for supply chain, poverty, and pollution calculations are readily 
available upon request. The below is a rough sketch of notes used for the calculations of 
numbers in Table 3.5.  
 
Estimates for Typical Gold Wedding Band: 
- 4 grams is the weight of a size 6 comfort-fit 3mm wide ring from Respondent 4, 
15, and 16, Judith Lockwood of Arctic Circle, and Amazon  
- Average retail price from looking up that ring at Zales, Respondent 15’s store, 
Rebekkah Brooks, Amazon, and Cartier.  
 
“Mark-up” or “Service Fee” and Proceeds from Sale: Actor’s Perceived Value Added to 
the Base Value of Gold in the Ring 
Value Added Definition: percent (%) of the ring’s gold value the actor charges for their 
services. This is how much value the actor thinks they add to the value of the “raw” 18k 
gold in the ring. It is how much they “mark” the value of the ring “up” after they’ve 
performed the “service” of a transformation (either of location, physical state, or 
aesthetics).  The service fee is shown as a % of the ring’s gold value in first “Value 
Added” column and as a $ amount in the second column. The “proceeds” from the sale, 
i.e. how revenue an actor acquires from the post-service sale is “gross”, i.e. before 
expenses, as opposed to “net,” which is after expenses. Because expenses vary both with-
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in and across supply chain actor categories, gross proceeds is calculated so that their fees 
can be compared. For Actors 1-6, I had data on the % Value-Added.  
 
Why Value-Added is Important: Because it’s arbitrary and thus malleable and speaks 
directly to the ethics of supply chains. Looking at our example, the retailer believes they 
deserve 210% of the value of gold for their efforts, while the miner’s work is valued at 
70% the value of gold. Do consumers agree with these representations of the value-added 
to the gold? Value added determines how much money “should” go into each actor’s 
pocket, including the miner’s, and is therefore important both philosophically and 
practically.  
- Miner: Both AGC and FLO agree that the average artisanal miner receives a 
payment of 70% of the LBMA price for their gold. Translated to $ Value Added 
(or $ proceeds from sale), that’s .7*$106=$74. 
- On-site Buyer: Supply chains differ on whether the on-site buyer is also the 
exporter or not. Most of the literature cites them as separate actors. Respondent 4 
gave me data on the export costs of his first-buyer, saying he buys his gold from 
the Sotrami cooperative and ships from Lima to UK. However Lima is 9 hours by 
car from Sotrami’s location in the Atacama desert. So it stands to reason that 
someone transports the gold from the mine in Atacama to Lima (they do not Fed-
Ex it, because Fed-Ex is not doing domestic services in Peru yet). I have no data 
on how much this gold transporter charges, or who they are. It is likely someone 
from the cooperative or mining group (perhaps the site boss) but it could be 
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anyone, including a local trader who makes their living from such transactions. I 
do, however, have data on other supply chain actors, so I backed out this 2.3% 
figure from what I argue is an average price for the ring and these other data 
points.  
- Exporter through Refiner & Fabricator: This data comes from Respondent 4 
and is buttressed by several online articles that site refineries as having “margins” 
of 1.5-2% of the value of gold. Respondent 4 makes a single payment to one actor 
for the following services, which give him a pure gold product (a “shot”) that he 
can then sell to Manufacturers. 
o Pays 107-115% above base rate of 24k gold = Value of Gold + Export 
Shipping + Refining + Fabrication + Miscellaneous Service Provision (ie 
expertise). If 100% is the Value of 24k gold in the ring, that is $106. Then 
7-15% = Export Shipping + Refining + Fabrication + Miscellaneous 
Service Provision (ie expertise, transaction costs). Refining has a value-
added of 1-2% of pure gold. I use the 1.5%, the average which I got from 
several sources referring to large-scale and small-scale based supply 
chains. However, for the 7%-15% range, I use the lower end, 7%, to 
recognize that the data comes from smaller-scale supply chains, and the 
lower volume they trade in results in higher mark-ups, so I take the lower 
the markup to leave room for higher-volume actors.  
o Then: 7%-1.5% = 5.5% = Export Shipping + Fabrication + Miscellaneous 
Service Provision (ie expertise)  
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o Given Shipping by Respondent 4: 10 kilos of 70% gold Fed-Ex’d from 
Lima to London = $300. 10kg = 10,000 grams = $300. Dividing by 
10,000: 1 gram = .001 kg = $.03. Shipping cost for 4 gram ring = 
$.03*4=$0.12. In % value of gold, that is: $0.12/$106 = 0.1%. This is very 
close to 0%, so I estimate I still have 5.5% to spread across Fabrication 
and Service Provision. However, my $300 is the slow motion economy 
plan of fed-ex. Should an actor need the materials faster for an order it 
would of course be more expensive.  
o Then: 5.5% = Fabrication + Service. I estimate that fabrication (involving 
equipment, labor) must fetch more than amorphous services. So, I give 
3.5% to fabricator and 2% to services. With refining at 1.5%, 1.5% + 3.5% 
= 5% which is an easily memorable number for the refinery/fabricator 
actor. I add the services charge to the exporter’s fees, sine this actor 
manages selecting the refiner and doing other various things. That actor’s 
value added = shipping + services = 0.1% + 2% = 2.1% 
o Final Equation: 107% = Cost of Gold (100%) + Export Shipping (0.1%) + 
Refining (1.5%) + Fabrication (3.5%) + Miscellaneous Services (2%). 
o To get $ proceeds for the above % for a 4 gram 18k ring, I took % of 
$106: Cost of Gold ($106) + Export Shipping ($0.12) + Refining ($1.5) + 
Fabrication ($8.5) + Misc. Service ($2) 
- Manufacturer: This data comes from Respondent 15, a small-scale, independent 
jeweler and retailer in Toronto. She gave me data based on 14k gold. 1 gram of 
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14k gold = .58*$35.36 = $20.50. Respondent 15 paid her manufacturer $26.40 for 
1 gram of 14k gold. Manufacturer’s $ value added = $26.40-$20.50 = $5.9. This 
amount represents a value-added % on the value of gold = $5.9/$20.50 = 29%. 
Because Tamara is a lower volume dealer, however, I arbitrarily lower this 
amount to 25% to represent a more typical business and make nice numbers 
(since they fluctuate anyway).  This 30% figure is corroborated by Respondent 
16, who is a small jeweler in the US who buys wire from a “mill” at about 30% 
cost of gold. 
- For actors 7 (Wholesaler) and 8 (Retailer), I had data on the $ Value Added. 
Respondent 4 says that when he as a retailer buys from a wholesaler, he pays the 
wholesaler a “turnkey”, i.e. twice their cost of goods. Cost of Goods incorporates 
all of the costs of the ring up until this link in the chain, i.e. the amount paid for 
the gold + all service fees. From the above calculations, we know the cost of 
goods for the ring for the wholesaler was $111. So the price they charge the 
retailer = 2*$111 = $222. That’s $111 in proceeds, which = $111/$106 = 105% 
value-added to the raw gold. When he sells to UK consumers, he charges 2.5 to 3 
times the cost of goods. For US consumers, he says, the market’s a little harder, 
so he only charges another turnkey, or 2 times his cost of goods. Using the US 
case, retail price = 2*$222 = $445 (rounding), = $445/$106 = 210%.  
o This amount of markup from wholesale to retail was also in line with 
Marric Buessing’s estimates from running her family’s small jewelry 
business— they would buy finished pieces of jewelry, and charge 2-3 
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times cost of goods or higher. Respondent 16 also corroborates, noting a 
2.5 to 3 cost of goods wholesale price and 6 times cost of goods to retail 
(which I think he means 3 times to wholesale plus 3 times to resale). He 
notes markups vary widely depending on the market.  
 
“Cost of Goods”  Definition: Cost of goods is the price the next supply chain actor must 
pay for the product they want. Here, it incorporates the payment for the gold plus 
payment for the services the seller has performed to the gold (i.e. the value they’ve 
added) (e.g. shipping, refining, manufacturing, finishing). The consumer’s cost of goods 
is the retail price of the ring. The consumer thus pays for the value of the gold in the ring 
plus all of the value each supply chain actor has added.  
- Calculation: For the miner, the Cost of Goods (i.e. Selling Price) is known from 
the data: .7*106 = $74. All subsequent calculations for actor’s cost of 
goods/selling price are: Actors CoG/SP = Previous Actor’s COG + Current 
Actor’s Value-Added Proceeds. If the current actor is the Refiner (Actor 5), for 
example, they buy the gold from the previous actor (the Assay Office, Actor 4) 
for $79.4 = Value Added Proceeds from Actor 1 through 4 = $74.4+$2+$2+$1. 
The refiner’s value-added proceeds is $5.3, so they’re selling price to the next 
actor, the Manufacturer (Actor 6) is $79.4+$5.3 = $84.7 = $85. 
- Importance: This figure is derived from others, but is important for calculations as 
it shows how the end price is achieved and how it balloons at the end when the 
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last two actors (wholesaler and retailers) start determining value-added as “double 
the cost of goods.” 
 
“Share of Gross Proceeds” i.e. “Share of Final Ring’s Selling Price” Gross Proceeds 
is the sum of the amount of money generated by extraction and transformation of the 
gold. In other words, it is the amount of money flowing through the supply chain, i.e. the 
lump of cash a customer gives the retailer to pay for the ring. It is divided up among 
supply chain actors according to how much these actors believe they deserve (i.e 
according to their value-added). These numbers show how much of the consumer’s 
money goes to which actors. For the $445 ring, the miner gets $74 (17%) of that $445, 
and the retailer gets $222 (50%) of that $445. 
 Importance: It must be noted that the consumer never sees the breakdown of value 
added— they only the see the retail price. Therefore, an important contribution of this 
project is beginning to correct this information asymmetry, which is a type of market 
failure and common justification for governance interventions. If the customer does not 
want 50% of their money going to the retailer when the miner only gets 17%, this 
provides impetus for consumer mobilization and supply chain change.  
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_____________________________________ 
i While multilateral treaties are obviously voluntary, once they have been ratified by states and have 
become parts of states’ laws, they are legally binding. 
ii This is due to the new norms of accountability in the non-profit sector. For example, ISEAL, which 
serves as an umbrella governance organization setting best practices for its certification organization 
members, now requires all of its members to submit “Theory of Change” documents detailing how they 
will continually evolve their strategies (e.g. broadening to enter new sectors as opposed to deepening to 
engage more actors or issues within a sector or category) in order to achieve their goals (e.g. biodiversity 
protection, higher wages, peace). Since a large number of existing certification organizations have evolved 
over the last decade via sequential broadening into new sectors (e.g. Fairtrade International, Rainforest 
Alliance, Utz Kapeh, IFOAM, Fair Trade USA, Fair for Life, Global G.A.P, Equal Exchange, etc.), this 
trend of evolution via new sector entry will likely continue and is worthy of increased theoretical attention. 
ii  This is due to the new norms of accountability in the non-profit sector. For example, ISEAL, which 
serves as an umbrella governance organization setting best practices for its certification organization 
members, now requires all of its members to submit “Theory of Change” documents detailing how they 
will continually evolve their strategies (e.g. broadening to enter new sectors as opposed to deepening to 
engage more actors or issues within a sector or category) in order to achieve their goals (e.g. biodiversity 
protection, higher wages, peace). Since a large number of existing certification organizations have evolved 
over the last decade via sequential broadening into new sectors (e.g. Fairtrade International, Rainforest 
Alliance, Utz Kapeh, IFOAM, Fair Trade USA, Fair for Life, Global G.A.P, Equal Exchange, etc.), this 
trend of evolution via new sector entry will likely continue and is worthy of increased theoretical attention. 
iii  Selection of RA and FLO as cases follows Mahoney and Goertz’s “possibility principle” methodology 
for choosing a negative case. FLO is positive case, RA is negative but most likely case, and is discussed in 
the next chapter. 
iv  [Auld wants me to soften this to make HI “indeterminate”: some early choices by FLO push one way, 
while other early choices by FLO push the other way. These other choices are basically about voting 
power. To confirm, I need to check the exact date of Greg’s official Harriet meeting and the exact date of 
the change in governance structures which gave more voting power to producer organizations. It might be 
that this data strengthens the “no gold” argument, or it’s possible that pro-gold factions had more power 
than they do now, which would make it indeterminate. Small tweak—logic and justification for DI still 
strong.] 
v  a new regulation is layered on top of existing ones, changing the organization’s form 
vi 
 (see Carpenter 2014 and Bloomfield 2014 for two useful studies of advocacy failures) 
vii  p. 169 
viii  p. 34 
ix  Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hubert 2007; Huliaras and Tzifakis 2010; Haas 1002; Parson 
2003; Stone 2001 
x  p.16 and 25-40 
xi  p. 460. Of these, research found the entrepreneur’s personal network (i.e. ties to peers, colleagues, and 
claimant populations) to be especially important as it lent “credibility” to the entrepreneur’s ideas. They 
care about “what sort of crowd” they are joining if they partner with the entrepreneur or simply join their 
campaign. P. 466. 
xii  In conversation, Auld usefully linked my findings on “start-up costs” to his ideas on “barriers to entry,” 
note sure how to cite, but surely others have argued similarly. Auld mentions that this is in line with 
North’s thinking although North doesn’t talk about entrepreneurs providing services 
xiii  Calibration includes substantive matching and balancing emotional and scientific content 
xiv  Auld agrees with this assessment. 
xv  Again, argued in this project to be akin to “sector entry decisions.” 
xvi  My research strongly corroborated mission fit and linkage concern, as explained later. 
xvii  (recall that form is defined as the organization’s array of target issues, actors, the inclusivity of their 
governance structures and the scale of change they seek to create) 
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xviii  theories of vertical and horizontal integration are different and under-represented in the certification 
organization literature with the exception of Cashore, Auld, Newsom 2004. They are to my knowedge 
absent from the advocacy literature. 
xix Related to but not the same as existing array linkages (?) 
xx Auld 2014 deals with barriers to entry, but these are within the sector (e.g. domestic levels of product 
demand) rather within the organization (e.g. employee expertise on the candidate sector). 
xxi Vertical and horizontal fragmentation or cohesion 
xxii Carpenter subsumes analysis of an issue’s fit with other issues an organization governs and with the 
organization’s mission as well as discussion of the norm entrepreneur’s network in her “intranetwork 
relations” concept. But think this stretches the concept too far and is distracting. Instead, this project 
focuses on her “gatekeeper” hypothesis, and the subsumes the “issue fit” considerations into the 
organizational culture factor and the norm entrepreneur considerations into the norm entrepreneur factor. 
xxiii Defined as the most “respected” network member, where respect is measured by the number of 
mentions the actor gets in interviews or surveys and the number of hyperlinks they receive from other 
actors. 
xxiv It is a broader conception than “fair trade” which is generally focused on small-scale actors trading 
outside of traditional channels. 
xxv See the Appendix for in-depth display and discussion of calculations used in this gold industry overview 
xxvi 12% was the Artisanal Gold Council estimate in 2011; up to 30% is the quoted number in the Minamata 
Convention as of 2015. 
xxvii  Negotiated daily in the international markets run by the London Bullion Market Association. 
xxviii  Many interview respondents were small-to-medium sized jewelry business owners. The model for 
larger scale retailers is slightly different, but not much. The value-addeds are the same, but the volumes 
they’re able to buy and sell are different. However, in focusing on the potential impact of certification of 
ASGM, it makes most sense to focus on these smaller, more boutique jewelry stores, as these are the ones 
most likely to sell certified ASGM gold (mass retailers like Target and Walmart may or may not 
participate… more on that in Chapter 6.)  
xxixAlthough this figure seems high compared to some accounts, and it is an average, meaning some will get 
much more and less, Fairtrade has an incentive to publish as low a percentage as possible to make the 
“development case” for their activities. 
xxx Ore is the larger mass of rock which contains both gold and gangue. Gangue is the bit of non-gold rock 
that generally clings to the gold until the very final step in the refining process. 
xxxi Note that this is the same income per days as calculated previously albeit via a different route, and so 
serves as nice corroboration of the numbers.  
xxxii Exceptions are Tiffany’s supply chain and the new certification organization supply chains.  
xxxiii A research design based on regression analysis or other statistical techniques would be less appropriate 
for this project for two reasons. First, such quantitative designs focus on correlations between independent 
and dependent variables, rather than on the causal mechanisms linking them (Mahoney and Goertz 2012). 
By contrast, qualitative case studies employing process tracing provide data on why the correlations occur, 
and thus are best for use in explaining the causal processes present in critical cases and outcomes of 
interest. Second, the number of cases in my population of interest (transnational certification organizations) 
is too small (less than 30) to generate findings of statistical significance. If I were to widen the research 
question or population of interest, a mixed-methods project using regression as a diagnostic tool or to test 
the scope conditions of the current project’s findings in a larger population would be interesting. But due to 
time constraints, I will be save this for a future project. 
